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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the last decade, the Central Jail of Nicosia (CJN) - the only correctional institution in 
the Republic of Cyprus – saw a significant rise in its prison population. Today, the CJN is 
facing a number of challenges to its legitimacy which are evident in recent episodes of prison 
unrest, and the rise in self-harm, suicides and rapes. This research aims to provide a critical 
exploration of the reasons behind the increase in the prison population, and the challenges 
this brings.  
The review of current evidence, while limited, suggests a number of possibilities which might 
account for the rise including political patronage, racism and corruption. In order to consider 
issues that concern the rise and challenges of the prison population, this study focuses on the 
connection between imprisonment and micro elements of the Cypriot society/culture such as 
crime rates and trends, levels of social expenditure, public opinion and punitiveness, and 
institutional trust and legitimacy. Exploration of the increase in the prison population was 
carried out within a critical realist framework. 
 Data was collected using twenty seven semi-structured interviews with Criminal Justice 
System ‘elites’, (including politicians, judges, public prosecutors, prison staff, prison 
administrators, senior counsels of the Republic of Cyprus, officers from the Ombudsman 
Office, and the Ombudsman herself). Thematic analysis of this qualitative data aimed to 
uncover the deep and often unobservable structures and mechanisms that influence the prison 
population in Cyprus. 
The findings of this study suggest that the reasons behind the increase in the prison 
population and its challenges display significant correlation with political patronage, racism, 
and corruption, and explain the unprecedented levels of immigrants within the Central Jail of 
Nicosia. The study also revealed that foreign immigrants are at greater risk of rape and 
suicide, and the impacts of corruption by those in authority. Finally the study, suggests that 
the rise and the challenges of the rise in the prison population have significant social, 
economic and political axioms. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The rise in prison populations is one of the central problems facing contemporary penal 
policies. At a time when serious crime activity in Cyprus has been falling, the prison 
population saw a steep and progressive growth. The prison is dangerously overcrowded, and 
the budget has suffered dramatic cuts due to the on-going financial crisis. Despite the 
significance of this matter, there has been remarkably scant debate about the reasons and 
structures behind the prison surge, and possible ways to deal with it (see further Hough et al., 
2003). Over the last two decades, governments throughout the world have adopted a wide 
range of policies in order to deal with the rising prison populations. For example, the 
American criminal justice system has heavily financed the construction of prisons with the 
exemption of the states of New York and Texas who saw a significant drop in prison 
admissions and a downsizing trend. Similarly, in the United Kingdom (UK), prison 
expansionism has seen investment at an unprecedented scale, though, not at the rate of the 
United States (Hough et al., 2003). 
International criminological research provides a variety of theories and approaches offering 
explanations for the growth in penal severity and the use of imprisonment (Lappi‐Seppälä, 
2007). Most of the in-depth studies are confined to a small selection of western countries. 
Comparisons covering a larger number of countries are often impaired by the availability of 
data. Moreover, none of the analyses have been able to produce a single and simple 
explanation of why imprisonment is rapidly growing throughout the world.  However, several 
studies (Lappi‐Seppälä, 2007, 2011, Tonry, 1999, Caplow and Simon, 1999, King, 1994, 
1999) provide some interesting associations between imprisonment and social, political and 
economic axioms.  
Research on the contributing factors towards imprisonment in Cyprus is scarce. The need for 
fundamental research through empirical elaboration, has compelled me to undertake this 
research, which sets to answer why the prison population is increasing in Cyprus, and to 
critically examine the challenges that the rise brings to the correctional institution. Nowadays, 
one of the most significant discussions is that of financial emergency, with Cyprus and 
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Greece at the centre of attention in the global economy (see further Xenakis and Cheliotis, 
2013).  
This study draws on international literature, and aims to provide a critical exploration of the 
causes behind the increase in the Cypriot penal establishment. Yet, this is another reason for 
choosing to collect evidence in Cyprus, since I am a native speaker, a fact that helps in 
maintaining the richness of the data, which is unlikely to happen by a non- native speaker. 
Moreover, the application of the methodological framework offered by Critical Realism to 
this specific context i.e. the cause and consequence of the rise in the population of the Central 
Jail of Nicosia, is ground breaking. As a researcher, I began my study particularly attracted 
by the production of observable effects such as the rise in the prison population in terms of 
underlying conditions (Frawley, 2011, in Kramar, 2011). Critical realism takes events (e.g. 
crime and imprisonment) as outcomes of deep and in many occasions’ unobservable 
conditions that need identification (Frauley, 2011, in Kramar, 2011). 
The current study is significant, as this is the first empirical attempt that investigates the 
causes behind the rise in the prison population in Cyprus and the problems that the prison 
system is currently facing. After several years studying in the UK, I have developed a 
detailed understanding of the differences that occur in both penal policies and prison systems, 
in the United Kingdom and Cyprus. Initially, ‘the January events’, a significant event in the 
Cypriot penal history and development could be interpreted using a critical account of what 
the problems facing the Cypriot prison system are and what sparked those events. Then, the 
issue of immigration (Aas 2011b, 2013; Boshworth, 2004; 2008, 2011; 2013), penal politics 
(Simon, 2007; Wacquant, 2005, in Pratt et al, 2005), and political economy (Cavadino and 
Dignan, 2007; Simon, 2007) appeared to be vital. The criminalisation processes of 
immigrants has been studied extensively in recent years by criminologists  (Melossi, 2003, 
2008, 2011), and is implicated with other contributing factors. I believe my results are ground 
breaking, as they flow from the originality of the Cypriot culture, and position Cyprus in the 
international criminological debate. As the results of this study suggest, the cause of the rise 
in the prison population is determined by the relative weight attaching to culture and political 
economy and party politics with great emphasis on penal populism and penal punitiveness as 
detrimental themes in politics that have a direct impact on the penal management of poverty 
and inequality (Wacquant, 1999; 2001; 2009). In fact, nowadays penal punitiveness is a 
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central feature of the Cypriot society and especially towards immigrants and refugees, with a 
(continuous) disreputable and ‘unwanted’ media, public and political discourse. 
1.1 Prison population 
The Central Jail of Nicosia (CJN) is the only correctional institution in the Republic of 
Cyprus and is located to the west of the city of Nicosia. The prison facility detains convicted 
and pre-trial detainees, of both sexes and all age groups from sixteen years and over (CPT, 
2014). The prison population reached its highest ever peak in September 2014 when it 
breached 1027 for the first time, although it has an official capacity of 550 prisoners (see 
Figure 1.1).  
Figure 1.1 Evolution of the prison population, 2000- 2014 
 
Source: Prison Population Explained, Eurostat 2014. 
The existence of confinement and the nature of imprisonment are – or should be - of interest 
to social scientists, the governing body of the society, and members of the societies that 
reside outside the prison walls; after all, the vast majority of prisoners will be released back 
into society. Very few prisoners remain incarcerated for life. Therefore, the appropriate 
preparation for discharge is crucial. However, according to the Council of Europe Reports 
(CPT) many European prison establishments are blighted with various contentious issues 
including: overcrowding and bad conditions, understaffing, weak security and control, lack of 
resources, riots, injustice, suicides and rapes and more recently corruption (Cavadino and 
Dignan, 2007; Jewkes and Johnston, 2006 ; Sparks and Bottoms, 1995 ). According to 
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various CPT Reports ( 2000, 2004, 2008, 2013), the Cypriot prison establishment, has 
repeatedly suffered various challenges related to overcrowding, insufficient material 
resources, unhygienic facilities, militaristic regime, violation of fundamental human rights, 
and high levels of injustice amongst prisoners.  
It should be noted that imprisonment is an expensive venture with the detention of each 
prisoner costing the Cypriot taxpayer 118,000 euros every year. Prison budget in 2014 was 
570,000 euros, compared to 750,000 euros in 2012, placing Cyprus amongst the European 
countries with the lowest prison budget despite the growing numbers of prisoners within the 
prison establishment. In 2004, the mission of the prison department was revised in the 
process of harmonisation with the European prison rules and standards with the following 
aims:   
1. The safe detention of prisoners referred to it by the courts. 
2. Ensure detention conditions that guarantee and promote a respect for human 
dignity.  
3. The equal treatment of detainees without any discrimination due to race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, national or social origin, political or other opinion of the  
detainees. 
4. To encourage the self-esteem and develop the sense of responsibility of prisoners 
by providing them with educational opportunities, vocational training, creative 
entertainment, reflection, self-criticism and self-awareness. 
5. The guidance and assistance of prisoners for a new start after their release (CPT, 
2013). 
However, incarceration in Cyprus is deeply problematic and spectacularly fails to meet its 
primary avowed aims. Today, the CJN faces a number of challenges to its legitimacy, evident 
in recent episodes of prison unrest and the rise in self- harm, suicides and rapes. In terms of 
equal treatment, serious cases of racism and discrimination and lack of justice practices have 
been reported in which Cyprus was fined £100,000 for mistreatment and unnecessary use of 
violence in prison (see further CPT, 2000; CPT, 2004; CPT, 2008; CPT, 2013; Ombudsman, 
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2012;Ombudsman, 2013a, Ombudsman, 2013b; Ombudsman, 2014; Ombudsman, 2015a; 
Ombudsman, 2015b).  
Regarding educational opportunities and vocational training, the Central Jail of Nicosia has 
undergone significant expansion, with the conversion of educational and training facilities of 
the prison into dormitories in order to accommodate the high volume of prisoners sent from 
the courts (CPT, 2013). Partly as a consequence of the absence of educational and vocational 
training programmes the Cypriot prison system has recorded high recidivism rates with 
nearly two in five prisoners reconvicted within two years after their release (CPT, 2013).  
In 2015, 62 per cent of the Cypriot prison population were serving a sentence for illegal entry 
into, departure from, or stay in the country; the third highest  figure  in Europe, (Green Paper, 
2012). More than two decades ago, Simon (1998) drew our attention to the increase of 
immigration imprisonment, with ‘border’ the new criminal justice frontier (Bosworth and 
Kaufman, 2011). Those designated as non-Cypriot citizens encompass a wide range of 
people, including, refugees, economic migrants, and long-term residents. The ‘problem’ of 
foreigners extends beyond penal statistics to the wider marginalisation and mistreatment of 
non- citizens in Cyprus. This study suggests that non-citizens are the new enemies in the war 
on crime in Cyprus today. The ongoing emphasis on ‘foreignness’ in penal policy raises 
concerns about due process, conditions of imprisonment and the purpose of the prison 
establishment (see further Bosworth and Kaufman, 2011).  
It should be noted that the social composition, the institutional practices as well as the culture 
(s) of the prison system are historically, politically, socially, and economically set. Prisons 
are not autonomous institutions or isolated from or impervious to changes in society. The 
nature of the prison - who is sent to prison and how they are treated, while there - depends on 
current thinking and attitudes towards ‘order’ and ‘control’. Prisons are a reflection of current 
cultural norms and values, which can evolve. Prisons are not total institutions (Goffman, 
1961) because institutions, as per Goffman’s conceptualisation, have significant cultural 
social, political and economic constituents (see further Karstedt, 2001; 2015). This analytical 
complexity of the society-prison connectedness is of paramount significance for this study. 
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1.2 Pains of imprisonment  
The adjustment to prison life has long been referred to as what Sykes (1958) calls the ‘pains 
of imprisonment’, and includes the deprivation of prisoners from their autonomy, liberty, 
security, relationships, and goods and services. The loss of liberty and autonomy is perhaps 
the most apparent pains of being imprisoned, as prisoners’ movement within the prison 
establishment is usually dependent on the prison regime. During the last decade, the CJN has 
suffered severe and chronic overcrowding conditions, which has significantly affected 
prisoners’ autonomy and liberty. European watchdogs such as the European Committee for 
the Prevention of torture and inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) and the 
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) and national pressure groups 
(mainly the Ombudsman) for example, described the environment in most cells as suffocating 
and, on many occasions life threatening. 
Today, cells originally designed for single occupancy now contain thereto four prisoners, 
leaving the prisoners in degrading conditions due to lack of privacy, autonomy and dignity. 
Prison guards’ ‘shake- down’ activity, for example, comprises of unannounced searches, 
verifying that prisoners have very little privacy, protection and are more vulnerable to suffer 
from humiliation and degradation. In the same vein, Bloustein (1964) argues that: 
“The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among others and whose 
very need, thought desire, fancy or gratification is subject to public scrutiny, has been 
deprived of his individuality and human dignity” (p: 1003). 
This lack of autonomy is associated with psychological distress and the creation of mental 
disorders while the prisoners are in prison (Wright, 1993). Although the extent of deprivation 
of goods and services has been lessened since the 1950’s, when Sykes (2007) conceptualised 
the ‘pains of imprisonment’, this study has uncovered significant evidence that in the case of 
the CJN, there is a serious lack of resources (mainly material) and services (mainly health 
services) due to the unprecedented level of prisoners. Moreover, the on-going economic crisis 
had exacerbated fundamental provisions such as food and water supply. On various 
occasions, the delegation team of the Council of Europe anti- Torture Committee appeared 
concerned with the strained relationship between prison staff and prisoners, the lack of health 
care services and the routine use of imprisonment stating that: 
“Such overcrowding necessarily puts a strain on relations between staff and prisoners 
and among prisoners, on the provision of health-care services, and on material 
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conditions, as well as on the regime of activities offered to prisoners and their 
possibilities for rehabilitation. While the increase in additional accommodation, such 
as the return of Block 10 from the police to the prison, might relieve some of the 
overcrowding, it will not constitute an effective and lasting solution to the problem. In 
this context, the Committee reiterates that a strategy for the sustainable reduction of 
the prison population should be put in place, which ensures that imprisonment is in 
practice the measure of last resort at all stages of the criminal justice system, from 
pre-trial to the execution of sentences” (CPT, 2014, p:30). 
 
Several studies have found that access to educational and rehabilitation programmes have a 
positive impact on prisoners’ welfare and well- being and can prevent prisoners from self-
harm and suicide (Nurse et al., 2003, Huey and McNulty, 2005). However, the persisting 
overcrowding conditions have impacted the offer of educational and recreational programmes 
and turned facilities that were educational into dilapidated dormitories, such as the ‘theatre’. 
Similarly, the CPT (2014) depicts: 
“The CPT calls upon the Cypriot authorities to take vigorous steps to increase the 
range of purposeful activities for inmates: work, vocational training, sports, 
educational and other activities must be available so that all prisoners may be 
purposefully engaged for most of the day. In addition, specific measures should be 
taken to put in place individual sentence plans and psycho-social support programmes 
for prisoners serving long sentences” (p: 32). 
It may appear counterintuitive to think that prisoners can experience security issues whilst 
being incarcerated, given the strict levels of security that characterise contemporary prison 
regimes. However, in the case of the CJN, the lack of security has been laid bare, as three 
prison guards were caught in 2013, trying to smuggle injectable drugs, alcohol and mobile 
phones into the prison. In addition, high rates of prisoners’ victimisation have frequently been 
reported, including violence, theft and sexual assault, leaving us with serious questions 
regarding the level of legitimacy of the Cypriot prison institution. More recently, the Cypriot 
Ombudsman received complaints from prisoners about ill-treatment and threatening 
behaviour with reprisals. In the same vein, the CPT (2014) highlights that: 
“The CPT recommends that the Minister of Justice and the management of Nicosia 
Central Prisons deliver a clear message to custodial staff – and reiterate it at regular 
intervals – that all forms of ill-treatment are unacceptable and will be punished 
accordingly. Further, prison management should ensure that all prisoners may make a 
complaint without fear of reprisals by staff” (p: 28). 
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Furthermore, over the last decade, the Ombudsman publicised how prisoners, convicted as 
well as pre- trial detainees, “are living under a militaristic regime and a threatening 
environment that is increasing fear and intimidation” (Politis, 2013).  
1.3 Thesis Justification 
Cypriot imprisonment rates - 102 per 100,000 individuals behind bars in 2014 - have reached 
unprecedented levels compared with other times in Cypriot history (Aebi et al., 2016). 
According to the latest statistics published by the Council of Europe this unprecedented rate 
of increase has occurred against a backdrop of declining crime rates (Eurostat, 2015). Today, 
according to the Council of Europe’s Green Paper, Cyprus has the third highest prison rates 
in Europe, a number that has created strain within the prison system (European Commission, 
2011, Walmsley, 2003, 2012b, 2012a). There is a long tradition of studies in the United 
Kingdom (Hough et al., 2003), United States of America (Tonry, 1999, 2004), and Finland 
(Lappi-Seppälä, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2011), exploring the causes and 
differences in sentencing in national penal policies. These studies, suggest that the key 
drivers of the rise are a result of a punitive penal climate which has resulted in a new era of 
penalisation of offences mainly around immigration. Furthermore, politics, punitive public 
attitudes and welfare spending play a crucial role. Notwithstanding, the identification of the 
forces behind the increase in the prison population and the challenges this brings in the prison 
estate is of paramount significance.  
Since the financial turmoil begun in 2009, Cyprus has been placed at the centre of attention in 
the global economy. As a result, the issue of crime has received significant critical attention, 
with Cypriot scholars focusing on the package of austerity measures. However, there is no 
research on the factors behind the steep and progressive growth in the prison population, 
which suffers from major drawbacks. Given the significant lack of Cypriot literature on the 
reasons behind the increase in the prison population and the challenges this has created, this 
study produces an original and cutting edge critical examination of the penal ‘drivers’ and the 
ensuing ‘crises’ this brings in the Cypriot penal system. 
Therefore, the research questions that have informed this PhD include: 
1. Why is the prison population rapidly growing in the Central Jail of Nicosia?  
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2. In relation to the on-going growth of the prison population, what types of 
challenges does the Central Jail of Nicosia face? 
Research questions require explanation and justification. An exploration of the rise in the 
prison population has significant social, political and economic dimensions. According to 
Cheliotis (2012)  recent decades have witnessed a rapid increase in the use of imprisonment 
in a large number of jurisdictions worldwide (Van Dijk, 2008b). International research is 
focused mostly on the Anglophone perspectives, neglecting to provide relevant information 
outside the Anglophone jurisdiction.  
With the intention to help rectify this gap in the international review literature, the present 
thesis turns attention to the case of Cyprus, offering a systematic summary of key findings 
from a range of sources in both Greek and English: from scholarly studies, to media reports, 
to official documentation produced by governmental bodies. The overarching aim of this 
study is to emphasise the need for urgent intervention. The data for this study were collected 
in five phases: March 2012 (pilot interviews), March 2013, and August 2013, January 2014, 
and July 2014. This study consists of twenty seven semi – structured interviews with 
participants from the three main bodies of the Cypriot Criminal Justice System: Legislative, 
Adjudication and Correction. This study adds to the growing concerns expressed by national 
and international observers, and it is hoped may alert the Cypriot state authorities to actively 
promote change, whether through practically reforming the existing operation of the prison 
system or, implementing policies of decarceration. 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters, each unfolding in a developmental sequence towards 
a full understanding of the major problems faced by the prison system today. 
This chapter has introduced the rise in the prison population and the problems this brings to 
the Cypriot prison institution and the gap in knowledge, which this study endeavours to 
cover.  
Chapter Two provides an analysis of existing literature in the sociology of punishment and 
penal politics, and pays attention to culture, political economy and party politics, penal 
populism as a theme in politics, and recent work on punishment and migration. 
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Chapter Three entitled ‘Cypriot Culture and Context’, presents an overview of the Cypriot 
culture and introduces the role of nationalism and political parties’ crucial issues strongly 
related to penal policies and changes. Furthermore, the chapter provides important 
information about the historical development of the Cypriot prison establishment and offers 
the first empirical account of what is happening within the wired fences. The chapter 
concludes with the origin and impact of the January events, the biggest legitimacy episode in 
Cyprus’ penal history. 
Chapter Four offers a picture of the major factors that appear relevant to the rise in the prison 
population in the context of Cyprus, including political discourses of crime, penal and public 
punitiveness, the criminalisation of immigration, corruption, clientelism and elite impunity, 
and more recently the financial ‘crisis’ of neoliberalism. 
Chapter Five introduces the methodology utilised for this study. Considering the complexity 
of exploring the ‘hidden’ mechanisms that contribute significantly to the rise in the prison 
population, twenty-seven qualitative, semi-structured interviews are utilised with the elites of 
the Cypriot criminal justice system (CJS). In addition, this chapter presents the 
methodological process used in the thesis, including research design, sampling and 
population, data collection and analysis. Furthermore, critical realism is discussed in detail, 
and I outline how the study benefitted from this research paradigm.   
Chapters Six poses the first analysis chapter, and examines the factors behind the rise in the 
prison population.  
Chapter Seven is the second analysis chapter, and provides a critical exploration of the 
current challenges of the prison today. 
Chapter Eight concludes the thesis with multiple reflections concerning the study questions, 
content, method, and implications. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 
In recent years, the concept of culture in the field of criminology has moved from the 
periphery to the centre of scientific investigation, and culture poses as a primary variable in 
global change (see further Karstdedt, 2001). Similarly, this chapter drawing on comparative 
analysis explores the potential benefits and inherent limitations, including the difficulty of 
translating and transplanting crime control policies and concepts across different national and 
cultural boundaries (Nelken, 2009). In doing so, it attempts to unravel the attached weight to 
culture and political economy and party politics, with significant emphasis given to Simon’s 
work on ‘hyperincarceration’ and ‘governing through crime’. Following the American 
paradigm, prison rates in many jurisdictions throughout the world have soared while crime 
rates saw a steady decrease. Governments have handed over penal policies into the hands of 
an ill-informed public, and as this chapter argues, governments have increasingly allowed 
penal populism to impact on penal policy developments and there is a minimal involvement 
of technocrats and academics (Pratt, 2007). One of the most serious outcomes of penal 
populism is that of punitiveness in criminal justice practices in numerous countries (Bosworth, 
2011). Moreover, this punitive turn is indicative in the overrepresentation of foreigners, 
immigrants and other ethnic minorities across penal systems worldwide (Aas, 2005). 
2.1 Comparative criminal justice: between the Scylla of ethnocentricity and the 
Charybdis of relativism 
Over the last decade, there has been a growing interest in research on the globalisation of 
crime and criminal justice and the ways this affect the concepts and practices of criminal 
justice as they are shaped internationally or transferred from ‘there to here’ (Nelken, 2009, 
see also Sozzo, 2011, in Melossi et al., 2011). The task of comparative criminal justice 
scholar is to compare and contrast ways of responding to crime in one country to those 
practices elsewhere (Nelken, 2007; 2009). However, as Nelken argues there are significant 
barriers in understanding or interpreting what is really happening in other cultural contexts 
(see further Karstedt, 2001). On the one hand, we risk ethnocentricity - or culture blindness 
according to Nelken– if we assume our responses to crime are universally shared and 
appreciated, and on the other hand, there is the temptation of relativism, the notion that we 
will never be able to understand what others are doing, thus we cannot evaluate whether what 
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they do is right (Nelken, 2009). It is important to recognise that criminal justice policies are 
shaped by both, global and local conditions and criteria (see further Karstedt, 2015).  
According to Nelken (2009, 2011) our perceptions of others is depending heavily on our 
cultural ideas. Nils Christie, for example, first argued that criminal justice policies are 
‘cultural polices’ less determined by crime rates but rather reflect the cultural identity of 
nation countries (in Karstedt, 2001). Which actions are criminalised, what type of crime 
responses the punitive state offers, and how offenders are dealt with, depends on cultural 
values and on contemporary ‘law and order’ thinking and attitudes. Today, criminologists 
claim that the rise in crime rates has been exaggerated by media and political discourses and, 
that we are obsessed with penalisation and punitive responses towards offenders (Pratt 2000; 
2007).   
Recent discussions on ‘Asian exceptionalisms’ and ‘western culture’ have brought questions 
of culture back in the field of criminology. For many criminologists the deep cultural crisis of 
the west and the failure of western crime control culture have been contrasted to Confucian 
traditions and conscience collective values and ideals and deemed contributory factors for the 
low criminality in these nations (Karstedt, 2001). Asian criminologists have found that the 
absence of collectivistic orientation and the socio- culture syndrome of individualism and 
consumerism are central features of high rates of crime and violence in societies, especially 
those of the West. However, this perspective on Asian exceptionalism offers ad hoc cultural 
explanation for economic success and failure (see further Karstedt, 2001).  
This perspective on Asian exceptionalism is burdened by prejudice and is shaped by cultural 
rhetoric more than by systematic analysis. This perspective is monolithic in nature as Asian 
countries differ significantly from each other and Confucian traditions do not influence all 
countries in the same way; neither do western values represent a monolithic culture. For 
example, Scandinavian cultures differ significantly from those of Central Europe, and 
European countries differ from American culture (Karsted, 2001). Furthermore, this 
perspective does not take into consideration the mass modernisation of south-eastern 
countries (e.g. Japan, China and South Korea) which has disrupted the Confucian traditions 
and collectivistic spirit and values of these countries. 
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2.2 The concept culture in cross cultural criminology 
Today culture has a predominant feature in this field, and writers pay close attention to the 
role of culture in the shaping of punishment, and to the cultural significance of penal 
practices. Most recently, attention has focused on the realisation that culture encodes and is 
encoded by distinctive political and economic forces. The idea and notion of penal 
institutions is grounded in cultural norms, values and perceptions; they draw upon particular 
sensibilities and express specific emotions; they are sites of ritual performance and cultural 
performance and diffuse crime control (Garland, 2006 in Melossi et al, 2011). 
The idea of ‘culture’ in this context has been typically used in two opposing senses. In the 
first sense, cultural factors appear as a causal force in shaping penal institution, while the 
second points to different cultures and seeks to show that contrasting cultures produce 
different patterns of penality (Garland, 2006). The first conception sets to segregate particular 
cultural forces, ideas, symbols, meanings or values and to separate them from social, 
political, economic and criminological factors. Conversely, the second concept of culture 
recognises the different social wholes, each of which is understood as a distinctive ‘culture’. 
Therefore, culture is understood to be a bounded and unified set of customs, habits, values, 
norms and beliefs: a distinctive universe of meanings (Patton, 2002). Those cultures are 
usually associated with particular communities such as an ethnic group, a social class or a 
nation- so that we might talk of Islamic culture, working- class or Cypriot culture, and 
therefore, the conception of culture in relation to punishment is perceived to be implicitly 
connected with the Cypriot economics (social roles) and politics (political structure).  
Concomitantly, penal practices are the product of certain cultural traditions and frameworks 
of values. As Melossi (2001) argues:  
Punishment is deeply embedded in the national/cultural specificity of the environment 
which produces it (p: 407). 
2.3 Punitive turn? From American dystopia to European utopia 
Today, criminal justice systems face numerous common problems and increasingly seem to 
respond in similar ways to ‘risk society’ (Nelken, 2009). People are now looking for a ‘safety 
utopia’ and like all utopias contain some kind of dangerousness, especially for those who get 
in the way. Therefore, the concern of contemporary work in the field evolves around growing 
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punitiveness (Nelken, 2009; Pratt, 2008; Matthews, 2005). The majority of criminology 
scholars do not suggest that prisons should be abolished but their concern has been shifted to 
what De Haan (1990) calls a ‘bad conscience of punishment’; the economic and political 
mobilisation of punitiveness especially, but not only, in America ( see further Nelken, 2009, 
De Haan, 2005). 
Despite recent evidence that crime levels are decreasing, there is an increased resort to 
punishment, in particular, a greater use of prison has been seen as useful and appropriate. 
Recent studies (Tseloni et al. 2010, Roeder et al, 2015) reveal that there is greater use of 
prison even though crime levels have been decreasing (Beckett and Western, 2001; Downes 
and Hansen, 2006). In his influential work, Garland (2001) suggests that ‘penal welfarism’ 
has been displaced by the politicization of crime and the growth of penal punitiveness. 
Garland (2001) offers an account of how penal policies (mainly in America and England) 
utilised a victim-centric character and claim that prison works. He also notes the emotional 
tone of crime policy from humanity and decency to anger and insecurity. Whilst some 
scholars saw the roots of this penal turn to be found in late modernity and the changes in 
social and economic conditions, some others (Nelken, 2009) claimed that the new punitive 
era is an ethnocentric projection – an Anglo- American tendency which assumes that what 
other countries do is less important because soon they will follow the Anglo-American 
example (see further Nelken, 2009). 
According to Nelken (2009) such critics tell us how we must avoid the dystopia of the 
bloated American penal system that contains more than 2 million prisoners. However, Zedner 
(2002) suggests that is necessary to recognise and explore the differences between the USA 
and Europe and within Europe. Zedner (2002) suggests that numerous cultures of control 
exist within Europe, and some European countries have a more punitive stance than others. A 
few years ago, the criminal justice system of the Netherlands, for example, was seen as less 
punitive. However, things have changed and recently the Dutch prison population has risen 
dramatically and at a faster pace that in the USA (Nelken, 2009; Van der Leun, 2006). Today, 
it is the region of Scandinavia that is seen as beacons of tolerance. 
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2.4 Punitiveness and Political Economy 
Cavadino and Dignan’s (2006) famous work on comparative penal systems, aimed to 
demonstrate the differences in penal tolerance in a bid to stop the inflated prison population 
in England and Wales (Reiner, 2000; 2007). Cavadino and Dignan (2006) dismissed the 
correlation of cross-national differences in public support for prison sentences, and argued 
that variation in prison rates – which is the proxy for punitiveness - are related to different 
types of political economy. As seen in Figure 2.1, the imprisonment rates in 12 industrial 
societies vary considerable and have been classified as neo- liberal, conservative/corporatist, 
social democratic, and oriental/corporatist economies. According to Cavadino and Dignan 
(2006), the biggest symptom of neo- liberal societies is that of the exclusionary nature of 
social and economic policies which contributes significantly to their higher prison rates. On 
the other hand, Continental European corporatist and Scandinavian social democratic 
societies have pursued an inclusive social, economic and penal strategy that offers citizens 
protection and inclusion and views offenders not as isolated, culpable individuals, thus 
appreciating resocialisation by employing community as a whole. Typically, these societies 
are seeking to respond to crime with measures that aim for offenders’ reintegration and 
reformation into society (see further Garland 1985, 2001)       
Figure 2.1 Imprisonment rates per 100,000 in 12 countries, 2002/3 and 2008 
         
 2002/3 2008 
Neo-liberal countries   
USA 701 756 
South Africa 402 334 
New Zealand 155 185 
England and Wales 141 152 
Australia 115 129 
Conservative- corporatist 
countries 
  
Italy 100 92 
Germany 98 89 
Netherlands 100 100 
France 93 96 
Social democracies   
Sweden 73 74 
Finland 70 64 
Oriental- corporatist countries   
Japan 53 63 
Source: Cavadino and Dignan (2006, p: 22). 
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Meanwhile, Lacey (2008) argues that ‘coordinated market economies’ (such as the 
Scandinavian and Nordic states) have the opposite effect from neo - liberal societies such as 
the USA, Australia and the UK, mainly because those countries develop multi- party political 
systems that are less susceptible to appeals to populism. Furthermore, Lacey (2008, 2013) 
argues that European corporatist countries (to a certain extent) and social democracies (to a 
greater extent) are more equipped than neo-liberal, ones in dealing with the challenge of 
crimes committed by (illegal) migrants (see further Solivetti 2007, 2012). 
2.5 Impediments in comparing prison rates  
According to Nelken (2009), Cavadino and Dignan’s work is not the only account of the 
differences in prison rates as indicators of comparative punitiveness. Neo-liberalism in the 
USA and Europe, for example, is associated with the ‘exclusion’ of offenders, and its 
establishment coincides with a greater use of imprisonment. While punitiveness poses as an 
explanation, Cavadino and Dignan (2006) actually define neo-liberalism with increased 
punitive attributes. However, countries such as China saw a sharp rise in its prison population 
without being neo-liberal, while Russia, a country that saw a rise in neo-liberalism recorded a 
decline in the use of imprisonment. Thus, a wide range of variables are connected to 
punitiveness rather than neo-liberalism itself. 
Taking the ‘problem’ of crime levels, for example, it is plausible to assume that countries 
with high crime rates experience higher prison rates. However, inclusive social democratic 
countries have recorded a reduction in the levels and severity of crimes committed. However, 
countries suffering from less crimes are not necessarily less punitive. In Netherlands, for 
example, - a country with an overall low crime rates - prisoners get shorter sentences, but 
actually more people are sent to prisons than those with higher crime rates (see further 
Engbersen and Van der Leun, 1998; Engbersen et al, 2007; Van der Leun and Van der 
Woude, 2011). However, this penal trend complicates further any argument about 
punitiveness and inclusiveness. 
Figure 2.1 offers a snapshot of from 2002, 2003 and 2008, but prison rates in different 
countries in earlier years evolved in ways to confirm this argument. Finland, for example, 
after the Second World War saw a sharp decrease in its prison population compared to other 
Scandinavian countries. Even the USA had a moderate number of prisoners until the late 
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‘70’s and more recently Italy has recorded the lowest prison population amongst the 
Continental European countries. The reason behind this trend was not the outcome of a 
generous welfare system but was owed to the collective pardons that decongested the prison 
population nearly by a third. The example of Italy illustrates how important the criminal 
justice process is in order to understand prison rates. It is impossible to understand the French 
prison rates, for example, without taking into consideration its amnesties and pardons 
(Nelken, 2009).   
However, the irregular and mutable nature of prison rates are calling us to search beyond the 
basic differences in political economy. A country’s prison rates not only reflect their attitudes 
towards offenders. They are also a productive of reflexive responses by politicians and policy 
makers to what is going in other countries. Roy Walmsley – the man behind the World Prison 
Population Lists - urges the criminal justice practices and policies of all countries to limit 
their rates below 100 prisoners per 100,000 of the population. 
2.5.1 The ‘cultural meaning’ of punitiveness and tolerance: 
Another importer component of Cavadino and Dignan’s thesis is that of cross cultural 
meaning. However, we cannot compare punitiveness and tolerance in different cultures 
because each term has different meaning and deliberating actors; for example, in some 
cultures (e.g. Netherlands) tolerance has been seen a deliberate choice. For instance, the 
promotion of welfare provisions (Downes and Hansen, 2006) –is it a non- calculated choice - 
and to a certain extent negligent - that involves the non-enforcement of existing sanctions. 
Also questions raise related to who is claimed to be tolerant or punitive; politicians, judges or 
the public? 
It cannot be denied that in our attempt to compare punitiveness and tolerance, there is the 
temptation of relativism. In Greek language, for example, ανεκτικότητα (anektikothta) is not 
translatable into English or any other language. The term is Greek, and its concept is 
applicable only in Cyprus and Greece. Similarly, the Dutch word gedogen, cannot be 
compared with the English word tolerance nor with the Greek word ανεκτικότητα 
(anektikothta). According to Nelken (2009), the English term is passive, whereas the Dutch 
term entails an open–eyed tolerance, which is part of the governmental policy. In the 
Netherlands, gedogen, is based on the states willingness to accommodate exceptions to the 
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law, whilst in Cyprus, such accommodation is not applicable mainly because the criminal 
process is based on strict procedural requirements.  
The ‘hegemonic punitive worldview’ that emerged in the 20th century was linked to the 
global forces that lead to the homogenisation of crime and criminal justice across the globe 
(Karstedt, 2015). Within such a concept, there is limited space for nation states, giving that 
global forces and flows play such an imminent role on national justice policies (Aas, 2007). 
A famous example of the global penal spread is that of the ‘zero tolerance’ policy that 
originated in America. As criminologists soon observed, there was less convergence than 
divergence in penal systems and policies, with numerous exceptions to the penal impact of 
neo-liberalism, and with many regions resisting punitiveness with the formulation of different 
types of exceptionalisms, from US exceptionalism to Dutch, French and Scandinavian 
(Karstedt, 2015). However, today penal policies have become powerful instruments of 
national governments. 
2.5.2 Cultural peers and penal policies 
According to Karstedt (2015) nation states are part of international systems and their 
authorities are shaped by both global and local criminal justice issues. As Karstedt (2015) 
argues, penal policies have local and global dynamics, with governments accountable to their 
citizens, but concomitantly they are part of a global and transnational system of international 
human rights values, conventions, and are usually subject to decisions of regional and 
international courts. National crime policies are shaped by global forces from above, internal 
forces from below, and finally the horizontal diffusion of practices (see Karstedt, 2015). 
The region of Europe is a good example of convergence and divergence processes. Europe is 
divided by linguistic, political and cultural history, different governmental systems, and 
significant variances in their criminal justice systems and procedures. According to Unnever 
(2010)  the European region has distanced itself enormously from the ‘harms’ imposed by the 
penal policies in the USA, like, for example, hyper incarceration, boot camps, and most 
importantly the death penalty. De Koster (2008) and his colleagues noticed a relative trend 
toward higher imprisonment in only six out of thirteen countries. According to Snacken ( see 
further 2007, 2010, 2012) the Europeans have managed to ‘resist punitiveness’ for many 
reasons but their welfare policies are likely the most important reason (Cavadino and Dignan, 
2006; Downes and Hansen, 2006; Lacey, 2008; Pratt, 2008), as well as their democratic 
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political structures (Lappi-Seppälä, 2007, 2008), and great emphasis on human rights and 
human dignity (Whitman, 2003 ). Similarly, Garland (2001) argues that European penal 
policies are paying a lot of attention to due process and human rights against the punitive 
culture of the American crime control policies. Also, empirical evidence by De Koster et al., 
(2008) suggests that between 1992 and 2001 neo- liberal policies had no impact on the 
numbers of imprisonment in 13 West European countries. On the contrary, and very similar 
to the European model of ‘penal restraint’ high levels of welfare expenditure, solidarity and 
trust seemed to be effective variables that assisted in the decrease of penal punitiveness; 
however, these factors vary significantly amongst European countries. 
From a comparative perspective, European imprisonment, prison conditions, and public 
opinion on crime issues appears to hold a unified front yet in reality European regions differ 
from each other in terms of punitiveness (Karstedt, 2015). Hirtenlehner et al., (2012 in 
Karstedt, 2015) suggest that specific socio-cultural and ideological characteristics are shaping 
European penal policies. Punitive - exclusionary regime and welfare-inclusionary regime can 
be found in Central and Eastern Europe and Scandinavia respectively, while a ‘hybrid cluster’ 
includes western and southern European countries. As Karstedt (2015) argues, the 
geographical and regional distributions of these clusters mirror the types of European welfare 
states. 
Despite the significant differences between European countries, Europe has been established 
as a normative power and more recently has been seen as an effective model of welfare 
policies, and ‘desired’ criminal justice policies (see further Lappi- Seppala, 2007). This has 
led to what has been described by Van Zyl Smit (2006) as the ‘Europeanisation’ of penal 
regimes, the tendency to converge or homogenate penal policies within European countries. 
However, Van Zyl Smit (2006) highlights that Europeanisation impacts countries differently 
and is primarily influenced by their resources, political structures and nature of criminal 
justice system.  
As Brodeur (2007) suggested, ‘punishment evolved from a moral episode’ (p: 52), implying a 
conflict between the good and bad of a culture. Therefore, according to Meier (1994 ), penal 
policies are morality policies that contain moral judgement, core principles and values; they 
are values to establish and not a means to achieve political aspirations. Drugs, alcohol and 
gambling are amongst the criminal justice issues that contain these values. Penal policies 
32 
 
characterised by moral conflicts, public salience and simplicity. A wide range of criminal 
justice issues have been explored, from the death penalty, boot camps and three strikes laws, 
to sentencing guidelines, mainly in the USA. As Karstedt (2015) argues, ‘it is a mixture of 
cultural actors and characteristics of the political culture that are decisive in the spread of 
penal policies’ (p: 380). Ideological similarities between nations are a more important factor 
from geographical proximity (see further Mooney, 1999).  
Therefore, cultural and institutional proximity is more decisive than close neighbours, and 
morality policies are spread to those regions that share cultural and ideological similarities. In 
addition, Karstedt (2015) argues that in the process of adopting, learning or reinventing penal 
policies, states are more likely to adopt policies from similar countries in terms of values, 
beliefs and political representation with the government.  
2.6 Punitiveness and Neo-Liberal States:  
Nowadays, the surge in the prison population in North America, Western Europe and 
Australia, has urged the topic of penalisation in contemporary criminology. As stated by 
Wacquant (2009) the surge in the prison population (mainly in the USA) serves three 
missions: 
“to bend the reticent fractions of the post-industrial working class to precarious wage- 
work; to warehouse their most disruptive or superfluous elements; and to patrol the 
boundaries of the deserving citizenry while reasserting the authority of the state in the 
restricted domain it now assigns itself” (p:38). 
Wacquant in his influential works, Prisons of Poverty (2009b) and Punishing the Poor 
(2009a) has set the epistemological foundations to scrutinise the relationship between 
penality and neo-liberalism in the aforementioned countries. While Wacquant makes it clear 
that his theory concerns these Western countries –also referred to as economically advanced 
societies – does not state in which countries penalisation has occurred. Wacquant (2009a, 
2009b), states that the focal symbol of all advanced societies at the end of the twentieth 
century was inarguably the inflation of their prison populations. However, on the other hand, 
he claims that the situation with the region of Europe differs drastically from that in the USA. 
However, in recent times, Wacquant (2006) came to recognise that penalisation has been a 
core characteristic of American society(ies) for the last thirty years and of western Europe for 
the past fifteen years.  
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Off course, the fact that imprisonment rates vary in time, raise questions for an explanation.  
A simplistic approach is that of crime rates, however a rise in the prison population over the 
last twenty years has occurred when crime rates were stable or in decline (Garland, 2001, 
Hudson, 2002, Wacquant, 2006), and no clear correlation was ever reported between crime 
and imprisonment rates (Garland, 2001; Von Hofer, 2003; Cavadino and Dignan, 2006). 
Instead, Wacquant offers a Neo- Marxist account based on the reasoning of penalisation and 
neo-liberalisation. 
Furthermore, Wacquant (2014) expanded his focus to a transatlantic comparison caused by 
the moral panic in France and much of the Western part of Europe in the early 1990’s about 
the alleged ‘ghettoization’ of peripheral urban districts undermined by deindustrialisation 
(Slater, 2016). Wacquant (2015) argues that the ghetto is an institutional form, a social- 
organisational instrument that utilises space to fulfil two oppose functions: economic 
extraction and social ostracization. Wacquant (2015) developed the concept of ghetto to show 
how the rulers of cities had to maximise ‘the material value extracted out of a disparaged 
ethnic category, while minimising contact with its members’ (Slater, 2016, p: 3). As a 
consequence, ghettoes exhibit distinguishing sociological properties and a set of parallel 
institutions such as schools, places of warship, and businesses, that duplicate those of the city 
where residents of the ghettoes are banished. Wacquant (1992) anchored his analysis to 
describe the mental and social structures of urban exclusion in the American ‘Black Belt’ and 
French ‘Red Belt’. Wacquant (2007) soon came to recognise that the ‘new’ urban poverty of 
economic advanced societies is characterised by a relatively powerful stigma attached to 
residence in the segregated spaces, the neighbourhoods of exile where the marginalised 
populations are being relegated. According to Wacquant, this stigma helps to identify and 
explain cross-national similarities of a transatlantic convergence between the poverty regimes 
of Europe and the USA.  
2.6.1Explaining penalisation and neo- liberalization 
According to Wacquant (2001), large numbers of people are imprisoned because of the 
routinely increased use of imprisonment that has been used by governments in order to 
manage social insecurity. Wacquant (2001) argues that this social insecurity was driven by 
economic developments related to the transformation of the ‘Keynesian’ state into a 
‘Darwinian’ one. Whereas the former was based on the principles of solidarity and 
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egalitarianism, and the prominent role of the state in economic redistribution, the latter 
utilises neo-liberal and free-market measures that promote competition and celebrate 
individual responsibility. Thus a less generous system of welfare benefits is seen by 
Wacquant a key element to explain penalisation. Wacquant’s conceptualisation aligns with an 
extensive literature by influential scholars in the field e.g. Hudson (2002), Beckett and 
Western (2001), Cavadino and Dignan (2006), and Downes and Hansen (2006). 
Although meagre welfare provision was seen a prominent feature, Wacquant (2006) discusses 
the advent of the Darwinian state as a perplexed process that includes the polarization of the 
labour market by increasing employment in services, leading to insecure flexible labour, and 
individualised contracts and fragmented careers. These economic developments were soon 
worryingly normalised and were generalising precarious employment Wacquant (2009a). 
Furthermore, Wacquant (2006) supports that these intertwined processes are justified by a 
neo-liberal discourse, whose main characteristics are the ‘competition fetish’ and the 
‘collective responsibility’ as posed by the Darwinian state.  
Declining welfare provisions, rinsing numbers of insecure flexible labour contracts and a 
neo- liberal discourse have caused what Wacquant calls ‘surplus labour’. Deprived of secure 
employment–and subsequently income- this labour surplus is regarded responsible for 
‘survival’ petty crimes. Thus, the Keynesian welfare state, which has traditionally stressed 
the importance of solidarity and inclusion of marginal groups by providing generous welfare 
programmes, transformed into a Darwinian ‘penal’ state, a highly competitive state in which 
marginal groups (mainly the poor and immigrants) are routinely incarcerated (De Koster et al., 
2008). Thus, social insecurity is managed through a process that Wacquant calls ‘the penal 
management of the poor’ (Wacquant, 2002; 2009). 
Despite Wacquant’s influential work and impact, his theory has never been empirically tested. 
Instead his propositions were sketching the startling boom in the United States, by suggesting 
that the rise in imprisonment was accompanied by a decline in welfare programmes and 
provisions (Wacquant, 2005, 2006). Although, many scholars have provided empirical tests, 
they focused only on a part of Wacquant’s theory: on the proposition that meagre welfare 
expenditure leads to higher levels of incarceration. The work of Downes and Hansen (2006) 
and Beckett and Western (2001), find support of this thesis in the USA. However, the work 
of Cavadino and Dignan (2006) does not support this thesis. 
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The study of Downes and Hansen (2006) seems to offer a serious test as they used 
longitudinal data to illustrate the declining welfare programmes and its impact on 
imprisonment in the West. Nevertheless, Downes and Hansen (2006) rightly argue the 
relationship between welfare and imprisonment requires further analysis and research 
because their work is merely focusing on a bivariate relationship. On the other hand, 
Wacquant’s work on the rise of the penal state stresses more causes than decline in welfare 
expenditure, including the alarming growth of insecure and flexible jobs, and neo-liberal 
discourse. 
2.7 Penal populism and politics 
Today penal populism is a widespread term with much analytical work on contemporary 
punishment (Pratt, 2007). However, according to Sparks (2001) and Matthews (2005) there 
has been little consideration of what it might be. In recent years, the term, penal populism, 
has been attached to politicians for pursuing punitive penal strategies and policies. However, 
as Pratt (2007) argues, penal populism is a “complex issue representing a shift in the 
configuration of penal power in modern society rather than something within the purview of 
politicians to tinker with as they please” (p: 8). Shils (1956), for example, notes that populism 
exists where there is a prevailed notion of dissatisfaction against the order imposed by a long 
established ruling class characterised by a monopoly of power and fortune. In the same vein, 
Canovan (1999) argues that populism represents the moods, sentiments and fears of distinct 
segments of the public and not the public in general. Those segments feel undepreciated and 
ignored by local governments, and unlike more deserving groups they feel that government 
policy benefits less worthy ‘others’ and not them. 
According to Pratt (2007) penal populism also involves those societal sectors complicit in the 
alienation, marginalisation and dissatisfaction of ‘ordinary people’ who are unable to have 
claims or a voice. Those responsible for this are to be found in government’s own 
bureaucratic organisations; sometimes the entire parliamentary process; sometimes various 
elite groups; and periodically the media. Hence, these forces make up ‘the establishment’. 
Therefore, penal populism should not be merely seen as an essential political tool, but as a 
device aiming to “inject the will of the people into the democratic decision-making process” 
(Raadt et al., 2004, p: 3). Very often, populist politicians in mainstream political parties, in 
order to re- establish their achievements with their consistencies, choose to differentiate from 
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their traditional political manifestations and demonstrate a shift towards the needs of the 
people, rather than vested interest groups within their parties ( Pratt, 2007).  
However, this adverse relationship between mainstream politics and dissatisfied 
constituencies cannot be bridged by mainstream representatives. Instead, these constituencies 
are assisting in the development of new politics, and today we can see that in two ways (Pratt, 
2007). First, we have the development of new political parties with a solely populistic 
character and nature, campaigning (nowadays obsessively) on immigration and refugees. 
Second we have the growth of more democratic initiative such as the referenda and citizen- 
based ballots, thus providing the opportunity for more authentic expressions of public will 
(Pratt, 2007). However, this new dimension of politics has been the firmed relationship 
between populist politicians and extra establishment groups such as pressure groups, 
speaking on behalf or representing the general public (see further Pratt, 2007). Thus, 
politicians have used those extra establishment groups for policy developments and initiatives, 
and have also made noticeable shift from consensus politics to politics that is divisive and 
more in tune with the public ideas and expectations. 
Against this backdrop, penal populism sees prisoners and criminals in general to be 
prioritised above the crime victims and law abiding citizens at large. It is based on anger and 
general disappointment of the criminal justice establishment, and as with populism, penal 
populism is fuelled by ‘feelings and intuitions’ (see further Sparks, 2000).  Furthermore, 
penal populism feeds on dissent with the public penal expectations and the actual penal 
practices of the establishment to be poles apart.  
2.8 The significance of (Populist) punitiveness 
According to Zarafonitou (2011, in Kury and Shea, 2011) punitiveness is often perceived as a 
response to wrongdoing that occurred in the past, and not as a preventive strategy for future 
offending (see further Matthews, 2005). Hence, punitiveness, is usually used “to mean 
support for a retributivist theory of justice and a lack of support for rehabilitative goals” 
(Maruna and King, 2009, p: 9). In the same vein, Garland (2001) states that recent increased 
punitiveness is linked to the decline of rehabilitation ideals, rising prison populations, harsher 
prison conditions, emotional and expressive forms of punishment, increased obsession with 
victims’ rights, and the derogatory treatment of offenders. Therefore, punitiveness has a 
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quantitative and qualitative dimension, with a particularly complex concept and framework. 
Snacken (2010), when exploring increased punitivity within Europe, suggested that 
punitiveness expresses attitudes towards punishment including political discourse, 
criminalisation processes by legislators, decisions form practitioners within the criminal 
justice system (e.g. police, prosecutors, sentencing, attitudes of victims of crime, and public 
attitudes towards punishment ( the so called ‘public opinion’) (Snacken, 2010).  
Comparative studies have clearly demonstrated that penal policies are not related to crime 
rates, but are related to a complex interaction of different factors, but most importantly by 
politicians and penal actors (Zimring and Hawkins, 1991; Snacken et al., 1995). Furthermore,  
international scholarship (Garland, 2001, Tonry, 2004, Pratt et al 2013; Herbert and Brown, 
2006; Zimring and Johnson, 2006) on increased levels of punitiveness, suggests that a shift in 
political decision-making is characterised by the failure of national governments to foster 
penal moderation by ‘handing over’ the making and implementation of penal policies to the 
hands of practitioners and experts, and not to the influence of tabloids and the public (see 
further Snacken, 2010).  
2.9 Political parties and ‘governing through crime’ 
Whilst economic neo-liberalisation has dominated criminological explanations of punishment 
and increased rates of imprisonment, scholars within the discipline of Sociology have 
identified the emergence of a new political culture that encompasses a cultural shift. This 
contrasting school of thought points out that crime is mostly characterised by intense 
emotional investment in crime and security. 
In his monograph, Governing through Crime, Jonathan Simon (Simon, 2007) offers an 
account of contemporary practices and discourses of the political culture in the USA. Simon 
(2007) provides a detailed account of the use of crime as a governance strategy in America 
and he argues that ‘victims’ became an idealised subject of legislation (Baker, 2010).  
The focal claim of Simon’s analysis is that, progressively, American political order has 
rallied around ‘the problem of crime’ in a way that legitimises government activity (Simon, 
2007, p: 3). According to Simon (2007) an exerting power has been the advent of the ‘crime 
victim’ as the ideal political topic of legislation. For the last three decades, the ongoing 
making of crime laws became increasingly the favourite subject of American people: 
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We are crime victims. We are the loved ones of crime victims. Above all, we are 
those who live in fear that we or those we care for will be victimised by crime (Simon, 
2007: p: 109). 
According to Simon (2007), by making laws that implicitly and explicitly appeal to victims 
and potential victims, law makers saw crime victims as the ideal political strategy that 
stresses the general good. Subsequently, any plan that addresses crime victims as a class has a 
universal appeal, and those who question these plans have a deviant status. 
This constitutional dichotomy has resulted in significant modifications in the governance.  
Institutions and agencies of governments have promoted the interests of crime victims and 
identified as vigorous supporters of common good (Simon, 2007). In the interim, those who 
support less priority to the crime victims are perceived as working against it. Essentially, this 
‘zero sum game’ transformed into a powerful tool used by the government to cause a division 
between the ‘executive and legislature, on the one hand, and the courts, on the other one’ 
(Baker, 2010, p: 197).  
A further feature of Simon’s analysis concerns the governmental dynamic between federal 
and state levels. This analysis concerns the degree in which the federal government can 
influence crime policies at a state level. The point here is, although, crime constitutes the 
biggest governmental value, the implementation of crime policies varies significantly across 
the states. Therefore, federal administrators have had to create a set of imaginative tactics in 
order to persuade state officials to implement their favoured line (Baker, 2010).  According to 
Simon (2007) once a ‘problem’ is identified – on a federal level – then crime policies are 
ready to penetrate states, along with an economic strategy, provided by the federal 
government to assist the state to adopt the preferred crime policies. 
Simon (2007) argues that the logic of these developments promotes the adoption of punitive 
and vengeful policies because of their victim-centric character. He also highlights that the 
victim-centric strategy of the government and the patterned thinking that accompanies it, lies 
beyond the domain of criminal law. As Baker (2010) argues ‘this is serving to pervert choice 
because it generates the expectation that policy responses must conform to the logic of the 
victim model in preference to any alternative’ (p:198). Therefore, the situation of ‘governing 
crime’ has transformed into that of ‘governing through crime’. According to Simon (2000) 
another significant element of this transformation is that of hyperincarceration (see further 
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Wacquant, 2010). Hyperincarceration captures a clear increase in the use of imprisonment for 
marginal and racially minority groups (Simon, 2000). 
2.10 Penalisation and the new political culture  
This new ‘cultural’ formation of crime and punishment is characterised not only by a ‘culture 
of control ‘or ‘governing through crime’, but also promotes a quest for national unity and 
national protection. 
It is well established that the counterculture of the 1960’s and 1970’s has popularly featured 
middle-class young people protesting against the ‘system’ that contained a capitalist 
technocratic society that was threating individual liberty. Inglehart’s (1977) studies revealed a 
shift from authoritarian to libertarian values. More specifically, Inglehart (1977, 2008) saw 
the emergence of a new political culture with a rightist cultural politics. Most European 
countries have seen an increased in new-right movements and parties since the end of 1980’s 
(see further De Koster et al., 2008). Just like new-leftist parties, these new-rightist parties 
soon emphasised on cultural issues almost obsessively, and as stated by Koster et al., (2008) 
cultural issues have been deployed electorally with success for more than forty years.  
Furthermore, Acheterberg (2006) argues that a wide range of right-wing political parties in 
the West have implemented an authoritarian vocabulary as well as discourses.  
The ‘new’ authoritarian discourses are striving for tighter national unity and national identity, 
obstructing immigration, repressing non-national ethnic and cultural minorities, and 
reaffirming traditional norms and moral values. These issues are ‘basic’ discourses of new 
rightist parties’ political agenda’s across western countries that prominently feature crime 
fighting as a major vehicle to maintain order in the nation. 
2.10.1 From penal populism to penal nationalism 
The many concerns that occurred in Europe since 1990, growing concern with crime is 
among the most persistent. Haney (2016) argues that since the collapse of state socialism in 
Central Europe, there has been a noticeable concern about crime and punishment in general. 
In these countries political discourses on crime are bellicose and combative and usually call 
for inhumane and tough measures such as castration laws for sex offenders and three strikes 
laws for repeat offenders (Haney, 2016). Their penal harshness has been intensified by the 
influx of immigrants and refugees from the Middle East in 2015. Politicians from Poland, 
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Hungary and Romania responded to the ‘attack’ in a similarly uniform way, utilising the most 
punitive measures -from severed pig heads hung along Hungary’s border to deter Muslim 
refugees and migrants from entering the country to the establishment of riot police and 
erected barbed wire fences at the borders (The Telegraph, 2016)– all ways of protecting and 
securing their national and legal order (see further Haney, 2016). One might suppose that 
Central Europeans would be reluctant to punitive responses due to their experience under 
state socialism, and sceptical towards punitiveness due to the harshness of dictatorship. 
However, what we witness is a relatively ‘tough’ treatment towards refugees and opposition 
to EU Refugee Plan (The Guardian, 2016). 
Today in Europe there is a different element of the popular populist culture of punishment. 
This element emerged in the 1990s from populist politics and has been grown into what 
Haney calls penal nationalism and has spread throughout the region of Central Europe. Penal 
nationalism is a central tool for pulling moderate penal populists towards extreme stances by 
calling them to stop being ‘soft’ on crime. Nationalist sentiments tend to be more pervasive 
and usually are articulated in small ‘law and order’ political parties but also can be found in 
mainstream political parties across Europe.  In Poland, for example, the Kaczynski brothers 
are the founding and leading figures of the Law and Justice Party, one of the most anti- 
immigrant political parties. In Hungary, FIDESZ, after securing a parliamentary 
supermajority in 2014, utilised penal nationalist ideals, by building an $80 million razor wire 
border fence and passing legislation to deploy an army that is allowed to fire against refugees 
and immigrants. In October 2016, Hungarians voted to reject the European Union 
resettlement plan, yet, the failed turn out has made the result legally unbinding. In Greece, 
Golden Dawn, one of the biggest winners of the parliamentary elections in 2015, is a 
significant mouthpiece of penal nationalism principles and ideas. While penal nationalism 
can be reduced to central and southern European countries where Christian- conservative 
politics prevail, it is also the outcome of politically powerful forces in the region (Haney, 
2016).  
Similarly politicians in these countries articulate penal nationalism sentiments more explicitly 
in their slogans. For example, in Greece, Golden Dawn campaigned aggressively throughout 
2000’s portraying itself as the ‘only nationalist choice’ under the campaign slogan ‘let’s rid 
the country of this stench’, referring to migrants. The party played heavily on fears over 
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Greece’s frontline role in Europe, posing extreme penal nationalist sentiments toward 
immigrants and promising to protect the nation from ‘ethnocide,’ the death of the nation ( 
The Guardian, 2015). Similarly, in Hungary the presidential campaign of the far right party 
Jobbik, was based on ‘gypsy criminality’ and on extreme punishment responses such as 
castration for sex offenders.  
The divergence between penal nationalism and penal populism is located in the message of 
the former. For example, penal nationalist sentiments are referring to the ‘people’ and the 
‘nation’.  For penal nationalists, crime control is not a matter of security as in many right 
wing discussions across Europe (e.g. Italy, France, England and Wales and Germany), it is a 
matter of national protection instead. Therefore, ‘getting tough’ on crime is a crucial element 
for national well-being. In these countries, punitiveness is often presented a part of the 
national character, so when the Polish politicians speak about the war on crime they linked it 
to the war against communism (see further Haney, 2016).  The ways that Central European 
countries had deal with the refugee crisis, also reveals that for penal nationalist politicians, 
punitiveness is a central tool for national sovereignty, independence and autonomy (Haney, 
2016).  
The on-going emphasis on criminal treats to the nation has led penal nationalist politicians to 
utilise metaphors of national essence and blood ties and often criminal threats are the 
‘others’. Often penal nationalists’ politicians utilise a discourse based on fear and fascist 
suggestions; for example, in Greece, Golden Dawn supporters are dress in black, its emblem 
resembles the swastika and is slogan it’s ‘Blood, Honour, Golden Dawn’. Similarly, in Czech 
Republic, government officials in 2015 were pulling Syrian refugees off the trains to write 
their numbers on their arms. Thus, it is not coming as a surprise that, penal nationalist 
politicians were openly and unapologetically stating who must eradicated in order to regain 
control: the barbarian hordes of Asians and Africans in Greece, the Arabs in Cyprus, the 
gypsies in Hungary, and so on. 
2.11 Migration and security in the European Union 
The past two decades have been empirically and theoretically productive of borders 
especially within the EU. Governments in many European jurisdictions have expanded their 
internal and external mechanisms of border control (Bosworth and Guild, 2008). Growing 
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evidence suggests that foreigners particularly asylum seekers, refugees and members of 
ethnic minority groups “are increasingly subjected to discourses of criminalisation in 
government policy and legislation, in the media and in public and community discussions” 
(Bosworth and Guild, 2008, p: 703). In recent years, there is a growing tendency to correlate 
disparate groups of non- citizens, from refugees to the so called ‘economic migrants’, or non-
nationals in prisons, ignoring fundamental differences between them (see further Bosworth, 
2008). Drawing on Jonathan Simon’s thesis on the process of ‘governing through crime’, 
Bosworth and Guild (2008) have suggested that the unknown and undocumented is not just 
undesirable but dangerous. And recently a growing body of literature addresses migration as 
a security problem on a political and public level, that does not occur in neoliberal regimes 
such as the USA and the United Kingdom, but can be seen in many western countries but 
most importantly within EU member states (Woude et al., 2014). 
According to Bosworth (2008) stringent border controls were not established after the 
September 11, 2001 attack in New York, but can be traced much earlier. Taking Europe as an 
example, it has been well commented that political and public discourses towards 
immigration have become more hostile since the early eighties (Bosworth, 2008). Citizens 
within member states of the European Union appeared to feel threatened not only by the 
unprecedented levels of migrants outside the EU, but also by the free movement, the principal 
policy chapter of the acquis communautaire of the EU. Politicians and policy makers have 
used these fears to create various migration reforms at a member state level (Barker, 2012).  
For the past twenty-five years, member state after member state asserted that their borders 
were weak and in desperate need for stricter securitization (Guia, 2013) . In the securitization 
process, European state governments have created a sharp distinction between deserving and 
underserving foreigners, which has in turn led to punitive practices and ideologies from the 
criminal justice system (see further Aas, 2011). 
The reliance of national governments – most importantly that of the United Kingdom, France 
and Italy- on punitive rhetoric and ideologies is in line to what Garland (1996) labelled the 
‘crime complex’ of industrial societies, and to what Tonry (1999) has called ‘moral panic’. 
According to Bosworth (2008) nowadays, foreigners, just like criminals, became targets of 
state intervention, as many western governments claim to have less capacity to secure their 
borders. Forces of globalisation, which many neo-liberal regimes have championed, do not 
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require skilled labour only, but require unskilled labour too. In the process of developing 
policies and responses about foreigners and immigrants, globalisation worsens the decline of 
the welfare state which according to Garland (1996, 2001) is a central feature of the punitive 
crime control policies of contemporary societies (Bosworth, 2008). In addition, recent 
discourses on immigration and asylum issues over insufficient levels of integration reflect on 
strategies implemented on the ‘war on crime’ that according to Simon (2010) is eroding 
social trust. Hence, stringent migration and asylum controls are not means of securing 
national and economic security, but are based on fear and mistrust (Bosworth, 2008).  They 
rely on the power of the prison in constructing and securing the symbolic borders of nation 
states (see further Bosworth, 2008). 
2.12 Crimmigrant bodies 
In her influential work ‘The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, crime and sovereign power’ , 
Juliet Stumpf (2006) first introduced the term crimmigration to denote the merger of criminal 
law and immigration law (see further Woude et al., 2014). Despite strong evidence 
suggesting that the merger of criminal law with immigration law is taking place in many 
jurisdictions throughout the world, scholars have focused primarily in the United States 
(Leerkes and Broeders 2010 ; Aas, 2011; Melossi 2013a; Melossi 2013b; Mitsilegas, 2013 ). 
Stumpf (2006) argues that the merger of criminal law and immigration is odd because 
criminal law seeks to prevent and address harm to citizens of a given society. Immigration 
law determines who is allowed to enter a country, and for how long. Historically, 
immigration law was interlinked with foreign policy rather than the criminal justice system 
(Stumpf, 2006). According to Stumpf (2006), Bosworth (2008), Van der Leun (2006) and 
Engbersen et al., (2007) both immigration and criminal law at their core are systems of 
inclusion and exclusion. Both systems produce policies promoting the inclusion of all citizens 
or excluding them from all spheres of social life, and by default both system create insiders 
and outsiders. According to Stumpf (2006) both systems (criminal and immigration law) 
create different categories of citizens: innocent versus guilty and legal versus illegal. Hence, 
it is not surprising that these two different types of law are inexorably intertwined. When 
policymakers, for example, with enacted policies are restricting non-citizens from attaining 
membership, they are turning to an area of law that operates to exclude non-citizens. 
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Nowadays, crimes committed by non-citizens have influenced intensely the direction of 
immigration law. For many years, non-citizens were prohibited from entering a country if 
they had committed crimes in the past. However, in many countries today immigration 
violations are defined as criminal acts themselves and can result in deportation. This 
connection between criminal and immigration law highlights choices about who is a member 
of a given society (Stumpf, 2006). 
2.12.1 European Union: A ‘land of immigration’ 
Over the past two decades, specific parts of the EU saw a disproportionate numbers of EU 
citizens in prison. Analysis of Table 2.2 reveals that there are grosso modo three distinct 
groups of EU countries (Melossi, 2013a). The first group consist of traditional immigration 
countries such as the UK and France and Germany. In these countries (especially in the UK 
and France) most of their citizens are naturalised citizens from other colonies, who are 
serving a prison sentences and do not show in foreigners’ statistics (Melossi, 2013a). In 
contrast, southern European countries have a common characteristic that of undocumented 
migrants, usually immigrating for work (Calavita, 2005a; Calavita 2005b). In these countries 
– mainly those of Spain, Greece, Italy and Cyprus – the criminal justice system provides a 
rather unique institutional ‘care’ to migrants by criminalising their presence and sending them 
to prisons, where paradoxically they enjoy higher living standards than being free in their 
countries. Finally, there are Eastern European states, where there is a limited presence of 
migrants, and therefore no migrants in prisons (Melossi, 2013a).  As a matter of fact, Eastern 
European countries such as Romania, Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania are traditional example 
of emigrant countries with higher imprisonment rates.  
A comparison with the USA is very useful. The number of incarcerated people in the US is 
staggering, whilst the number of incarcerated people in Europe is substantially smaller. 
According to the World Prisons Population List in 2015 the US imprisonment rate was 698 
per 100,000, whereas in Europe the median rate was 84 per 100,000 (Walmsley, 2015). 
Despite a recent increase in imprisonment rates in countries such as the UK, Spain and the 
Netherlands, there rates are below to 150 per 100,000 (Snacken, 2010). However, if one 
considers the percentage of non- citizens in these numbers, the situation change significantly. 
The percentage of foreign prisoners within state and federal prisons in the US accounts for 
about 6 per cent of the overall prison population, whereas the of non-citizen population 
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counts for about the 12 per cent (Mauer and King, 2007). However, as shown in Figure 2.2 
the percentage of non- citizen detainees within European prisons is extremely high. 
Figure 2.2 Overrepresentation of foreigners in EU prison systems 
 Percent of foreigners 
in prison population 
Percent of 
foreigners/foreigners 
extra EU in general 
pop. 
Estimate of the rate of 
overrepresentation 
Austria 45.8 10.5/6.57 4.36-6.97 
Belgium 41.1 9.7/3.12 4.23-13.17 
Bulgaria 1.9 Missing  
Cyprus 59.6 15.9/5.47 3.74-10.89 
Czech Republic 7.3 4/2.71 1.82-2.69 
Denmark 21.9 6/3.9 3.65-5.61 
Estonia 39.4 15.9/15.08 2.47-2.61 
Finland 10.3 2.9/1.85 3.55-5.56 
France 19.2 5.8/3.77 3.31-5.09 
Germany 26.3 8.7/5.6 3.02-4.69 
Greece 43.9 8.4/6.97 5.22-6.29 
Hungary 3.8 2/0.82 1.9-4.63 
Ireland 10.8 8.6/1.68 1.25-6.42 
Italy 36.9 7/4.95 5.27-7.45 
Latvia 1 17.4/16.97 0.05 
Lithuania 1.2 1.1/1.03 1.09-1.16 
Luxemburg 69.5 43/5.9 1.61-11.77 
Malta 40.1 4/2.39 10.02-16.77 
The Netherlands 27.7 3.9/2.04 7.10-13.57 
Poland 0.7 0.1/0.07 7-10 
Portugal 20.2 4.3/3.42 4.69-5.90 
Romania 0.7 Missing  
Slovakia 1.8 1.2/0.47 1.5-3.82 
Slovenia 10.8 4/3.78 2.7-2.85 
Spain 35.5 12.3/7.25 2.88-4.89 
Sweden 28.7 6.3/3.47 4.55-8.27 
United Kingdom 12.9 7/3.92 1.84-3.29 
Source: Melossi, 2013, p: 126-127, in Tom Daems, Dirk van Zyl Smit and Sonja 
Snacken  (eds). 
2.12.2 Criminalisation processes of immigrants 
According to Melossi (2013a) recent data on US imprisonment rates have shown that 
foreign– born males of all American ethnic groups are systematically lower than those of US- 
born incarcerated males. Furthermore, Sampson’s (2006) noted that first generations of 
migrants are in a sense more ‘protected’ based on tight familial ties. Thus, immigrants try to 
avoid the consequences of any type of criminal and deviant behaviour. After all immigrants 
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have more to lose than natives (Melossi, 2013b) because foreigners have additional sanctions 
such as deportation. 
Recent criminological discussions on immigration in Europe have been focused on the 
connection between crime and migration. One of the most common characteristics between 
EU member countries- flows from Southern and Eastern Europe and extends to most parts of 
Central Europe and appears to be at the centre of their immigration laws, that is characterised 
by a criminogenic effect (see further Melossi, 2013b). Political, media and public discussions 
in these countries are evolved around the notion that ‘foreigners are committing more crime 
than natives’. However, European research demonstrates that foreigners’ contribution in 
Greece, for example, has been exaggerated by political and media voices, with the majority 
of migrants breaching immigration rules (Cheliotis, 2013). In addition, in Italy, crime levels 
amongst immigrants are very close to the rates of Italians (Melossi, 2013b; Caritas, 2009). An 
important element of ‘crimmigrant’ discourse in Greece, Cyprus, Italy and Spain evolves 
around immigrants’ status (documented or undocumented) and the risk of deviant behaviour. 
In other words, living and/or working in societies with multiple legislative and normative 
restrictions increases risk factors for criminal behaviour enormously (Melossi, 2013b). Before 
the advent of the financial crisis in the Southern region of Europe, unskilled labour was in 
demand with those aspiring to work in these countries entering by any means possible. For 
example, in Italy immigrants enter the country with boats through Lampedusa, in Cyprus 
through the Green line and by foot in Greece through the Albanian borders. Before 2011, in 
these countries immigrant flow was based on the notion that immigrants would be granted the 
permission to stay through individual or collective amnesty pardons (Melossi, 2013). 
However, the problems caused by the financial crisis in 2011 has increased migrants’ 
unemployment and caused the mass exodus of many migrants residing across Europe (see 
further Papademetriou et al., 2010).  
2.13 The meaning and significance of ‘Bordered’ Society 
Recent research evidence (Aas, 2007; Calavita, 2005a; Pratt and Valverde, 2002; Pickering 
and Weber, 2006; Melossi, 2013b) suggests that foreigners and particularly asylum seekers 
and refugees are involved in criminalisation discourses in all spheres of social life from 
government policy and legislation to media and public discussions (Boshworth and Guild, 
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2008). Bosworth (2007), for example, suggests that the mechanisms of border saw a rapid 
expansion and depended on the criminalisation of non- citizens. 
As Brown (2010) argues sovereignty is ‘a peculiar border concept’ (p: 52) and its meaning 
denotes supremacy and autonomy; and the state’s ability to be ‘a decisive power of rule and 
as freedom from occupation by another’ (Brown, 2010, p: 52). These two meanings have 
traditionally belonged to internal and external spheres of security (Aas, 2013b). Historically, 
internal security was preserved by the creation of criminal law and capable policing, whose 
task has been to create a well disciplined and ordered society. On the other hand, military 
security as well as border security and migration laws have governed external security, in 
order to preserve the states integrity and autonomy (Aas, 2013b). According to Aas (2013b) 
the role of border control is to ‘maintain clear boundaries between the inside and the outside 
of the state – the maintenance of the bordered society’ (p: 23).  
Traditionally, border issues and crime control were part of different domains; Stumpf (2006) 
observes that they share significant similarities. For example, they both share and promote 
the language of protection and security and act as ‘gatekeepers of membership’ (Aas, 2013b, 
p: 23). Questions of who belongs and what kind of rights they should enjoy are to be found in 
the states penal sanctions as well as in decision to expel and deny entry. The last two decades 
have seen intensified globalisation processes and by default have destabilised the boundaries 
between internal and external security, between policing and soldiering, and between 
migration and criminal law. Hence, sovereignty has become an unclear, fragmented and 
highly contested aspect (see further Andreas and Price, 2001, Stumpf, 2006). 
According to Sassen (2008) globalisation processes have resulted in novel assemblages of 
territory, authority and rights. According to Sassen’s (2008) observations, a shift away from 
‘centripetal nation- state articulation’, –where the state aggregates most of territory and 
authority to a ‘centrifugal multiplication of specialised assemblages’, which disrupts 
normative arrangements (see further Aas, 2013b). Lipper and Pyykone (2012), suggest that 
assemblage is a concept of disparate elements that work together in harmony. An interesting 
feature of the ‘ordered’ and the ‘bordered’ is the complexity of existing control practices, 
population and actors involved in them, and demands an examination of the state’s 
constitution in different institutional, national and historical configurations. As Aas (2013b) 
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highlights, the advantages of global assemblage are situated in its concreteness, partiality and 
situatedness. 
Over the last two decades, observers noted that ‘border is everywhere’ in an attempt to 
examine the recent proliferation of border controls and ID checks within Western territorial 
states (Aas, 2013a; Aas 2013b; Bosworth, 2007; 2008; 2013; Van der Leun and Van der 
Woude, 2011). Although, these practices are administrative in principle, their application is 
usually dependent on the practical involvement of the police force, which may result in high 
or lesser crime-fighting modus and are also intertwined with a wide range of other objectives 
such as human trafficking, terrorism, organised crime, and so on. Hence, it is important to 
note that in these contexts, these measures appear to be punitive rather than punishment. 
Contemporary penal measures, for example, vary according to the extent of immigration 
related objectives inscribed in them. In the case of the deportation of foreign national 
offenders, the penal and the bordered achieve a degree of hybridity of qualitatively different 
forms of control; what Stumpf (2006) describes as ‘crimmigration control’.  
2.14 The Northern penal state 
Recent studies (Mitsilegas, 2010, Weber and Pickering, 2011) have suggested that the 
Northern state, in order to achieve the objectives of internal – crimmigration - control, has 
expanded its control activities internationally by externalising its domestic control functions 
(see further Aas, 2013b). This is evident in the unprecedented level of deportation regimes.  
Since 2010, Frontex, the biggest European border control agency, has arranged chartered 
flights to countries such as Nigeria, Georgia, Congo, Iraq, Burundi, Kosovo, Ukraine, and 
Ecuador. The flights return to the global South, unwanted mobility including irregular 
immigrants and asylum seekers from Schengen States (Aas, 2013b).  
The organisation and transference of the ‘unwanted mobility’ is the prime interest of the 
Northern states. In 2015, for instance, 11 charted flights from the UK took place. As Aas 
(2013b) argues, several southern societies depend on remittances from the citizens living and 
the working to the North, and recent studies revealed the detrimental effects that most of the 
‘criminal returnees’ experience in their return (Weber and Bowling, 2008). However, these 
flights are supported by a complicated political and legal regime in which many of the 
southern countries are more or less active participants. Taking the European Union as an 
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example, we can see that the stick and carrot approach is particularly effective in exporting its 
migration control agenda and calls the Southern and Eastern states to take part in its policing. 
Frontex, for example, is not only acting as an important border control agency within Europe, 
by deporting the unwanted mobility, but is also responsible for border control  training 
standards and surveillance equipment, and subsequently imposes a de facto extra– 
territorialisation of the European border ( Aas, 2011, 2013). Mitsilegas (2010), for example, 
stresses a ‘convergence between models of extraterritorial immigration control globally’ (p: 
39). 
Another central feature of migration control is that of geopolitics. Although usually states are 
the main organs of criminalisation, many of the sates are not the same and some are more 
sovereign than others. As Andreas and Nedelman (2006) argue, crime control, what is illegal 
and how it is policed, usually depends on certain states, most notably the USA and  Western 
Europe. One of the main arguments of Aas (2011, 2013a, 2013b) on the objectives of 
migration are ‘formative of novel contours of criminalisation, punitiviness, and the state- the 
Northern penal state- which is crucially defined by its geopolitical positions’ (p :27). In the 
same vein, Dauvergne (2008)  notes that the Northern state has followed a punitive legal 
regime that promotes the criminalisation of certain forms of movement, effectively rendering 
a large proportion of the world population ‘illegal’. While the interests of the North drive the 
control regimes, they primarily affect citizens who reside in the South. These regimes do not 
only provide legal regulation, but also an assemblage of mechanisms i.e. policing, 
enforcement, and social exclusion due to the illegalisation that are increasingly becoming 
transnational in nature. 
2.14.1 From deviant states to deviant citizens: Exploring the hierarchies of Citizenship 
According to Guild’s (2009) definition illegal immigrants are those: 
“Whose presence of the territory the state has passed a law making mere existence a 
criminal offence” (p: 150). 
Evidently, the privilege to decide who has the right to stay in a country is a fundamental right 
of sovereign states, yet this also implies an element of selectivity. Hence, being born in the 
global South becomes a legal handicap for citizens from these countries (Aas, 2013b, Aliverti, 
2012). This legal handicap stems from the notion that there are several categories of states, 
those who are desirable (i.e. those whose mobility is to be attracted such as tourists), and 
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students -, and those states that are black listed. Dauvergne (2008) argues that illegality does 
denote a breach of immigration law, but it also entails a pervasive and insidious relationship 
between immigration, crime and insecurity. Despite heavy criticism, recently the concept of 
‘illegality’ saw a great deal of popularity on political and legal discourses that relates to 
migrants. Melossi (2013a) sends symbolic political signals with his work on ‘Criminalisation 
of immigrants’ and the progressive securitisation and criminalisation of migration today. In 
the same vein, Huysman (2006) indicates a legitimate but complex process of exclusionary 
practices. Globally, this approach has created a gradation of states according to the security 
risk presented by their migration, or what Melossi (2003a) calls their ‘deviancy’. Guild (2009) 
produced a typology based on inclusion and exclusion practices of European states:  
1. “The citizen of the state in Europe. 
2. The citizen of the European Union who is not the national of the state where he or she 
is living (expulsion and exclusion possible only on the grounds of public policy, 
public security, and public health). 
3. The citizen of the European Union who is temporarily excluded (time-limited 
restrictions for some nationals of the 2004-2007 EU enlargements). 
4. Swiss, Norwegian, Icelandic nationals. 
5. Turkish workers in the European Union. 
6. Third-country nationals with a long-term residence (who enjoy protection against 
expulsion equivalent to that of the migrant citizens of the European Union). 
7. Third- country national whose country of nationalist is on the EU’s visa white list (e.g. 
US nationals). 
8. Third- country nationals whose country of nationality is on the EU’s visa black list 
but with which the European Union has a visa facilitation agreement (e.g. Russia). 
9. Third-country nationals whose country of nationality is on the EU visa black-list and 
with which there is no visa facilitation agreement (e.g. China); there is a presumption 
that these persons pose a security risk and must obtain a visa. 
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10. Third- country nationals whose country of nationality is on the EU visa black- list and 
whose country has been specified in the EU visa rules as a country of specific security 
concern by at least one Member State” (p:188-189). 
According to Aas (2013b) such hierarchies are based on racialized and colonial ranking that 
is responsible for the level of protection, security and rights nationally, including the various 
degrees of protection against expulsion. Despite various national differences, most states 
follow the norms of cooperation with crime and immigration control objectives of the 
Northern state. Citizens from blacklisted countries (points 8, 9, 10) are described has having a 
potential risk, such as illegal immigration, criminality, and political violence.  
What we witness today is a constitution of two statehoods: the deviant state that entails 
cooperative and non- cooperative norms, and the Northern penal state, which is responsible 
for the creation, alteration and export of the ‘crimmigration control’ agenda. This tendency is 
neither new nor unusual; the US sponsored war on drugs, money laundering and anti-
trafficking laws. What is important, though, is that in the case of migration control, the 
deviant status of the state has direct impact and consequences on its citizens (see further Aas, 
2013b). Taking the example of Frontex and its risk analysis on the ‘Top Ten Nationalities’ 
rankings, countries are classified according to the probability of their citizens to illegal stay, 
refusal of entry, asylum seeking applications, false documentation applications etc. This has 
resulted in an anathema of practices related to the identification of the mobile ‘subject’. For 
example, the rise in the use of biometric ID cards and passports, and DNA databases are 
raising fears that relates to surveillance and security issues.  
What we are witnessing is on one hand the legal production and creation of standards of 
conduct and governance in the North, and on the other hand Southern compliance and the 
import of standards for trading and mobility benefits and the potential of EU membership. 
2.15 Conclusion 
There has been an increase in interest in the factors that contributed to the surge in the prison 
population throughout the world. The objective of this study is to examine the complexity of 
these factors and their interconnection. Existing literature on the sociology of punishment and 
penal politics suggests that today crime has become highly politicized which has resulted in 
increased punitiveness. This chapter has shown how current penal policies utilise a victim- 
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centric character that is often used by national governments for electioneering proposes. 
What informs populist punitiveness today - bloated prison numbers, harsher penalties, 
dilapidated prison conditions, emotional and expressive forms of punishment, the increased 
obsession on victims’ rights, and the derogatory treatment of offenders - is directed by a 
rather punitive political discourse and attributes. However, this punitive discourse varies 
significantly between America and European states and within European states. Along with 
crime, local governments are highly concerned with their borders and sovereignty, and the 
principle of supremacy and autonomy of every country. Hence, membership and citizenship 
have become interesting elements of migration control. Therefore, it does not come as a that 
the Northern state has followed a punitive legal regime that promotes the criminalisation of 
certain forms of movement by rendering a large proportion of the world population ‘illegal’. 
The next chapter uses existing work in sociology of punishment and penal politics to the role 
of history in shaping criminal justice in Cyprus. In doing so, the next chapter offers a 
historical inquiry into politics as a central feature of crime and criminal justice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
Chapter 3: Cyprus setting and context 
Over the past few years, Cyprus has been through a plethora of protests against austerity 
measures caused by the financial crisis in 2013, political scandals, high levels of 
unemployment and endless changes in taxation. Cypriot politicians found themselves 
unqualified and unprepared to handle the situation effectively. The political response to the 
financial crisis has created misconceptions about the acute levels of crime activity and how it 
is being dealt with. It is necessary to go behind this alarming façade to consider the history, 
demographics and the current situation in Cyprus in the context of crime and punishment. 
What follows is a picture of the fundamental components of the Cypriot criminal justice 
system in an attempt to gather information of the cultural and social factors, two crucial 
elements of crime and penal policies (see further Karstedt, 2015). Additionally, this chapter 
introduces important information on the current challenges facing the Cypriot prison system, 
with particular reference made to material conditions of detention, health services and self- 
harm and suicides. Lastly, the chapter uncovers how and why the police raided the prison in 
an attempt to save it from anarchy and corruption. 
3.1 Cyprus - Crime, Punishment and Criminology: An introduction 
Since 2004, the Cypriot Commission for Administration (Ombudsman) encouraged the 
government to take action against the inhumane prison conditions and injustice that many 
prisoners suffered from. Criminological research in Cyprus is scarce, therefore, solutions on 
crime problems, ways of preventing it and treatment of detainees is absent. However, the 
issues of crime and punishment have generated increasing public attention in the aftermath of 
‘January events’ – more discussion on this topic will follow. In 2016, the European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) have called the government to promote 
and implement measures - including research studies - to address issues such as the intolerant 
and xenophobic political discourses, injustice amongst non- nationals and the violation of 
fundamental human rights of non- nationals held in detention facilities in Cyprus. 
The national Crime and Safety Survey (2009) found Cyprus has a raised consciousness of 
safety and crime that not only matches but indeed significantly exceeds that of their European 
counterparts. When included in international comparative studies in the late 2000s, Cyprus 
was ranked amongst the most crime-fearing countries in Europe and beyond (Hummelsheim 
et al., 2010). Juxtaposing the findings of a nationwide Crime and Safety Survey (2009) with 
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those of the International Crime Victimisation Survey (ICVS) of 2004 – in which Cyprus did 
not participate – 79 per cent of the Cypriot respondents expressed fears of burglary 
victimisation, a rate that is two times higher than the European average, and higher than any 
recorded rate since ICVS was launched back in 1989 (in Van Dijk, 2008). In the same vein, 
data from the Eurobarometer (2013) have shown that only 35 per cent of Cypriot respondents 
have trust in the CJS. Moreover, the survey has shown that fifty-three per cent of the 
respondents reported that the Cypriot justice system is worse than other EU systems.  Also, in 
2000 the World Values Survey has shown that 63.7 per cent of the respondents have 
confidence in the national justice system ( in Inglehart, 2000). Likewise, recent literature 
(Roberts, 2005; 2013) found that public hold punitive attitudes towards crime and 
punishment based on what they perceive as rising crime and a lack of confidence and trust in 
the CJS.  
According to Harrendorf et al. (2010) significant segments of the public in Cyprus appear to 
favour punitive criminal justice polices especially the use of imprisonment. Cyprus’s rate of 
support for imprisonment is also demonstrated by the International Statistics on Crime and 
Justice of 2010 (in Harrendorf et al., 2010). Likewise, data from the Eurobarometer (2009) 
have shown that in Cyprus public opinion about sentences are particularly lenient, especially 
in regards to drug traffickers, rapists and any type of offence that is alleged to be committed 
by non- nationals. Ideas put forward by Trimikliniotis (1999; 2001; 2005; 2007; 2009; 2014) 
resonate with the idea of the ‘vicious circle’ an ill-informed public asking for harsher 
penalties in an attempt to improve public safety, which is in turn used by politicians to 
suggest more punitive policies for electioneering purposes. While not backed up by research, 
Trimikliniotis (2014) suggests that the connection between non-nationals with criminality 
became a core topic for discussion for politicians just before the Parliamentary Elections in 
2003, and again after the accession of Cyprus into the EU, where politicians demonised the 
presence of ‘unwanted mobility’, especially those coming from Schengen States. In order to 
gather more votes, the government hired hundreds of police officers and created more police 
units in the process of harmonisation with the European standards. This has resulted in 
Cypriot politicians misleading the public of the acute levels of criminal activity and thus 
creating a culture of fear and punitive attitude towards crime and punishment. 
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Although, the causes of the rise in the prison population have been examined in a large 
number of jurisdictions worldwide, in Cyprus the need for more research is pertinent. This 
study focuses on the determinants of public opinion and queries whether crime rates, welfare 
expenditure and migration policies are important in the formation of Cypriot attitudes 
towards crime and punishment. This study also addresses how politicians’ rhetoric around 
crime and punishment has created an anti-tolerant and chauvinistic environment and with a 
punitive public, which in turn prompts politicians to respond with strict and harsh policies in 
order to gain more votes.  
Having shown that research undertaken recognises crime activity and penal punitiveness as 
core elements of the rise in the prison population, this section comprises important 
demographic information of the penitentiary system in the Republic of Cyprus. 
3.2 Current prison population 
The prison population in Cyprus has undergone substantial change in both, qualitative and 
quantitative terms. According to the latest annual penal statistics by the Council of Europe, at 
the end of September 2012, the population of the Central Jail of Nicosia was 973, with an 
official capacity of 550 (Aebi et al., 2016). Today it is widely agreed, although not by all 
politicians, that the number of prisoners in the CJN is alarmingly high. As Figure 3.1 clearly 
indicates, the Cypriot prison population followed a steady upward trend, despite a substantial 
decrease of the use in imprisonment in several European countries in 2010. These figures 
place Cyprus in the group of Southern European countries occupying a central part in the 
punitiveness ladder that characterises most western countries. In March 2014, the Cypriot 
Ombudsman estimated that by 2017, the prison population would reach a record high of 2000 
if current trends continue to soar. This is not, however, an accurate picture, as evidence 
suggests that imprisonment rates are much higher. The latest Report (2014) published by the 
Ombudsman Office, for example, suggests that more than 300 detainees serving short – 
sentences are detained in police stations across the country. 
Among the contributing factors to the rise of the prison population is the hardening of 
sentencing policies and practices, especially those associated with the war on drugs and 
illegal immigration. Legislation passed in the early years of 2000s epitomises a ‘tough on 
crime’ turn, with judges competing in penal austerity and harshness to prove their integrity 
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under the shadow of major corruption scandals. This is clearly reflected in prisoner numbers 
serving longer sentences, and the incarceration of illegal immigrants, constituting an 
additional burden for the prison administration. Official prison statistics published by the 
Council of Europe indicate that the prison population is predominantly male (1255 prisoners), 
young (in 2011 65% of the convicted prisoners were between 30- 39 years old), 59% of the 
convicts were unmarried, and only 38% of the convicted prisoners have completed the 
compulsory nine-year education period ( Aebi et al., 2016). 
Figure 3.1 Prison population rate per 100 000 population, average per year, 2005-2007 
and 2008- 2010 
 
  
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Main_Page. 
A striking element of the prison population is that of the ethnic composition of prisoners. 
Within a period of ten years, the presence of non-nationals within the Cypriot penitentiary 
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system is staggering (see Figure 3.2). Recent research evidence by Hodgson (2011) reveals 
that today, 54% of the prison population consist of non-nationals, placing Cyprus as the 
second European member state with the third highest number of foreign detainees including 
non-national EU citizens and 3rd Country nationals (Green Paper, 2011). 
Figure 3.2 The percentage of foreign national and national prisoners in 2011 
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Source: Criminal Statistics, Ministry of Justice and Public Order 
According to the latest available data published by the Council of Europe (CPT, 2013) the 
non-national prison population varies significantly in terms of prisoner’s ethno- cultural 
identity, age, religion, offence, penal status, living in extreme conditions of extreme 
overcrowding. Furthermore, the social profile of non-nationals (currently from 66 different 
countries) differs significantly from that of Cypriot nationals: low status jobs, limited family 
ties and social support, and less economic means than Cypriots. In addition, nearly half of the 
foreign national prisoners are awaiting trial for immigration offences. Figure 3.3 establishes a 
clear-cut over-representation of non-nationals awaiting trial in the Cypriot prison 
establishment. 
Finally, non-national prisoners do not enjoy the benefits that national prisoners are entitled to 
such as prison leave. Although, the last fifteen years have not seen significant changes in 
relation to the social characteristics of the prison population as mentioned above, very 
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recently a small but significant segment of the prison population is formed by the middle and 
upper class (Ruggiero and Ryan, 2013). 
Figure 3.3 Absolute numbers of foreign national and national prisoners awaiting trial         
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Source: Criminal Statistics, Ministry of justice and Public Order 
3.3 Cyprus: Background and Demographics 
Cyprus’s strategic position at the crossroads of three continents and in the middle of the 
ancient world (Egypt, Mesopotamia, Greece and Turkey) has shaped its destiny throughout 
the centuries. The plethora of colonisers and conquerors (i.e. Greeks, Phoenicians, Assyrians, 
Egyptians, Persians, Romans, Franks, Turks and British) has left behind the imprint of their 
presence. Greek amphitheatres and columns, Roman mosaics, Byzantine churches, Turkish 
mosques, are all indelibly stamped on the surface of Cyprus today.  
Regarding crime, Cyprus’s geographical position is seen a contributory factor. Politi (1999, 
p: 51) argues that Cyprus is a centre providing ‘offshore banking facilities and fiscal 
incentives, a natural magnet for money laundry schemes’ (see further Ledyaeva et al., 2013). 
According to Trimikliniotis (2005; 2007; 2009; 2015, Trimikliniotis et al., 2015), following 
the collapse of Beirut during the 1980’s, Cyprus being the nearest regional centre, has 
become the biggest commercial centre in the Middle East. In addition, a decade later, the 
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collapse of Eastern European Communist regimes, allowed investment to emerge from the 
newly emergent bourgeoisies from these countries (Trimikliotis, 2001).  
According to the latest Census statistics, 840,407 people are living in Cyprus (Census, 2011), 
half of whom live in the capital city of Nicosia (Census, 2011). This means that 
approximately 50 per cent of the economy’s sectors are located in Nicosia. Other major cities 
are Larnaka, Ammochostos, Limassol and Paphos. For the past two decades, Cyprus became 
a famous destination amongst immigrants. The origin country of these immigrants varies 
from Middle East and Eastern Europe to Asia. Recent research studies (Trimikliniotis, 2001; 
2005, Trimikliniotis et al., 2015) indicates that a large proportion of non-nationals reside in 
Cyprus illegally. The exact number of non- nationals residing in Cyprus is not clear, 
although, national statistics recorded that 170, 000 non- nationals are currently living in 
Cyprus (Census, 2011), which corresponds to around 20% of the total population. However, 
if one is to include undocumented migrants, then the numbers of immigrants is considerably 
larger than the aforesaid figures. A fuller discussion of immigration in Cyprus will be given 
in a later chapter, including the reasons for migration and major issues discussed with relation 
to migration in Cyprus. And finally, 98 per cent of the population are of Christian Orthodox 
faith, and under the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, the Armenians, the Latins and the 
Maronites are recognised as minority ‘religious groups’ (US International Religious Freedom 
Report, 2010). 
While Cyprus is proudly the birth country of Aphrodite, the Greek Goddess of beauty and 
love, nowadays, Cyprus is associated with its economic crisis, major political scandals, and 
strikes against the austerity measures imposed by the national government. In February 2016, 
42,000 people were unemployed, a number that is estimated at approximately 19% of the 
total population. In August 2015, the total unemployment number was 32,000; however, this 
rapid growth of unemployment was caused by the new (austerity) measures imposed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to correct fiscal imbalances and to improve 
competiveness (see further Michaelides and Orphanides, 2016). 
In March 2012, five years after joining the Eurozone, Cyprus went bankrupt, raising 
questions about how a country that in 2008 had satisfied the strict Maastricht criteria, was cut 
off from international markets in 2011 and faced default by the end of 2012. According to 
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Zenios (2013b) the debt crisis in Cyprus was caused by a state of seven different aspects 
which have been described as ‘the perfect crisis’: 1. Contagion, 2. Herd behaviour, 3. Faulty 
lending, 4.Silent auditors, 5. Inadequate supervision, 6. Spendthrift government, 7. Shallow 
government guarantees. According to Zenios (2013b) before the advent of the financial crisis 
in Cyprus, households, organisations and the government accumulated excessive debt. While 
the country’s competitiveness was deteriorating, the banking sectors were dangerously 
expanding. These conditions have assisted the financial disaster when the international crisis 
erupted. During the period 2008- 2011, Cyprus lost access to international markets, and banks 
recorded losses of 4.6 million. During this period, public debt grew from 52.9 % GDP in 
2008 to 71.1% GDP in 2011. Along with the 4.3 billion losses of the banking sector caused 
by the Greek private sector involvement, the independence between banking and public 
finances was deemed crucial. Without an effective policy in place, Cyprus soon exited 
international markets. The period 2012-2013, saw the Cypriot President negotiating for an 
assistance package with international lenders under strict conditionality (Michaelides and 
Orphanides, 2016). In addition, politicians have blocked appropriate policy response, with 
initial banking losses of 4.6 million to 21.6 billion. The Cyprus crisis culminated on March 
25, 2013, with the Eurogroup meeting, where Cyprus was put under the strict supervision of 
the international lenders (Michaelides and Orphanides, 2016). In April 2013, deposits above 
100,000 were used to by the government to contribute towards the bailout. 
From that day until now (May 2017), issues such as the country’s debt, capital controls, 
political scandals and fears over the possibility of exit from the EU, have been ever- present. 
For the past three years, the country has suffered massive strikes and protests against 
emergency taxes and the harsh measures proposed by international lenders including the 
massive layoffs of workers in the public sector and the privatisation of the Cyprus 
Telecommunications Authority and the Electricity Authority of Cyprus. 
In April 07 2016, the President Anastasiadhs, in a review conference on his three years of 
governance, proudly claimed that: 
“The government will continue with full determination consensus policies and hard 
work to avoid the mistakes of the past and enduring pathologies that led us to the 
crisis we have experienced and still experiencing” (Politis, 2016). 
61 
 
According to Panayi and Zenios (2015) the crisis that the President was referring to is 
associated with a ‘grande’ corruption at all societal levels, tax evasion, bribery practices 
between politicians and private companies, and the inadequate supervision of banks. The 
newly elected President Nicos Anastasiadhs (DHSY) laid the blame on the previous 
government led by Dimitris Christofias (AKEL). On March 23 2016, the Cypriot Minister of 
Finance, Charis Georgiadhs, announced that Cyprus officially exited its three-year Economic 
Adjustment Programme (also known as Memorandum - Mνημόνιο) which included the 
implementation of a reform agenda to ensure financial stability, improve public finances and 
economic growth. Today (June 2016), Cyprus is under post- programme surveillance until the 
75 per cent of the financial assistance is repaid. This difficult financial situation of the 
Cypriot economy had serious implications on the prison establishment too. The first signs 
occurred in 2011 when the prison budget saw a significant drop to £18, 727 545 from 21, 862 
323 in 2010 (Panayi and Zenios, 2015). In 2013, and within the spirit of ‘austerity’ measures, 
the prison department was ordered to cut costs by 24 per cent, a fact that negatively affected 
the quality of life of prisoners. In addition, in 2016, the general government total expenditure 
on public order and safety stood at 1.7 per cent of GDP, with only 0.1 per cent spent on the 
prison, whilst Cyprus spent the highest amount of GDP, 1.4 per cent, on police services 
(Zenios, 2013a).  
3.4 History of nationalism in a divided state 
According to Karstedt (2001, 2015) penal policies are cultural polices. The Cypriot landscape 
of penal culture is characterised by particular historic trajectories that require identification.  
Values, ideas and ideologies are central to the concept of culture and have an important 
impact on the systems of crime control, as the history in Cyprus has shown (see further 
Karstedt 2001; Braithwaite, 1989). Crime and social control have become expressions of the 
wider culture, thus indicate and produce evidence about the structure of its inner core. 
Cyprus is a relatively young Republic (1960) and gained independency after eighty years of 
British rule in January 1960. Ever since it has remained a member of the Commonwealth and 
the Non- Aligned Movement (Hadjidemetriou, 1995). Cyprus joined the European Union 
(EU) as a de facto divided island in 2004 and is the third smallest country in EU, after Malta 
and Luxemburg. In 1974, the Turkish invasion left the country divided into two communities: 
62 
 
the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot. The consequences that followed after the division 
and the chronicle of the invasion are internationally recognised as the ‘Cyprus problem’. 
According to Mavratsas (1999) “the ‘Cyprus problem’ as we understand it today, emerged 
out of the clash between the two nationalisms ( Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot)  and 
perhaps, more importantly, out of the manipulation of this clash by foreign interests” (p: 91). 
In Cyprus, nationalism has been seen as a polymorphous phenomenon, directed and fuelled 
by political ideologies, cultural forces and economic interests (see further Mavratsas, 1996; 
1997; 1999; 2003). 
There can be little doubt that Greek-Cypriot nationalism has been the dominant political 
ideology in the modern history of Cyprus. Both Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot 
communities “have experienced strong feelings of ‘motherland nationalism’ and maintained 
loyalty to the national centres of Ankara and Athens respectively” (Loizides, 2007: p: 173). 
Both communities perceived common origin, destiny and history with Turkey and Greece 
respectively, an instrument that was later used to create two opposing and highly competitive 
nationalist projects (Loizides 2007). Starting from the late nineteenth century, Greek -
Cypriots saw their destinies linked to the ancient and glorious Hellenic past, which was 
predicated on the Megali Idea (Great Idea)1. Enosis (a term usually used to express the great 
desire for Unification with Greece) became the predominant form of Greek-Cypriot 
nationalism with very particular constituents and driving forces. In the case of Greek-
Cypriots, Enosis was based on the chauvinistic and romantic-idealist approach that was 
espoused in the history of the Hellenic world (see further Faustmann, 1998). Additionally, it 
was largely conservative in nature and strictly followed and fuelled by the Greek Orthodox 
Church.  
In the middle of the nineteenth century, ‘Cypriotism’ (Civic nationalism) appeared as the 
main internal opposition against Greek-Cypriot nationalism.  This new political ideology and 
cultural discourse, positioned Cypriot identity as the primary one. This territorial nationalism, 
proposed that Greek-Cypriots should consider their Cypriot identity first (Mavratsas 1996). In 
broad terms, Cypriotism saw Cyprus as an independent entity form the two motherlands 
                                                          
1 “The PanHellenic Ideology that the Byzantine Empire would again be recreated and which included Cyprus in 
its irredentist claim” (Anthias and Ayres, 1983: p: 62). 
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(Greece and Turkey). Such a statement is in direct contrast with the nationalist ideology that 
sees the island as a natural extension of Greece for the Greek-Cypriots and Turkey for the 
Turkish-Cypriots. However, Cypriotism was not disengaging from the cultural, social and 
political structures of Greece and Turkey respectively; rather, it argued that the ethnic identity 
and most importantly the culture of the two communities had some common grounds and 
features. 
3.4.1 Cultural Considerations 
Unlike traditional individualistic western societies, but very similar to Mediterranean and the 
Middle Eastern traditions, it could be argued that Cypriot culture has been based upon 
‘conscience collective’ norms and customs (Georgas et al., 1997) placing particular emphasis 
not only on the needs, values and preferences of the individual and nuclear family but also 
those of the extended family and close friends (Georgas et al, 2001). Since time immemorial, 
the Cypriot family has been seen as a central institution in society and a significant 
instrument of social cohesion (Georgas et al., 2001).  
Despite the recent urbanisation and modernisation of the Cypriot society, family ties and 
affairs have been always treated with reverence and remain strong to date. Georgiou (1995) 
argues that family values are not always solid and firm but heavily depend on the community. 
More specifically, Georgiou (1995) described Cypriot families as highly cohesive and 
community orientated, with a great emphasis given to the social norms and to what the 
Cypriot community defines as appropriate and inappropriate (Tsoudis, 2001). Research 
evidence indicates a significant controlling power of social sanctions within Cypriot society 
(Tsoudis, 2001). In addition Tartter (1993), found low criminality and imprisonment within 
Cypriot society as the outcome of the closeness of the family, the upholding of the family’s 
honour and reputation and finally the social pressures for achievement and recognition (in 
Solsten, 1993). Furthermore, Peristiany (1965) describes shame and honour as two crucial 
components and valuable sentiments of the Cypriot society. 
3.4.2 Fragmentation and Bipolarization: the political culture of Cyprus 
Criminologists and sociologists have long sought to establish a connection between crime 
activity and political culture (see Simon 2000; 2007). Today, crime offers a new style of 
political governance by utilising a strong sentiment of vengeance and incapacitation (Simon, 
2007). Levels of imprisonment are the results from policy choices and political actions, in a 
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given political culture. Penal policy in Cyprus, for example, has been partially seen as the 
outcome of a bipolar and fragmented political system. Cyprus is amongst the European 
countries with the smallest electorate, only 530,000 in 2014, a fact that makes it more 
susceptible to small town political structures, characterised by political patronage, nepotism 
and favouritism. According to Christophorou (2006), Cyprus is a peculiar case of the 
Southern European family and deeply affected by its volatile history; it is a de facto European 
divided state with two separate party systems. The Greek- Cypriot government is running 
under a presidential system, whilst the Turkish- Cypriot government has a parliamentary 
system with enhanced powers for the president (Christophorou, 2006). 
According to Katsourides (2013b), the political parties in Cyprus are extremely powerful and 
influential. Cyprus’s belated appreciation of the benefits of independence (Papadakis et al., 
2006) has given little opportunity for the development and establishment of a civic and 
democratic culture (Katsourides, 2013b). Nationalism, for example, was the dominant feature 
of the twentieth century. The constitution of the Republic provides a clear separation of 
powers: the president holds executive power and is not accountable to the Parliament 
(Katsourides, 2013a). However, the political structure is solely centred on political parties: 
they are the exclusive nominators of presidents and deputies as well as mayors and municipal 
councillors (Katsourides, 2012, 2013b). 
Certainly, politics in Cyprus has a dominant character. As Mouzelis (1994) argues, this is a 
residue of a society that experienced late development. A key element of the political culture 
is the way in which political parties and politicians firmly control all social and institutional 
domains (see further Faustmann, 2010). The political agenda influences all spheres of social 
life: the education system; welfare spending; health provisions; criminal justice system; 
media reporting etc (Katsourides, 2013b). This situation is further intensified by the unsolved 
Cyprus problem, which has been at the centre of political parties, and which has significantly 
contributed to the politicisation of the Cypriot society. Mavratsas (2003), for example, argues 
that the unsolved Cyprus problem has contributed to the atrophy of civic society and 
prominence of political parties. This atrophy involves the mass media’s lack of autonomy; the 
powerful role of the Cyprus Orthodox Church; the social marginalisation of immigrants and 
other vulnerable societal groups; corporatism; and the dominance of nationalism that 
encompasses high levels of intolerance (see further Mouzelis, 1986). 
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In Cyprus, the evolution of political parties has not changed drastically. Since 1974, for 
example, nearly ninety five per cent of the votes were received by four political parties: 
namely AKEL, DHSY, EDEK and DHKO. Although there have been signs of change, and 
regardless of the different approaches to partisanship, Cyprus has witnessed a pervasiveness 
of the party identification and partisan loyalties (Katsourides, 2009). According to 
Christophorou (2001, p: 97) the most striking feature of Cypriot politics is that of continuity 
in voting patterns, which according to Katsouride’s ( 2009) discoveries, is inherited through 
the family, where most electors feel a general allegiance  to a political party. The section 
below intends to give a brief overview of the manifestations of political parties in Cyprus 
today, considering the attached weight of party rhetoric and positions towards crime and 
imprisonment in general. 
On the Left 
AKEL (Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού) was founded under British colonial rule in 
1941 and accepted legitimacy and authority as a major political party until today. Over the 
years, the party has remained faithful to its Marxist-Leninist communist ideals though 
without proclaiming revolutionary positions and ideologies. AKEL is the party for the 
working class and the left progressive forces (Sepos, 2008). In the last Parliamentary election, 
the party received nineteen seats. Christophorou (2007) underscores that AKEL is the largest 
communist party in Europe and places particular emphasis on independence, sovereignty, 
demilitarisation, democracy, socialism, tolerance and acceptance (Sepos, 2008). For the past 
twenty years, AKEL sees crime as a symptom of well-hidden social problems that need some 
form of restoration. At the heart of AKEL’s law and order plans after Cyprus became a 
European country was the extension of community policing. AKEL, were the first to 
recognise low morale and a certain degree of corruption in the police and prison services.  
The mainstream right 
DHSY (Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός) was founded in 1976 by Glafkos Clerides (President of 
the Republic, 1993-2003) and cadres from the Unified Party and the Progressive Front, which 
collapsed following support by some of their officials for the coup against Makarios in 1974. 
The party gained full legitimacy in 1985 following the success of the parliamentary election 
in 1983. Today DHSY is the largest party and holds twenty seats. According to Sepos (2008) 
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the party adheres to western ideals of democracy, freedom and justice is based on right- wing 
crime reduction rhetoric. The right wing crime policy is based upon retribution and 
incapacitation. For the last fifteen years, the party provides a punitive stance for those 
breaking the law, rejects other explanations of the causes of crime and celebrates individual 
responsibility. In 2004, under pressure to harmonise legislation and practices, entrance and 
promotion criteria for the police and prison department become more objective. Most of their 
policy positions includes an opposition to illegal immigration and a strong national military 
force. In 2013, the Anastasiadis government (which is supported by DHSY) implemented a 
tough immigration law due to the ongoing migrant crisis.    
Left of Centre 
EDEK (Κίνημα Σοσιαλδημοκρατών) was created in 1969 by Vassos Lyssaridhs. Historically, 
the party favoured the socialist ideals with an open, well equipped and trained national health 
system, and the nationalisation of the banking system. In the last Parliamentary elections 
EDEK received five seats. The law and order agenda for EDEK is based on the notion that an 
increase in police officers will deter offenders more rather than tougher sentences. 
Additionally the party supports the national and international human rights watchdog 
organisation’s arguments for an increase in availability of jobs and training programmes for 
prisoners, aiming to reduce reoffending rates and prison numbers in general.  
The Centre ground 
DIKO (Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα) was founded in 1976 by Spyros Kyprianou, Makarios’ 
successor. The party is located on the left of centre and aims to offer citizens an alternative to 
left wing AKEL and right wing DHSY.  The party have been an advocate for meritocracy, 
human rights and European acquis. Today, DIKO is the third largest political party and has 
nine seats in the Parliament. In 2014, the party recognised the need for fairer and more 
tolerant treatment by the police and prison services, however these positions were passive. 
Their attitudes towards crime and crime prevention are similar to the traditional right wing 
view that criminals need to take responsibility for their actions and receive appropriate 
punishment, which also helps to deter others from committing the same or other crimes.  
Other parties 
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The Ecological Environmental Movement -Cyprus’ Green Party- was founded in 1996 and 
emphasise political ecology and environmentalism. During the last election, the party secured 
one seat, after calling for military withdrawal from Cyprus and opposing any kind of division 
based on geography, ethnicity or religion. 
Political parties with a constituency less than five per cent include the newly founded  
European Party (Eυρωπαϊκό Kόμμα) and European Democracy (Ευρωπαϊκή Δημοκρατία), 
both of which are nationalist parties with right wing ideology and principles. The United 
Democrats (Ενωμένοι Δημοκράτες), a party formed by the President George Vasiliou (1988-
1993) are in the political centre (Sepos, 2008). 
3.5 Features of the Cypriot Criminal Justice System  
Given that this study seeks to understand why the prison population is rising, it is necessary 
to explore the structures of each criminal justice agency in Cyprus. Rooted in Hirsch’s (1976) 
just deserts rationale, the Cypriot prison system was revised in 1996 to strengthen, at least on 
paper, the mission of the prison department as described in the previous chapter. The 
organisation of the prison is primarily based on the Prison Law, the Criminal Code (Cap 154) 
and Criminal Procedure Law (Cap 155). The responsibility of the function and operation of 
the penitentiary system in Cyprus lies on the Cypriot Ministry of Justice and Public Order. 
The relevant constitutional provisions are provided in Article 11 of the Cypriot Constitution. 
The main crime control agencies in the Republic of Cyprus consist of the Police Department, 
public prosecutors, coastguards and the customs service. According to Zalaf and Wood (2009) 
the Cyprus Police is based on a militaristic regime and since 1993 is under the Ministry of 
Justice and Public Order. According to the Council of Europe Report (Eurostat, 2015) the 
largest number of police officers (631 per 100,000 inhabitants) were in Cyprus, compared to 
the size of population.  
In relation to the judicial system, the judiciary in Cyprus is manifestly rooted in the Anglo- 
Saxon system of Law (Ker–Lindsay and Faustmann, 2008). The Supreme Council of 
Judicature, a body that consists of all the judges of the Supreme Court (Xatzimihail, 2013), 
appoints judges. Only the President of the Republic appoints the judges of the Supreme 
Court. Once appointed, a judge cannot be removed except under very exceptional 
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circumstances. In 2014, there were eighty-five judges serving the Courts of first instance and 
thirteen judges serving in the Supreme Court. Moreover, sixty per cent of the judges were 
male and forty per cent female. In relation to the court system, there are Courts of two 
instances in Cyprus: the Supreme Court (second instance) and the various courts of first 
instance such as District courts, Assize courts, Family courts, Rent Control Tribunal, 
Industrial Disputes Tribunal, and Military court. Probation is a relatively new agency 
enforced by the Ministry of Justice and Public Order in 2005 and voted in 1996. According to 
Eliades (2005) probation order was seen as the only reliable and effective interim measure of 
punishment of juveniles and other ‘inexperienced’ offenders. Today, probation order aims to 
decongest the prison population and support offenders. Nowadays, only seven probation 
officers are employed, despite its urgent need. 
3.6 The prison in Cyprus: A historical development 
In the last years of the occupation of Cyprus by the Ottoman Empire, the prison was housed 
in an old Ottoman inn, the so called Buyuk Han – Μπουγιουκ Χαν (1878- 1893); nowadays 
this is not controlled by the Government of Cyprus and is located in the northern part of the 
divided Nicosia (see further Iacovides, 2012). As Figure 3.4 illustrates, Buyuk Han was a 
prison with a ‘Panoptic’ influence in a Benthamic sense. It was designed to accommodate up 
to eighty prisoners Dreghorn (1979) and detained prisoners from all districts across Cyprus, 
whose sentences were more than six months. 
Figure 3.4 The Buyuk Han today  
 
(Photographed by the researcher, 2014) 
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The Panopticon prison design consisted of a central circular watchtower (where the guards 
were located) surrounded by an outer circular structure comprised of prisoners’ cells. 
According to Dreghorn (1979) the prison structure aimed to maintain continual observation, 
where guards had the chance to observe a lot of prisoners. The cells were likened to small 
theatres, “perfectly individualised and constantly visible” (Foucault, 1975: p: 200). Prisoners 
whose sentences were shorter than six months were kept in the District prisons located in the 
rest of the five cities of the island (Cyprus Prison Department, 2011). District prisons 
progressively began closing down in the middle of the 1940s, and by 1950 only two District 
prisons were functioning, one in Paphos and another one in Famagusta. Prior to being a 
prison, Bougiouk Han inn provided accommodation to travellers from Antalya (Turkey) and 
shelter for their animals (Iacovides, 2012).  
In February 1879, Buyuk Han was taken over by the British. The British prison governor 
used the ground floor as the prison and the first floor as a space to accommodate the prison 
guards (Dreghorn, 1979). Historical records demonstrate that prisoners were peasants who 
could not meet the high taxation imposed by the state and who lived under poor and 
degrading conditions. As a result, work for prisoners was designed to enforce obedience and 
discipline.  More specifically, prisoners were forced to work endless hours in exhaustive and 
monotonous jobs such as the fracturing of stones and the manufacture of rope. A large 
numbers of prisoners died from insanitary conditions and poor diet, as prisoners were given 
only one piece of bread a day and nothing else (Council of Europe, 2007). Furthermore, 
prisoners were not allowed to have any visits as any contact with the free society was strictly 
forbidden. 
To a large extent, the operation and administration of the prison establishment at the time was 
greatly influenced by the British colonial imprisonment policies and principles. The Cypriot 
prison had followed the British prison practices and processes, and soon had transformed into 
a place of pain and torture. According to the Report of the British police governor for the year 
1899, convicted prisoners were sent to the Central prison, a place of torture and severe 
deprivation (see Council of Europe, 2007). The main principle of the prison was the safe 
detention of prisoners within the prison walls and the exemplary punishment of the detainees 
(Council of Europe, 2007). Prisoners were deprived of all essential pleasures in life, living in 
continuous isolation in unhealthy cells and under a punitive and cruel regime imposed by the 
70 
 
wardens. The sentiments which dominated in the prison were hostility, hate, rebellion, 
malevolence and scorn: sentiments which lead to a repeated loss of human lives ( Council of 
Europe, 2007). 
The Cypriot society responded with a severity that often harboured feelings of hatred towards 
convicted prisoners. According to Iacovides (2012) the conviction of prisoners brought 
shame, embarrassment and humiliation to the conservative and traditional nature of the 
familial system, where in some cases, prisoners after their release, were banned from visiting 
or speaking to other members of their families. Another important element of the prison 
regime in the era was the relationship between prisoners and prison staff. Through historical 
recordings (mainly books and reports) it is apparent that the prevailing conditions in prison at 
the time were full of hostility and hatred amongst prisoners and prison staff. This resulted in 
the creation of two factions: one for the prison staff and one for the prisoners. Prison staff 
devised various humiliating ways to enforce ‘law and order’, whilst prisoners invented new 
techniques to bypass them. This environment caused the complete undermining of the prison 
system, the sharp increase of corruption among prisoners who inevitably left prison not 
rehabilitated (Patsalidou, 2013). 
It was in 1910 that the administration of the prison saw a significant change. The arrival of 
British colonialists, for example, introduced new routines and methods of treating the 
prisoners, reflecting the spirit and the new ideas of that era. Unfortunately, the prison 
improvements were disturbed by the Independence Fight of EOKA (a national guerrilla 
organisation that fought for the end of the British rule between 1955-1959, where the prisons 
once again, became places of terrorism, torture and death for the freedom fighters). The real 
change in the perception of the mission and the purpose of the prison began after the 
declaration of Democracy in 1960 (Cyprus Prison Department, 2011). Soon it became 
apparent that the oppressive prison conditions and policies were no longer effective 
mechanisms to rehabilitate or reform prisoners. In 1970, the prison department, following the 
significant prison changes in other European countries, were forced to adopt a more humane 
prison image and regime. Prison was no longer a place of torture and isolation, but a place of 
confinement instead, where prisoners were held for their sentenced period. During this 
period, the CJN marked another significant change as, for first time, the Prison Department 
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introduced a new mission based on the means that are considered necessary for the smooth 
reintegration of offenders back into society (Prison Department, 2011). 
With the aim of achieving this objective, the Prison Department introduced new legislations 
for the safe detention and treatment of prisoners, adapted from European models and from 
international statements and conventions on the protection of Human Rights (Prison 
Department, 2011). During the early ‘90s, the Cypriot government at the suggestion of the 
European Union, invested in new modern prison buildings as well as new systems of 
education and professional training. Also, new establishments like the Open Prison and 
Guidance Centre for out of Prison Employment and Rehabilitation of Prisoners was 
constructed in order to be in full compliance with European prison standards and 
conventions. 
In 2000, the Ministry of Justice and Public Order of the Republic of Cyprus proclaimed that 
the Prison Department was favourable compared with the prisons of most European countries 
in terms of legislation and technical infrastructure. The methods of education and the 
programs of resettlement of prisoners were seen as some of the most progressive across the 
European Union countries. It should be noted that, at this point, the prison population was 
already rising significantly, including high numbers of foreign nationals. In 2004, the 
Republic of Cyprus marked a remarkable development by joining the European Union. The 
accession of the country to the European Union impacted on the mission and the policies of 
the Cypriot penal estate. Specifically, the mission of the prison department was based upon 
the following four vital issues: safety, humanitarian treatment, education and rehabilitation. 
Today, the mission statement of the Prison Department is summarised below: 
1. The safe detention of individuals sent to prison from the provincial courts. 
2. The safeguarding of detention conditions that guarantees the respect of human 
dignity. 
3. The equal treatment of detainees without any unfavourable discrimination of race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, social origin and political or other beliefs. 
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4. The encouragement of self-esteem, feelings of responsibility of detainees with the 
benefit of education, professional training, creative entertainment, engrossment, self-
criticism and self-acknowledgement. 
However, the validity of the mission statement of the Prison Department is contrary to 
national and international accounts on the operation and management of the Cypriot prison 
establishment. The following section will provide a rigorous account of the challenges that 
the Central Jail of Nicosia is currently undergoing as seen through the Ombudsman Reports 
and the Council of Europe of Reports. 
3.7 The Cypriot prison department today: 
The Republic of Cyprus has only one Prison Department which is divided into the following 
three categories and buildings: closed prison, open prison and the Guidance Centre for out of 
Prison Employment and Rehabilitation of Prisoners. The operation of the prison is centrally 
coordinated by the Ministry of Justice and Public Order and other bodies such as the Unit of 
Criminological studies and Correctional policy, and the Committee for Prisoner Transfers. In 
theory, the role of these bodies is to provide the Minister with independent propositions on 
prison policy matters. However, in practice the Unit is staffed by high- ranking police officers 
and other ministerial officials and less by prison specialists and experts. As a result, 
international watchdog organisations such as the Amnesty International and domestic extra - 
judicial control mechanism – the Office of Commission for Administration and Human 
Rights - have noted that the suggestions and proposals of the bodies are not independently 
made and in many occasions their recommendations have been disregarded and ignored. One 
of its biggest failures is that of security which is accompanied by a string of scandals. 
When it comes to inspection, the Office of Ombudsman (or Office of Commission for 
Administration and Human Rights) is designed to ensure that prison rules and regulations are 
observed and to minimise instances of arbitrariness, abuse of power, mistreatment, and 
discrimination amongst prisoners. However, in 2011, the former Ombudsman was refused 
access to the prison after a series of complains from prisoners related to the internal operation 
of the prison. Complains were evolved around electricity and water supply cuts, hunger 
strikes, lack of food, and drug dealing. There are additional ways in which the internal 
operation and management of the prison is shrouded in a veil of secrecy. To mention a few 
73 
 
examples, access to the prison was systematically denied to doctors, members of non- 
governmental organisations such as the KISA, academics, researchers and members of 
parliament. Although, inspections by the Ombudsman became easier over the years, an 
advance warning of inspections is necessary; a factor that is undermining the effectiveness of 
the visits. 
3.7.1 Structure of the Cyprus correctional system 
In Cyprus there is only one Correctional Institution, which operates under a new and 
comprehensive legislative and regulatory frame, put in place in 1996 and 1997. This 
legislation incorporates the European Prison Rules and is consonant to the standards 
contained in the Council of Europe relevant instruments. The Cyprus Prison Department is 
under the administration of the Ministry of Justice and Public Order and caters for all 
categories of convicted and under trial prisoners of both sexes and all age groups. The Cyprus 
Prison Department consists of nine wings of closed prison (eight for male offenders and one 
for female offenders) guaranteeing raised security conditions of detention; one open prison 
providing minimum security conditions of detention; and the Guidance Centre (out of prison 
employment) as a semi-liberty condition of detention (CPT, 2013). 
3.7.2 Material conditions of detention 
The rise in the prison population has significantly contributed to the severe overcrowding in 
the prison system, and especially in the male wings. Indeed, international comparative 
statistics derived from the Council of Europe (Annual Penal Statistics, Space I and II 
Reports) have repeatedly ranked Cyprus amongst the most overcrowded prisons in Europe 
(see further Aebi and Delgrande, 2010; 2013; 2012, Zurhold and Haasen, 2005). Despite the 
continuing addition of new accommodation (especially in the male wing), overcrowding 
conditions have persisted. During the period 1998- 2013 the occupancy level rose by 200.3 
percent, from 226 to 1200.With a certified official capacity of 550 and currently standing at 
1200, it is evident that the prison system is on the brink of total collapse and explosion. 
As a consequence of severe overcrowding material provisions and conditions are deplorable. 
A number of Reports from the Ombudsman’s Office supports prisoner and ex-prisoner 
allegations and media reports and the European watchdog (mainly CPT) has stated that the 
Central Jail of Nicosia is plagued by inhumane detention conditions where prisoners are 
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living in dormitories with poor hygiene, miserable sanitation areas, unsatisfactory provision 
of food (in both qualitative and quantitative terms), and unsatisfactory provision of electricity 
and water supply. A recent report (Ombudsman Report, 2015a; 2015b) showed that due to 
overcrowding conditions, facilities that were used by prisoners for education and training 
purposes have been converted into dormitories. In addition, provisions such as bed linen and 
washing powder is minimal. In light of the above, the European Court of Human Rights in 
several occasions has warned the Cypriot prison system about its inhumane and degrading 
treatment of prisoners (see CPT, 2004, 2008, 2013). Furthermore, in 2014 the Cypriot 
government was fined for keeping a 24 year old male convict in isolation for two and half 
years (CPT, 2013). 
3.7.3 Health services 
Like material conditions, health services within the CJN have been meagre. In 2013, CPT 
Report showed that health care for prisoners detained within the Cypriot prison establishment 
has shown structural deficiencies. In particular, the prison employs only two general 
practitioners on a full time basis; a number that much too low to accommodate the needs of 
detainees. The CPT Report (2013) also shown that a dentist and a dental nurse are available 
twice per week, and four nurses are available on part time basis, and one nurse is on duty 
every day. Furthermore, CPT (2013) notes that staffing levels are inadequate with prison 
officers (and in some cases prisoners themselves) spending most of their time administrating 
and distributing, and in many cases injecting medication to prisoners. 
Newly arrived prisoners are not required to go through a medical screening by a medical 
doctor, Medical records are not kept systematically, and there are no confidentiality of 
medical records (CPT, 2008, 2013). In fact, the CPT delegation in many occasions have 
noted prison officers browsing the medical files of prisoners, a stated reason by the 
psychiatrist for making sparse annotations in the medical files of prisoners (CPT, 2013). With 
respect to mental health services, Cyprus has been ranked amongst the countries with the 
lowest ratio of mental health staff to prisoners. Indeed, the Central Institute of Mental Health 
in European Prisons notes that the Mental Health Services in the Prison department consist of 
one psychiatrist and five Mental Health Nurses of whom three are working on a part time 
basis (European Commission, 2007). For many years, mental health screening was not 
obligatory at any stage of incarceration, and there was no suicide and self-harm prevention 
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strategies until 2015, following the tragic January events (see further European Commission, 
2007; CPT, 2008, 2013, Ombudsman, 2012, 2013a, 2013b 2014, 2015a, 2015b). 
3.7.4 Transmittable diseases and mental disorder 
There no official data on the actual number of transmittable diseases in the Cypriot prison 
establishment. However, the Cyprus Human Rights Report (2012) reveals that HIV and 
Hepatitis B and C were highly prevalent. In the same vein, the CPT Report (2008, 2013) 
demonstrates the need for the implementation of a health education programme in the prison 
to prevent transmission. As with transmittable diseases, no official data are available in 
Cyprus on prison disorder within the prison. However, a Report by the European 
Commission in 2007 has shown that a large proportion of prisoners, have indicated high 
levels of long lasting psychological problems such as anxiety and depression. The prevalence 
of mental disorder appears to be high amongst foreign national and women prisoners (see 
further CPT, 2013, Ombudsman, 2012, 2013a, 2014, 2015b).  The vast majority of prisoners 
diagnosed with a mental disorder receives treatment, however the regularity and duration of 
treatment is ambiguous (CPT, 2008, 2013). 
3.7.5 Suicide, and Self-harm 
For many years, the levels of self-harm were amongst the lowest in Europe. However, the 
most recently published study by the Ombudsman ( 2015a, 2015b) reports that the rates of 
deliberate self- harm in the prison have seen a rapid increase.  In the same vein, the recent 
CPT Report (2013) reveals that self-injurious behaviour is worryingly prevalent and has 
called upon the Cypriot authorities to ensure that a comprehensive suicide prevention and 
management approach is introduced in the Central Jail of Nicosia. The high levels of self- 
injurious behaviour can be better understood if we take into consideration the overcrowded 
prison conditions, the prevalence of mental disorder and drug use within the prison in Cyprus. 
According to a recent report by the Council of Europe (CPT, 2013), the rate of prisoner 
suicides in Cyprus is the second lowest in Europe; however, suicides within the CJN are 
surrounded by vagueness and uncertainty as the vast majority of prisoners with chronic and 
severe mental health problems commit suicide in the Psychiatric Hospital of Athalassa. The 
latest published report by the Ombudsman (2014) suggests that that the general profile of pre-
trial detainees who commit suicide are young men (between 20- 25 years old), who have 
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violated the law for first time and have been arrested for a minor offence, and who commit 
suicide in the early stages of their detention. Prisoners who serve a sentence are over the age 
of 30, are usually individuals deprived of family support and have spent considerable time in 
custody (more than 4-5 years). The same Report also indicates that foreign national detainees 
both convicted and on remand, are at higher risk of committing suicide, due to strong feelings 
of marginalisation and abandonment from family support. The Ombudsman Report (2014) 
makes a special mention on how the risk of suicide is increased within the prison in Cyprus 
because foreign nationals become victims of discriminatory, racist and degrading treatment.  
3.7.6 Prison staff 
According to the latest Report published by the Council of Europe, on December 2014, the 
prison establishment in Cyprus have recorded 38 staffing positions fewer than the approved 
amount (CPT, 2013). In May 2016, 420 prison officers were employed in the prison, 115 of 
whom were located in offices, an excessive number to be significantly reduced according to 
the Ministry of Justice and Public Order. In 2014, the Ombudsman (2015a, 2015b) has 
reported that a large number of prison officers are on sick leave for long periods. The Council 
of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT, 2013) reported low morale not due to insufficient staffing levels but poor 
management and lack of incentives available to prison staff. With regards to training, the 
Ombudsman Reports (2012, 2013b, 2015a, 2015b) highlights that the great majority of prison 
staff are not sufficiently trained to cope with the demanding nature of the work. In 2012, for 
example, the initial prison training course was reduced from a six - week to three - week 
duration, and prison wardens responsibility is that of static security (see further CPT, 2008).  
Recently, prisoners allegations and national pressure groups (such as KISA and the 
Ombudsman Office), have suggested that prison staff in Cyprus are engaging in a variety of 
criminal activities with prisoners behind bars, and their families outside the prison walls 
(Proto Thema, 2014). A recent Report (Ombudsman, 2015a) reveals that corruption is spread 
throughout all layers of personnel within the Cypriot prison establishment, and was a key 
contributor of the January events (see more detail below). In these circumstances, it is not 
difficult to understand why the CPT (2013) has suggested that: 
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“The Central Jail of Nicosia requires dynamic management to address the various 
challenges facing it and to develop a long-term strategy. However, the fact that the 
establishment continues to operate with an acting director hinders this process. Every 
effort should be made to resolve this matter as soon as possible. In addition, on-going 
training should be further developed for all senior officers in the prison” (p: 33). 
3.8 The “January 2014 events”: 
Undoubtedly, the January events in 2014 were an important episode in the penal history of 
Cyprus and have had a significant impact on the Cypriot society. It could be argued that the 
scale of the events is comparable to the Strangeways Prison riot during the 1990’s in the 
United Kingdom. The penitentiary institution was confronted for the first time with its 
biggest crisis linked with an epidemic number of rapes and suicides. Within eight months, 
five prisoners ended their lives, and the causes of these deaths are to be found in a 
penitentiary system based on illegitimate distributions of institutional power, corruption and 
governmental self - indulgence.  
It all began in 2009, when Mr Tryphonides was appointed as the new Acting Director of the 
Prison Department. The appointment was in violation of the Council of Europe strict 
guidelines, as Tryphonides was a high rank Police Officer. From early days, prisoners felt the 
tough new managerial measures. According to complaints posed by prisoners to the 
Ombudsman Office, they were tied with handcuffs for long hours, they were obliged for a 
haircut and shaving every day for decency purposes, and water supply was available to 
prisoners every day for five minutes, in an attempt to minimise wastage (Ombudsman 2012, 
2013a, 2013b, 2014). Furthermore, in 2010, the prison management came in a juxtaposition 
with the Commissioner for Administration (Ombudsman), preventing her team from 
conducting their own- initiative inquiries after a pile of complaints from prisoners, and then 
not applying any of the changes recommended. In 2011, visits have been reduced from two 
visits to one visit per week and also telephone calls have significantly reduced. In 2012, the 
Annual Report on conditions of imprisonment published by the Ombudsman (2012) noted 
that most of self- harm and rape incidents are not recorded, and accused the prison 
management of concealing the real extent of these episodes.  At this point it necessary to 
mention that the newspaper Poliths (Πολίτης), due to ongoing revelations, was banned for 
three years from the prison. 
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3.8.1 The Chronicle of the events 
On December 2014, a 21-year-old Romanian prisoner arrived at the General Hospital of 
Nicosia from the Central Jail of Nicosia a few hours after he was gang-raped by a group of 
prisoners. Immediately, the incident attracted media attention. Three days after, a 22-year-old 
prisoner was found dead, hanging from a bed sheet. Within eight months five prisoners had 
ended their lives in the Central Prison of Cyprus, whilst more than thirty self-harm incidents 
were reported in the same period (Politis, 2014). 
3.8.2 The events in a context 
On 11 January 2014, the acting prison governor of the CJN, George Tryphonides, was forced 
to leave his job and re-joined his police duties. The main reasons were the pandemic 
proportions of suicides, the physical and sexual abuse of prisoners (mainly non- nationals), 
chronic corruption from all layers of prison personnel, and intolerable prison conditions. 
Along with these incidents, the corrupt and erratic behaviour of prison staff roused the 
concern of the political parties, which then forced the President of the Republic of Cyprus to 
intervene. Hence, on 12 January 2014, the President of the Republic ordered the Police Rapid 
Response Unit (PRRU) to raid the Central Jail of Nicosia.  In his statement, the president of 
the Republic of Cyprus said in an angry tone: 
“I am very disappointed. Enough is enough. The current behaviours and corruption of 
some people [prison guards] will be punished even if is against the will of some other 
people. I am willing to undo various bodies of the criminal justice system, and to the 
people involved I want to send a message that they have to do their job correctly 
otherwise they don’t have a place within the prison” (Fileleftheros, 2014).  
The penal estate to which the President of the Republic was referring contains the 3rd highest 
number of prisoners in Europe and is growing at an alarming rate.  A spate of cases came to 
light in which pre-trial foreign national prisoners were detained without a sentence for more 
than a year for migration offences and were not considered for deportation. Since 2010, the 
Commissioner of Administration openly accused the prison governance of following and 
practising improper administrative behaviour based on a militaristic regime, and more 
recently of ill- treatment and torture. What the Ombudsman really meant was the degrading 
treatment of prisoners by the intentional and frequent cut of water and electricity supply, 
beatings, and deprived from eating for sixteen hours until the next meal is served. 
Additionally, the Ombudsman’s Annual Report for the Year 2012 acknowledged occasions 
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where prison guards were suspected of being involved with illegal activities - mainly with 
convicts that serve a long sentence - such as selling drugs, mobile phones, and other 
substances to prisoners. In 2013, the Ombudsman received many complaints related to 
inhumane treatment by prison guards (mainly beatings and humiliation); the Ombudsman 
noticed that the complaint box that was installed in the prison few months earlier was 
missing. Furthermore, when the Ombudsman requested explanations for the humiliating and 
erratic behaviour of prison guards, she was told not to believe criminals (Kathimerini, 2014). 
Additionally, in August 2013, self- harm incidents doubled and the prison governance did 
everything to prevent those episodes going public (Fileleftheros, 2014). 
3.8.3 The political Response 
On January the 13th 2014, the Cypriot Minister of Justice and Public Order announced 18 out 
of 34 measures to deal with the unprecedented events. In the press conference, the Minister 
stated: 
“the President of the Republic has stressed the government’s determination to put an 
end to the unacceptable situation in the prison and to upgrade the level of the 
penitentiary institution to fully comply with the European standards. It was not our 
intention to hide the problems or seek excuses for the tragic events of recent months. 
The government took measures from day one, but unfortunately demonstrated 
negligence and in few instances they have been undermined. The policies and 
measures are not enough to be announced but also to implemented” (Sigmalive, 2014) 
The measures included the immediate return of the Acting Prison Governor back to his police 
duties and responsibilities and the suspension of a prison officer and nine prison guards. The 
disciplinary investigations, for the purposes of maintaining their objectivity were conducted 
by officers from the Legal Service. In addition, the Minister ordered the redesign of the 
closed circuit monitoring system, in a way that makes it impossible to interfere with the 
material recorded. Also the PRRU was responsible for the daily control of the cells, common 
areas and overall facilities of the prison for three months, and the categorisation of prisoners 
based on their sentence length and their offence. Lastly, the Minister ordered the immediate 
application of measures to prevent and combat corruption amongst prison staff, such as the 
declaration of assets by members of the prison staff and their relatives.  
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3.9 Conclusion: 
This chapter presents vital explores of the Cypriot history and culture that help us to 
understand recent developments of the penitentiary system. The penal institution in Cyprus, 
like elsewhere, is grounded in cultural norms, values and perceptions; and draws upon 
cultural sensibilities and expresses specific emotions. The struggle for national identity, for 
example, and the fact that Cyprus is a de facto divided state has given the grounds to political 
parties to pursue an anti- tolerant, chauvinistic and xenophobic rhetoric and a considerable 
punitive public opinion. Furthermore, the chapter explored the conservative and controlling 
family structure and the fragmented Cypriot political culture characterised by party 
identification and partisan loyalties, which created a political culture that is based on 
favouritism, political patronage and nepotism. In addition, this chapter provided a rigorous 
account of the main challenges that for many years the prison system was suffering from and 
that led to the raid of the CJN by the police in 2014. The following chapter stresses societal 
and political reactions to crime and imprisonment and how these have been linked to 
increasing racial and economic inequality, two central features of the recent sociological 
discussions on punishment and penal politics. 
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Chapter 4: Exploring crime and punishment in Cyprus: A Socio-Political Approach 
 
Over the last fifteen years, Cyprus has witnessed an unprecedented expansion of penal 
control which is consistent with the overall rise in the prison population in Western countries 
but is a dramatic change compared with earlier, very low Cypriot prison numbers. In an 
attempt to grasp the causes of this penal shift, the most obvious indicator has been penal 
punitiveness accompanied with punitive public opinion. Such perspective reveals two 
puzzling findings. First, that the prevalence of crime has been stable for most serious offences 
whilst fear for crime does not matching the actual levels of criminality. And second, crime 
victimisation is not correlated with penal punitiveness, but highlights a lack of confidence in 
the criminal justice system agencies instead. This chapter aims to review these contradictions 
within the midst of a deep economic crisis. The chapter starts with the organic components of 
the financial downturn in Cyprus related to corruption and clientelism practices following 
persistent scandals that involved Cypriot politicians and elite members. The next section 
elucidates recent level and trends of crime in Cyprus and further illustrates a disconnect 
between crime and imprisonment rates, especially if the race and nationality of the offenders 
is taken into consideration. Subsequently, attention is given to the heightened political 
significance of interplay during deep financial turmoil periods. The full- blown financial 
downturn was turned by politicians into a criminogenic tool in order to ensue a ‘getting 
tough’ approach towards property and violent crimes; and once again scapegoating 
immigrants and asylum seekers (Melossi, 2013; Aas, 2013; Bosworth, 2011; Stumpf, 2006). 
Lastly, taking inspiration from political economies of punishment of jurisdictions elsewhere, 
the chapter deploys media and political discourses on ‘law and order’ that have caused social 
insecurity and moral panic against crimmigrant ‘others’ (Aas, 2011; Wacquant, 2001b; 2009a; 
2009b). 
4.1 Economic downturn in Cyprus  
Prior to the economic downturn, Cyprus was seen to have a healthy economy, high GDP 
growth, low unemployment and sound public finances. As part of its EU accession, Cyprus 
was forced to implement financial policies to bring it in line with EU requirements that 
included the rapid liberalization of its fiscal policy and financial industries (Brown, 2013). As 
stated by Georgiou (2013), the abrupt expansion of the financial sector - within three years of 
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adopting the Euro meant that the top Cypriot Banks (Laiki Bank and Cyprus Bank) soon 
found themselves in possession of assets over eight times  the GDP of a small country like 
Cyprus’ size (Hess, 2015). The financial crisis in Cyprus was triggered by the United States’ 
subprime mortgage crisis in 2007- 2008, and inevitably in 2009 the Cypriot economy went 
into recession (OECD, 2013), which led to a rise in unemployment as the economy shrank by 
1.67% (see further Zenios, 2013b). Whilst all European states have suffered from the global 
downturn, the impact was severely experienced in Cyprus and Greece (Zenios, 2013b). In 
2012, the Cypriot commercial property values declined by 40 per cent and non-performing 
loans rose significantly up to 6.1% causing significant pressure on the banking system. With 
a small population and a modest economy, Cyprus had a large offshore banking industry. In 
addition to these factors, the historical and financial ties with Greece, had led the Cypriot 
government to take on major shares of the Greek bonds. As a result, the national deficit rose 
to 7.4% GDP, more than twice the acceptable amount stated in the EU guidelines (Hess, 
2015). 
In response to Cyprus’s admission in March 2013, a bailout packaged was engineered with 
the condition that the government implement a wide array of austerity measures from 
spending cuts to tax rises and the privatisation of public assets. Whilst the effectiveness of the 
austerity measures received extensive and mixed responses on an economical level, there has 
been scant research or evaluation of the social impact of those measures. Even before the 
advent of the financial crisis, Cyprus had persistently shown high levels of income inequality 
and poverty. With the imposition of austerity measures, the levels of unemployment rose 
from 4% in 2008 to over 16.6% in May 2015 (Eurostat, 2015c). Living standards have also 
significantly dropped as the Income and Household Living Condition study revealed 
(Eurostat, 2015b). A significant number of families suffered from a significant drop in 
income, and, relatedly, there was a rise in suicides, mental health problems and divorces, all 
caused by cuts to health and welfare spending and rise in imprisonment (European 
Commission, 2015). 
4.2 Corruption and clientelism 
A vast majority of national and international observers have reported that the financial crisis 
in Cyprus was organically related to the mismanagement of the banking sector (Serricchio et 
al., 2013; Karanikolos et al., 2013 Panayi and Zenios, 2015). Cyprus had a large banking 
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sector, about six times the size of the nation’s GDP, with banks heavily loaning abroad. In 
simple terms, the Cyprus banking industry was running with low supervision and so this, 
combined with the governments’ mismanagement of the budget, was the two-core element 
responsible for the collapse of the Cypriot economy. Successive scandals have illustrated, for 
example, how politicians and business elites have been involved in clientelistic relations - 
particularly associated to tax evasion (Pashardes and Polycarpou, 2008, Pashardes and 
Polycarpou, 2003, Pashardes, 2011). Clientelestic forms of corruption have been associated 
with ‘grande’ recruitment in the public sector and semi-governmental organisations in pre- 
lections times, which has led to the establishment of oversized and under qualified semi- 
governmental organisation appointments, transfers and promotions (Faustmann, 2010).  
The two main political parties (AKEL, on the left, and DHSY on the right) have often argued 
that all levels of the Cypriot society are responsible for the financial crisis, emphasising the 
patronage and corruption practices by public servants and bank employees. This political 
positioning has caused public frustration and anger as politicians and elite members of the 
Cypriot society have been incessantly involved in corruptive practices. 
With the advent of the financial crisis, public frustration saw a dramatic intensification that 
soon turned to anger. In 2013, an exasperated domestic public placed a substantial amount of 
pressure on Cypriot politicians to stop treating ‘elite’ corruption with impunity. Cypriot 
mainstream politicians supported and maintained impunity towards elite corruption because 
elite corruption has long functioned as a prerequisite to the maintenance of elite consent to 
the political status quo in the country (see further Xenakis and Cheliotis, 2013).  
4.3 Cypriot ‘partitocracy’ and elite impunity 
Following the economic downturn in 2013, public disaffection about persistent corruption 
and grand scandals was exacerbated by the continued leniency by mainstream politicians 
toward elite grand corruption impunity (see further Xenakis and Cheliotis, 2013, Kanol and 
Charalambous, 2014). One of the most frequent discussions evolved around the avoidance of 
the two dominant political parties - AKEL and DHSY – to take responsibility for their 
involvement in a series of major scandals that had rocked Cypriot politics in recent years. 
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One of the most recent scandals revolved around the close relationship between high ranking 
members of the Council of Paphos with a Construction Development mogul, who had forged 
plans and been granted building permits by submitting misleading and deceptive information 
(Fileleftheros, 2014). Another major scandal that erupted in 2013 was the involvement of 
Christodoulos Christodoulou, ex-Minister of Finance and Governor of the Central Bank in 
Cyprus, in multiple charges of bribery and forgery of official documents in order to avoid 
paying income tax of around one million euros (Fileleftheros, 2014). According to Law 
65/1965 (in European Commission Anti – Corruption Report) there is currently no legislation 
that obliges politicians or senior officials to disclose their assets. 
In a similar case, it was uncovered that since the beginning of 2000s’ the Mayor of the city of 
Paphos was receiving bribes from contractors for the construction of the sewage system 
(Fileleftheros, 2014). The way in which those scandals were handled and resolved, whilst the 
country was undergoing severe economic decline and stagnation, drew the public’s attention 
to the protective and immunity Law sections from prosecution by elected members of the 
Cypriot Cabinet (Assiotis and Krambia-Kapardis, 2014). The scandals involved the criminal 
liability of members of the Cabinet as well as mainstream politicians for corruption, bribery, 
money laundering and tax evasion.  
Equally crucial to growing public disaffection was the consistent impunity of Greek and 
national wealthy elites, Middle Eastern moguls and Russian oligarchs who have engaged in a 
string of grand scandals of tax-evasion, fraud and embezzlement (Ledyaeva et al., 2013). A 
famous example is that of the ‘Lagarde List’, when Christine Lagarde the French Minister of 
Economic Affairs, Finance and Employment, and Managing Director of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), informed the Cypriot Authorities that 459 prominent Cypriot 
politicians, wealthy Cypriot bourgeois and political ‘elites’, were suspected of having been 
involved in notorious tax evasion scandals and money laundering between 2000- 2012 
(Kathimerini, 2015).  
In September 2015, the President of the House of Representatives raised a storm of reactions 
by refusing to reveal the names of the people involved and instead stated: 
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“This List will be kept in my Office in the House of Representatives and I will take 
any action to respect the confidentiality of its content and personal data contained 
therein” (Politis, 2015).  
4.4 Crime trends 
Although Wacquant (2009a) argues that crime rose significantly in European societies 
between 1985 and 2000, the data for total recorded crime for the EU 28 shows a steady 
decrease since 2003, and as far as Cyprus is concerned, the crime-incarceration thesis holds 
true (Aebi and Linde, 2010). Expressed as a rate per 100,000 inhabitants, the volume of 
reported crime in Cyprus rose from 4.8 in 2002 to 8.0 in 2011 (Aebi et al., 2015). Whilst one 
might argue that the volume of reported crime has doubled within a decade, a closer look at 
the statistics reveals that 33 per cent of those cases in 2012 were classified as no cases and 10 
per cent were classified as false (Aebi et al., 2015). Data for violent crimes have shown a 
steady movement from 7,256 reported crimes in 2002 to 7,556 in 2013 (Council of Europe 
Crime Statistics). In addition, the number of homicides recorded in 2013 reveals a modest 
increase from 15 in 2001 to 19 in 2013, however, from 2007 to 2013 the number of robberies 
doubled in Cyprus (Aebi and Delgrande, 2013 ). Furthermore, drug trafficking offences 
registered a modest increase from 876 in 2007 to 1030 in 2013. 
4.4.1 Political discourse towards crime 
Since 2012, as the first signs of the financial crisis have shown in Cyprus, dominant political 
discourse has grown heavily preoccupied with an inexorable rise in property and violent 
offences, conflating it with the presence of migrants and other social events such as urban 
poverty and degradation. In fact, in 2009, the Mayor of Nicosia stated that the housing 
conditions of migrants downgrade the city (Trimikliniotis, 2005). In 2011, a nexus of illegal 
immigration and asylum seeking was seen central by the vast majority of the political parties, 
in the presidential elections in 2012. The Democratic Party (DIKO), for example, required 
blocking the allowances provided for asylum seekers. In the same vein, the Democratic Rally 
(DHSY), and the National Popular Front (ELAM), have proposed the termination of medical 
and social welfare access to Turkish Cypriots and other minority groups who did not 
contribute to the country’s Social Insurance Fund. Those propositions were backed by the 
Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK), the European Party and the Greens (Katsourides, 
2012; 2013). The political agenda of the elections has opened a can of worms and given 
competition to xenophobic and racist votes (see further Cheliotis, 2013). In June 2015, at the 
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peak of the Syrian refugee crisis, the Interior Minister Sokratis Xasikos, has said that ‘we 
prefer Christian refugees’, which then gave the opportunity to ELAM, the extreme-right 
political party in Cyprus, to patrol areas supposedly inhabited by immigrants and committing 
acts of violence against them. ELAM is a new political party, only founded in 2008, however, 
in the parliamentary elections in 2016 it won 2 seats and attained 3.71 per cent of the vote 
(Fileleftheros, 2016). Their political agenda was focused on an anti-immigrant, national and 
ethnic purity platform, with slogans like: ‘Cyprus, is a Greek land’, ‘Cyprus is part of Greece’, 
‘Race, blood, decent’, ‘Foreigners out of Cyprus’, ‘Each refugee turns a Greek unemployed’ 
‘No to pseudo-political asylum seekers’ (Katsourides, 2012; 2013, ECRI Report, 2016) 
Diachronically, politicians and government officials used arguments to legitimise their 
attitudes towards immigrants in Cyprus (see further Trimikliniotis, 2001; 2014). In 2009, the 
MP Koulias argued that the presence of immigrants is in line with the increase in criminality. 
In the same vein, in 2012, the then Minister of Justice and Public Order Loukas Louca made 
the infamous statement that “most burglaries are proven to be committed by immigrants who 
come to Cyprus for three-four days for this purpose” ( Sigmalive, 2012). 
The ‘criminality’ issue is regularly invoked by ethno-nationalist and populist politicians by 
narrating ‘stories’ of immigrants involved in criminal activities. MP Pittokopittis, in 2006 
claimed that ‘crime is in their blood’ and claimed that immigrants “pose a threat to our 
society, culture and nation” (Trimikliniotis et al., 2015). This discourse has led the 
government to intensify policing against illegal immigrants and asylum seekers and enforced 
the ‘sweep’ and ‘cleaning’ operations aiming to fight illegal immigration to Cyprus 
(Trimikliniotis, 2007). 
These discourses have had a great impact on public attitudes (see further Van der Leun, 2006). 
According to Eurobarometer (2015) survey data, the financial crisis has altered the public’s 
attitudes as concern is now centred on unemployment, rising prices, inflation and the overall 
economic situation. However, there is a significant rate of public concern about crime which 
is significantly higher than the EU average (see further Hummelsheim, 2011). 
4.4.2 The significance of property and violent crime 
Since the advent of the financial crisis, public sentiments and fears about property and violent 
crimes have risen significantly, and have been associated with offences around illegal 
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immigration and drug abuse (Aebi et al., 2015). Public sentiments and fears have been fuelled 
to a greater extent by political and media discourses that have deliberately drawn parallels 
between the rise of property and violent crimes such as thefts, burglaries, homicides and 
robberies, and the presence of immigrants in Cyprus. Such proposals represent a clearly 
partisan distortion of figures; between 2008 and 2010, for example, the total number of 
robberies rose from 62 to 156, whilst the respective volume of homicides saw a significant 
decline (Aebi et al., 2015). Amongst offenders known to the police, Cypriots were 
responsible for the majority of burglaries, homicides and thefts, but non-Cypriots were over- 
represented in proportion to their share of the general population (Aebi et al., 2015). 
Such data confirm the longstanding trends of disproportionately high levels of public fear of 
criminal victimisation but also underscores public support for harsher sentences, especially 
when offenders are non-nationals. Indeed, over the last decade, Cyprus has become one of the 
most crime-fearing and punitive nations in Europe and beyond, even though police- recorded 
crime rates have been rising modestly and generally for offences that have minimal 
criminological interest (Entorf and Spengler, 2002). Today the levels and patterns of public 
fear of crime are still disproportionate to the actual levels of victimisation. According to the 
latest published crime statistics, certain types of theft and burglary offences have fallen 
significantly since the advent of the financial crisis (see Figure 4.1). Also, the participation of 
Cypriots in thefts and burglaries have risen considerably since 2009, whilst the participation 
of non–Cypriots has reduced considerably between 2012 and 2013 -as many immigrants lost 
their jobs because of the financial crisis and were then forced to leave the country (see further 
Aliverti, 2014). 
In any case, recorded crime statistics in Cyprus have to be treated with particular suspicion as 
they are used as a proxy for actual crime rates. We must keep in mind that the Cypriot police 
very often file unwarranted charges because of their systematic over-policing of immigrant 
communities and also the police’s susceptibility to stop and search and arrest immigrants. In 
addition, Cypriots are not only fearful but are also highly suspicious with a great tendency to 
report unimportant crimes to the police, especially when believed that the perpetrator is of 
immigrant origin (see also Xenakis and Cheliotis, 2012). 
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 Figure 4.1 Theft and Burglary Offences between 2011 and 2014 in Cyprus 
  
Source: Cyprus Police Department, 2014 
4.5 Media discourses and public opinion 
The role of mass media in galvanising and inflaming the publics’ concerns and insecurities in 
Cyprus has barely been studied. Whilst mass media constitute a field with its own rules, these 
rules are defined by its positions in the world in general and the attractions of the ‘meta 
fields’ of economy and politics (Bourdieu, 1998). It was in this sprit that Hall et al (1978) 
argued that sensationalised media reporting along with punitive penal policies by capitalist 
states have displaced mass economic insecurities onto powerless minorities, thereby 
strengthening class rule (Cheliotis, 2010).  
In the same vein, Sparks (2000) work highlights how media speaks “irresistibly to the moral 
and emotional dispositions” (p: 101) of the public, with vengeful representations of crime that 
he calls ‘ sentimental altruism’. Interestingly, the public has shown resentment and solidarity 
to the victim in a highly emotional process and provides the outlet for blame and sanction, as 
well as an amplification of fear and anxiety (see furhter Sparks, 1992, 2002). Consequently, 
the public regards atrocious crimes and bizarre sentences as the norm. They believe that 
sentences are soft, and have the tendency to believe that crime rates are rising even when they 
are falling because this is what they read about in the press. As a result, the majority of 
ordinary Cypriot citizens perceive sentences imposed by judges as too lenient, although when 
asked to propose sentences for individual cases they generally suggest sentences that are 
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shorter than those actually imposed. According to Tonry (1999), the public perceives crime 
as the nation’s most pressing problem and support harsh sentencing laws/policies that occur 
as a result of media and political preoccupation with crime. Cypriot politicians attempting to 
win favour by demonstrating their toughness have said that they are honouring citizens’ 
wishes, though the evidence implies that emphasis by politicians and the media on crime is 
the primary cause of the public’s concerns with crime. Jewkes (2004), for example, expresses 
a critical opinion of how politicians engage with media by stating that: 
“Politicians of every political party campaign on law and order issues, reducing 
complex crime problems to easily digestible ‘sound bites’ for the forthcoming news 
bulletins on radio and television” (p: 3).  
Therefore, in Cyprus it is not public opinion that leads to harsher penalties (which then lead 
to the expansion of the prison estate), but politicians’ proposals and rhetoric that lead to penal 
changes in public opinion and consequently fear. Over the past decade, Cypriot politicians 
have, for partisan advantage, deliberately invoked the public’s fear of crime, (markedly 
regarding immigrants) and then offered harsh policies to quell this ‘created’ fear. Hence, it is 
necessary to explore why crime control has become a focal issue in Cypriot politics and how 
immigrants have been targeted as a threat by political and media discourses. There are certain 
favourite issues that the Cypriot media is keen to bring up regarding migrants in Cyprus. 
Recent reports mainly generated by the mass media highlight the ‘negative’ social 
consequences from the ‘excessive numbers’, ‘floods’, ‘chords’ and ‘waves’ of migrants 
(Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, 2005). In Cyprus, anti- immigrant and xenophobic attitudes 
have been identified and summarised by Trikikliniotis and Demetriou (2005). 
The connection with unemployment: A recent undocumented presumption that has been 
extensively made is the connection between the unprecedented number of immigrants and the 
sharp increase in unemployment rates amongst Cypriots. Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 
(2005) argue that this connection is amplified by the media and individual politicians who are 
using the current financial crisis and its consequences by focusing on the themes of 
Cypriotness and patriotism. Significant too is the attitude of the trade unions, that support 
attempt to reduce the numbers of migrant workers in Cyprus. 
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Metaphorical connections: Regular connections between migrants, disease and dirt have been 
reported. Headlines like “Foreign workers are a real cancer” or referring to undocumented 
workers and refugees as ‘gangrene’, a ‘plague’ and a ‘headache’ are amongst the most used 
remarks (see further Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, 2005). 
The connection with the country’s size: a phrase often heard in public is “Cyprus is too small 
to absorb the current number of foreign workers” (Trimikliniotis, 2005, p: 16). This phrase is 
derived from the “host-immigrant” model theory that assumes that migrant workers pose as a 
“threat” to the social fabric of the Cypriot society (see further Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 
2011). 
The connection with the ‘Cyprus problem’: According to Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 
(2005), anti-immigrant argument that is often invoked by politicians is that Cyprus is still 
semi-occupied, therefore restricted migration policies are of paramount significance to ensure 
its national survival and sovereignty. Conservative politicians often argue that immigration 
issues are not important elements of their political agenda as long as the ‘Cyprus problem’ is 
still unresolved. 
National culture and heritage vs. alien cultures and religions: According to Trimikliniotis and 
Demetriou (2005), alien cultures and religions are sensitive issues. Cypriots feel strong about 
their culture and societal values and norms; however, they often based their opinions on 
various misconceptions. For example, public discourse suggests that migrants are carrying 
‘contagious’ attitudes, believes and morals that have the potential to alter ‘our’ social 
institutions and to impose their norms and values. 
The connection with criminality: the ‘connection’ between immigration and criminality is 
one of the media’s favourite themes, also used by populist, right wing or ethno-nationalist 
politicians, as well as by the police. The media often record such statements made by 
politicians or the police without criticising their underlying message and usually accompany 
the text with photos of unshaved dark-skinned men, thereby reinforcing this connection 
(Milioni et al., 2015). 
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Illegal immigrants and asylum seekers: Syria’s brutal civil war has pushed a new wave of 
immigrants into Cyprus. Today asylum seekers are frequently the subject of media reports, 
which, although in some cases are sympathetic, generally tend to portray them as a potential 
threat. This is in line with the view often expressed by the trade unions and the authorities. A 
conclusion that may safely be deduced is that the media tend to be sympathetic when 
covering heart-breaking stories of individual migrants and less sympathetic, or even at times 
xenophobic, when they refer to migrants as a group or section of society (Trimikliniotis and 
Demetriou 2005).  
4.6 Public and penal punitiveness 
According to Unnever and Cullen (2010), similar to elsewhere in the West, the public in 
Cyprus favours a ‘get tough’ approach to crime control. According to their analysis of data 
from the Eurobarometer Survey of European Values and Societal Norms in 2006, Cyprus 
appears the most intolerant country with 97 per cent of the respondents agreeing that 
criminals should be punished more severely. Moreover, significant segments of the public in 
Cyprus appeared to favour punitive criminal justice polices especially the use of 
imprisonment. Cyprus’s rate of support for imprisonment is also demonstrated by the 
International Statistics on Crime and Justice of 2010 (in Harrendorf et al., 2010).  
Cypriots are also alleged to support a ‘zero tolerance’ approach towards immigrants  and are 
also in favour of stricter police monitoring, especially in areas or communities populated 
mainly by immigrants (Harrendorf et al., 2010). According to Constantinou (2015), in 
Cyprus, police officers frequently exercise police biased stop and search operations 
particularly in areas inhabited by foreigners or immigrants. Such attitudes, have led to the 
widespread perception of immigrants as one of the most persistent problems in the Cypriot 
society connected with criminality (Constantinou, 2015). The connection of immigrants with 
criminality is based on two assumptions: one is that immigrants, by their nature, are more 
prone to criminality and the other assumption is that immigrants because of their social 
circumstances and “impoverished ghettoes” are driven into criminality (Trimikliniotis, 2007, 
see also Wacquant 2001a). Romanians and Bulgarians, for example, are especially likely to 
be seen as dangerous, and the terms ‘Ρουμάνοι’ -Romanians, ‘Βούλγαροι’- Bulgarians and 
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‘Aράπηδες’- Arabs is often used derogatorily by Cypriots to describe immigrants in their 
entirety.  
Another way of gauging trends in public punitiveness in Cyprus consists of the restoration of 
the death penalty which has abolished in 1999 but can be applied in the case of high treason. 
Furthermore, the public have also expressed support for vigilantism, possession of guns, and 
also the use of violence by the police (see Eurobarometer, 2015). Using data from a national 
survey focused specifically on the public attitudes and opinion for the death penalty in 
Cyprus, have found support for the restoration of death penalty mostly for rapists, 
paedophiles and drug traffickers. Despite the strong and principled position against the death 
penalty of the member states of the European Union, it is important to gauge public opinion 
on the use of death penalty in Cyprus. The death penalty, for example, offers a symbolic 
significance in populist ‘war on crime’ as any opposition mostly by politicians who have to 
endorse a ‘tough on crime’ approach.  
More evidence of trends in public punitiveness in Cyprus can be found in polling company 
research. The findings show that a sizeable proportion of the people participating in the 
survey supported increased use of CCTV cameras in public places for security reasons, the 
establishment and consolidation of neighbourhood-watch schemes, the expansion of the 
police force, the use of violence by police force at times of urban disorder, and mass arrests 
of protesters (see further Mawby, 2011, Psara, 2013). 
Another way of gauging trends of penal punitiveness in Cyprus is by looking at developments 
of the criminal justice policy and practice. In Cyprus, for example, the perceptions of the 
public define the nature and content of the penal policies implemented by the government 
(Gibson, 1992). The most characteristic example within the Cypriot context is that high levels 
of public support towards imprisonment coincides with the unprecedented levels of non- 
Cypriots within the CJN.  
In recent times, crime control in Cyprus -just like elsewhere- has been at the centre of 
partisan politics, and policies have been shaped more by symbols and rhetoric than by 
substance and knowledge. During the 1970s’, in Cyprus, although many voters held 
conservative views on social and racial issues, penal policies were still in the hands of 
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criminal justice practitioners and technocrats. During the 80s’ and ‘90s’, crime control was 
still an unpopular matter for the political matters, and the ‘Cyprus problem’ was dominating 
the ideological tack of political parties (Christophorou et al., 2010). It was in the middle of 
the new millennium that the new main political parties took particular manifestations about 
crime control in Cyprus (Tsoudis, 2001). In Cyprus today, conservative’s proposals suggest 
that crime rates are rising because judges are lenient and punishments are soft, demanding 
greater toughness, and argued the leftists (the Progressive Party of Working People) did not 
take much guidance from academic expertise in formulating its new crime control policies in 
2008. In 2007, for example, the presidency of Christofias, Cyprus borrowed ‘European’ 
symbols and policies, using crime as a governance strategy, with victims and their rights to 
be idealised. For example, the ‘importation’ of neighbourhood Watch Scheme in 2011 is a 
good example. Furthermore, in 2013, the Right won the elections based on a campaign that 
promised support for a tough stance on criminality and exemplary punishment for those who 
are breaking the law. 
4.6.1 The importance of courts and criminal procedure 
While Cavadino and Dignan’s (2006, 2007) thesis seeks to identify the causes of high and 
low punitiveness, the role of criminal justice system is of paramount significance when 
examining penal punitiveness. It can be argued that political economy can shape punitiveness 
through mediating variables such as crime levels, national culture, the role of media, political 
culture and political institutions (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007). However, in the case of 
Cyprus criminal procedure could be seen, to a certain extent, an independent variable (see 
further Nelken, 2009). 
Criminal procedure in its own right is a sociocultural variable. Myriad differences occur 
between countries with regard to how receptive the criminal justice system is to political 
direction or public pressures. Lacey (2008) for example, suggests that prison rates are more 
likely to be in moderate levels because of the concerted efforts between politicians, policy 
makers and judges. Therefore, penal rules are often seen as substitute for political and policy 
decision making, given the fact that other forms of civil regulation are often poorly 
accomplished. Within the four districts (Nicosia, Limassol, Larnaca and Paphos) powerful 
elites control parts of the economy as well as regional and local politics.  
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Similar to the Italian case (see further Nelken, 2009) the moderate numbers of the prison 
population in Cyprus in the past when compared to other European countries –despite the 
growing trend in recent years- was due to the processes of attrition; although a very high 
number of cases have been reported that did not develop into criminal investigations and 
were either interrupted or suspended. However, many of the procedural benefits are not 
available to illegal immigrants or minor offenders, and today are those people who fill the 
Central Jail of Nicosia.  
4.7 Governing through Migration control: Non- citizens in Cyprus 
According to Trimikliniotis et al., (2015) thousands of people cross the border each years. 
This considerable number of ‘visitors’ includes tourists, workers, retired people, asylum 
seekers and refugees. According to the latest published statistics by Cyprus Statistical Service, 
170, 000 people arrived in Cyprus in 2011, from the European Union and outside the 
European Economic Area (EEA). According to Trimikliniotis et al., (2015) migration 
statistics provided by the Statistical Service have to be treated with suspicion as those 
numbers do not include students, refugees and asylum seekers. In 2011, asylum applications 
declined significantly since 2002 (see further Figure 4.2). 
                          Figure 4.2 Asylum seeking application cases, 2002- 2011 
                        
                              Source: Asylum Service of the Ministry of Interior, 2012 
Though governments’ attention and popular concern stresses the ‘floods’ and ‘waves’ of 
migrant populations – particularly those who belong outside the EEA – over the same period, 
there was a great movement outside Cyprus ( see further Figure 4.3). 
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                      Figure 4.3 Migration and Emigration movements, 2002- 2015  
                            
                            Source: Demographic Report, 2015, Ministry of Interior 
Around 29,000 people emigrated, of whom more than 4000 were Cypriot citizens; however, 
this group is rarely considered in discussions about migration. More than 15,000 migrated 
people were non- EU citizens. While there are no precise figures of where non- citizens live, 
the 2011 Census showed that 34, 1% of non-citizens were living in Nicosia, 16,2% in 
Larnaca, 27,1% in Limassol and 17,4% in Paphos. According to Trimikliniotis (2014) there 
are a disproportionate number of immigrant clusters in Cyprus. Asylum seekers, for example, 
are an emigration cluster with an extensive and stringent regulation system that is dispersed 
around the country. Recent published figures for this immigration cluster shows large 
numbers in the cities of Paphos and Larnaca. Those asylum seekers that are dispersed are 
located in socio - economically deprived areas. In addition, there is an unknown number of 
undocumented non-citizens of trafficked people in the country, many of whom reside in 
geographical area already established by other in their ethnic or linguistic communities.  
Such figures are in line with Bauman’s notion of ‘liquid modernity’; a period that is 
characterised by fluid boundaries, identities and borders (Bauman, 2000). According to 
Bauman (2000), as the obstacles of information, capital and goods have eased the movement 
of people has been subject to increased scrutiny. Asylum seekers, refugees and unskilled 
workers are seen as a threat to public services, social cohesion and culture, which is linked 
into one discourse that connects all non-citizens. 
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4.8 Migration in an era of austerity measures 
Today migrants, TNC’s, and EUN’s comprise one fifth of the economically active population 
and since 1990 they have been seen as a temporary and transitional attribute, and workers 
from these countries in migration policies are referred as ‘working hands’ (Trimikliniotis, 
2005). From its inception, the permit for TNS’s was not designed on integration ideals and 
principles. Over the years the permit regime for TNC’s was based on an eclectic 
‘Europeanised’ version of   Gastarbeiter (quest worker on four year visas) and Kafala (where 
the worker is tied to employer) (see further Trimikliniotis, 2005). Consequently, until the 
beginning of 2011, there was no integration policy or civic rights in place.  
In 2013, the number of irregular or undocumented migrants was estimated between 20,000 to 
30,000. Irregular migration is a subject of fierce debate in media and political discourses and 
has become a central feature for the transformation of the political divide. Inevitably this is 
structurally connected to issues of national protection and survival and economic perspectives. 
There are many aspects that require an explanation here. The first is structural, imposing an 
authoritarian regime on migrants, and the second is ideological, comprising by political and 
technocratic divide over the migration management, order and cohesion (Trimikliniotis, 
2015). This second aspect is a significant element of political parties and Cypriot politics in 
general. 
4.9 Immigration and the Ideological divide of the right and left 
The division of the party system along left/ right ideological lines is centred in three political 
fields (a) socio- economic order, (b) the Cyprus problem, and  (c) a spectrum of social issues, 
for example, immigration and multiculturalism. Immigration holds a central feature because 
in not only related to the process of nation formation but also interconnects with a wider 
range of social and economic issues (see further Trimikliniotis, 2005). This schismatic divide 
clearly illustrates the analytic divisions of migration in political discourses. Given the specific, 
and to a certain degree, particular historic and political context, the fact that the ‘Cyprus 
problem’ is still unsolved, coupled with the fact that immigration is a relatively new 
phenomenon, the political divide over immigration policies does not respond to other 
European contexts. Nevertheless, it could be argued that since Cyprus accession to the EU, 
debates around immigration and immigrants have been informed by Greece and, to a lesser 
extent, the UK (Trimikliniotis, 2015). It can be safely assumed that political discourses of the 
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traditional right spectrum tend to utilize xenophobic, racist and anti- immigrant sentiments, in 
comparison those of the left. However, a closer examination is required. 
Undeniably, political parties occupy a central role in Cypriot politics; however, critiques of 
the dominance of the political parties are often evolved around the ‘deficient modernisation’ 
or the ‘underdeveloped civil society’. In the same vein, anti-immigrant, racist and xenophobic 
sentiments are blamed using the same arguments. However, migration has a different 
development in Cypriot politics. The post-colonial development of Cypriot parties has 
suggested that parties are not homogenous carriers (Trimikliniotis, 2015). In Cyprus, party 
formations vary significantly from charismatic leaders who run a clientele to small sectarian 
groups. The ideological divisions distinguish political parties’ organisational structure, 
membership and politics they espouse, for example, the way that the communist mass party 
of AKEL approach the issue of immigration differs significantly to the way in which the 
issue of migration and migrants are viewed by the other mass party of DHSY and 
characterised by the Helleno-centric right (see further Trimikliniotis, 2014). In Cyprus, 
certain parties can be safely termed traditionally clientistic. Weber, for example, argues that 
modern party formations are based on ‘rational- legal’ frameworks because after all political 
parties ‘are the children of democracy’ (Weber, 1991, p: 102).  
The belief that the maltreatment of immigrants is the result of an underdeveloped civil society 
is problematic. Cyprus advanced modernisation by expanding finance and banking sectors on 
one hand, and on the other hand by utilising cheap labour from third world countries in order 
to achieve high levels of growth. Therefore, it is not a matter of modernisation when 
comparing Cyprus to other European countries, but is a matter of modernisation that 
combines a different set of politics when it comes to address issues such as migration, gender, 
racism and class (Trimikliniotis et al., 2015). Regarding immigration policies, in Cyprus 
political parties are not the key drivers; recent research evidence suggests that immigration 
policies are instrumental tools by other state structures such as the office of the general 
attorney, immigration authorities, the judiciary and media moguls (Trimikliniotis et al., 2015).  
Despite the various treaties and international conventions for equal rights, human rights and 
fair treatment of immigrants there is a deeper and often unseen policy making that amplifies 
anti-immigrant politics where immigrants are regularly racialized. This can be found in right 
political parties or those with a nationalistic leaning. However, those parties are used as 
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opportunistic vehicles of racism and xenophobia in specific constituencies or by newcomers 
in politics calling for attention by utilising anti- immigrant and often racism discourses. 
4.10 Political parties and xenophobic- loaded ideologies: Governing through fear 
In the context of Cyprus, the uprising of xenophobic populist parties cannot be explained or 
explored in the same ways as in other European nations. The ‘national problem’ (i.e. the 
Cyprus problem) is the issue that defines whether a party is ‘ethno- nationalist’ or ‘radical 
right’ (extreme right) (see further Kamali, 2010). Who belongs to the ‘nation’ usually is 
determined by how ‘nation’ is defined. For ethno- nationalist parties, the ‘state’ is the organ 
of power for territorial protection as well as the protection from other ‘threats’ to its  
sovereignty and survival (i.e. health , welfare, internal security).  
However, in Cyprus, immigration has always been subordinated to the Cyprus problem’s key 
determinant in defining the ‘nation’. The ‘others’ are primarily immigrants, though these 
‘others’ are also multiplying beyond immigrants, to include Turks, Turkish- Cypriots and 
refugees. These are primarily media generated images where ‘others’ are portrayed as spies, 
criminals and vagabonds. A particular property of racism and xenophobia in Cyprus is that of 
anti-immigrant and xenophobic populist politicians. The small size of the Cypriot society 
gives the opportunity to individual politicians to act as carriers of xenophobic-loaded 
ideologies. This is confirmed by International Reports generated by the Council of Europe on 
racism and xenophobia across Europe. ECRI Report (2016) refers to political discourses of 
‘inflammatory’ speeches with racist statements in the public sphere as common phenomenon. 
Furthermore, the ECRI Report (2016) deplores occasions where politicians and public figures 
(such as the Archbishop of the Autocephalous Church of Cyprus) blamed migrants for 
unemployment, and welfare scroungers and migrant women were stereotyped as prostitutes. 
In addition, the ECRI Report (2016) depicted an offensive discourse targeting Muslim 
migrants.  
4.11 Punitiveness and Political Economy: the Case of Cyprus 
Trends in punitiveness require a political economy perspective that will assist to understand 
and then uncover “the efficacy of symbolic power and the symbolic efficacy of material 
power” (Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2010, p: 27). This perspective hasn’t been developed in 
contemporary Cyprus. According to the world systems theory, peripheral societies are the 
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losers of the intentional commodity exchange. Cyprus is a small size, peripheral state with a 
distant island status that hosts a low-profit production process employing merely -but not 
exclusively- labour intensive techniques (Sepos, 2008). It is this peripheral status that 
generates sharp divisions between higher and lower classes, as small upper classes are often 
more close to influence policies to their favour. Recent research evidence suggests that the 
elite groups and professional middle classes in Cyprus have played a crucial role in shaping 
the socio-economic conditions as well as their trajectories (see further Cheliotis and Xenakis, 
2011). 
4.11.1 Cyprus and (IL) logics of neoliberalism 
Whilst Wacquant (2009a) argues that neo- liberal penality has travelled from the US borders 
and entered Europe, we have to appreciate that Europe today consist of twenty seven member 
states and some states have been unaffected. Neo liberalism bears little pertinence to the 
Cypriot case and this is evident if we shift our attention from the penal realm to the history of 
welfare and economy regulation, two vita prerequisites of neo liberalism. 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) work “Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” categorised welfare 
states into three archetypes. The first archetype consists of the Scandinavian or social-
democratic model, which is a “public service state” -essentially financed by taxes- and 
characterised by the principle of universality and the public provisions of services rather than 
the distribution of cash incomes. According to Esping-Andersen (1990)  the second archetype 
is the Continental state-corporate model:  
“which is a “distribution state” - mainly financed by the contributions by employers 
and employees in work-based insurance schemes - and characterised by social 
transfers in cash, related to earnings. In addition, the entitlement to the social rights is 
founded on social status and work performance” (p: 26-27). 
The third archetype is the Anglo-Saxon model which is financed by tax, its main features 
being not only its universality, but also the residual means-tested services and the relatively 
low flat-rate benefits (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
According to Gal (2010), the Southern European or Mediterranean welfare regime could 
arguably be considered as a fourth model. Gal (2010) has argued that the Mediterranean 
welfare regimes of eight countries namely Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Malta, Spain, 
Portugal and Turkey, have characteristics which distinguish them from other welfare regimes. 
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These countries were perceived to belong in a single welfare model not only because of 
geographical proximities, but also due to common historical and cultural legacies (Gal, 
2010). Moreover, Castles (1995) saw the rudimentary provisions of state welfare in those 
countries as a key component distinguishing them from the traditional welfare states.  
Gal (2010), for example, argued that during the mid-1990s in Cyprus, the three main 
characteristics of the welfare regime were those of: 
1. “Dualism, fragmentation and ineffectiveness of the social protection system 
which often led to marked gaps between segments of society and high levels of 
poverty within specific geographical or social sectors.  
2. Universal existence of (or near universal) health provision by the state 
alongside a flourishing private health market.  
3. Particularistic-clientelistic patterns of the welfare state” (p: 283). 
Interestingly, a recent body of research evidence (Pashardes, 2007, 2011, 2003, Shekeris et 
al., 2009) on the Cypriot welfare state suggest that weakness and centrality are its two salient 
characteristics, while strength and marginality can be found in social forces beyond the state 
such as the family. As Figure 4.4 indicates, the weakness of the state is evident from the low 
levels of social expenditure both in terms of benefits and services, when compared to other 
European countries (see further Andreotti et al., 2001). Even though the levels of social 
expenditure saw a steady increase over the last decade, the pattern of its internal contribution 
remains uneven and clearly in favour of pensions, giving few resources to active labour 
policies and housing (see Figure 4.5) (see further Andreotti et al., 2001). 
Despite its weakness, the state has a crucial role in regulating the heterogeneous and 
fragmented social interests of the Cypriot society (Andreotti et al., 2001). According to 
Andreotti et al. (2001) a plausible explanation for the centrality and inefficacy of the Cypriot 
welfare state is attributed to the fact that “the modernisation of political institutions preceded 
the modernisation of economic structures” (p: 46). 
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                              Figure 4.4 Cypriot Expenditure on Social Expenditure 
 
Source: Cystat, 2014 
A key element of the political institutions in Cyprus is how politics overshadow the states 
functioning and intervention through high levels of particularism, clientelism, nepotism and 
corruption (Kopecký and Scherlis, 2008). Therefore, in a state aimed at increasing 
legitimation within a divided and socially fragmented society some social groups are more 
privileged than other groups. According to Andreotti et al. (2001) the integration of different 
social groups freezes state provisions and hinders the formation of political consensus. 
Recent evidence of this is the over production of legislation; penalisation of offences; 
intervention without effective public regulation; rhetorical dimension of politics; fragmented 
administrative structures and a bureaucracy based on clientelistic practices with a minimal 
sense of professionalism. It is not difficult for someone to recognise that the Cypriot welfare 
state lacks the legitimacy to impose a universal and redistributive system of protection, but 
the state allows the stronger social groups to follow a corporatist policy and keeps the weaker 
social groups in an unprivileged position instead. 
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Figure 4.5 Benefits by function in Cyprus in 2010 
 
Source: Cystat, 2014 
Moreover, democratic consolidation in Cyprus has been closely related to the political parties 
and, to a large extent, has shaped vital elements of the electoral law such as the party 
membership, party- elite stabilisation and party identification. In Cyprus, for the last fifty 
years, political parties have adopted and followed the logic of competition with the party of 
the Right (DISH) against the party of the Left (AKEL). In Cyprus, the relatively weak nexus 
between political parties and civil society is reinforced by the weak role of trade unions. In 
contrast to the Nordic and Scandinavian countries (e.g. Sweden, Norway, Finland and 
Denmark) of the northern Europe, Cypriot trade unions played a limited role in both design 
and implementation of welfare policies. In Cyprus, trade unions have failed to effectively 
voice and force substantial social policy changes since their involvement in addressing social 
welfare issues emerged during the 1990’s.  
One of the main features of the Cypriot society is that of strong family ties and support with a 
large number of social risks such as unemployment, disability, and illness assumed to be the 
responsibility of the family (Andreotti et al, 2001). The state intervenes only when family 
fails but only by providing meagre monetary benefits, and access to underdevelopment care 
services. In Cyprus, for example, childcare services for babies under the age of two cover 
only 2.2% of all babies (Kouloumou, 2004). The familial system of the Cypriot culture is 
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based on nuclear families, high solidarity from the extended family and the community, and a 
rigid division of labour with men working outside the family, the male breadwinner model 
while women are inside the household looking after members of the family (usually the 
children and elderly). However, this does not mean that women in Cyprus are not 
emancipated (Andreotti et al, 2001). While in Northern Europe, women emancipate from 
their families, finding jobs outside the family in paid and part-time employment, Cypriot 
women emancipate within the family in the same professional way (Georgiades and Potocky-
Tripodi, 2000, Andreotti et al., 2001). 
More recently, research has sought to investigate the ways in which welfare states, the family 
and the market interact, and the implications this has for households, gender relations and for 
the structuring of welfare states in Cyprus (see further Moreno, 2004, 2005, 2008). Indeed, 
despite on-going changes in female labour participation and the introduction of social 
programmes (related to the Pension System, National Health Insurance Scheme and Social 
Insurance), the family unit in Cyprus has a distinctive role to play, and takes a different 
normative form than in other welfare states (Moreno, 2008). Furthermore, Georgas et al. 
(1997) underscore the enduring sense of strong and extended family obligations within the 
Cypriot society, (see also Georgas et al., 2001). Georgas et al (1997) study found that in 
Cyprus, care work remains a family responsibility. More recently, a study by Pashardes and 
Polycarpou (2003) has underscored low levels of state support for one parent families, the 
divorced and the elderly. 
As argued by Moreno and Palier (2005) the centrality of the family to the Cypriot welfare 
state can be related to the role that religion has played and continues to play in Cypriot 
society. In Cyprus, the “communalistic” ethic of the Orthodox Church has largely contributed 
to the empowerment of family ties, extensive mutual obligations and responsibilities, and also 
emphasises the importance of marriages (Durlauf et al., 2012, Gal, 2010). Marriage in Cyprus 
is institutionalised and supported by strong family bonds and solidarity with extended family 
members and the community (Durlauf et al., 2012). This contrasts strongly with the Central 
and Northern European welfare states. Correspondingly, the proportion of single parent 
households in Cyprus is relatively low, particularly when compared to Social-Democratic or 
Liberal welfare states (Gal, 2010), whilst the age children depart their parents’ household is 
comparatively higher in Cyprus than other Mediterranean welfare states (Toren, 2003). 
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The centrality of the family in Cyprus and the strong sense of solidarity within the nuclear 
and extended family has had significant implications for the ways in which social needs are 
dealt with, and hence upon the structuring and functioning of the welfare state in Cyprus in 
general (Gal, 2010). In particular, the strong family support networks and the acceptance of 
care responsibilities mainly by the female members of the family, has minimise the pressure 
on the Cypriot governments to deal with diverse needs (Gal, 2010). The centrality of family 
in the Cypriot welfare state enables it to rely on the family as an alternative to the state and 
market and thereby limits or deflects state spending on services, programmes and benefits 
designed to deal with specific needs. Thus, the care for the young, elderly and the sick in 
Cyprus is still considered to be a family ‘obligation’ (Andreotti et al., 2001).  
Recent studies (Trimikliniotis and Fulias-Souroulla, 2006, Trimikliniotis, 2009) have also 
underscored the role of family in Cyprus, focusing on a particular form of elderly care, and 
stressing the rapid growth of family-funded care provision in Cyprus mainly by female 
immigrant caregivers. According to Trimikliniotis and Demetriou (2011a) these home-based 
care workers provide assistance to the elderly, generally financed by the families, instead of 
the previous care responsibilities falling to female family members (usually the daughters) 
(Trimikliniotis and Fulias-Souroulla, 2006).  
Furthermore, recent research evidence by Karamessini (2008) has highlighted an interesting 
feature of the Cypriot economy: labour market rigidity and segmentation that distinguishes 
between insiders, who are protected within the formal economy; and outsiders, who form a 
relatively unprotected temporary or informal segment of the labour markets (Gal, 2010). This 
has resulted in the creation of a shadow economy, with implications both for the labour 
market and for the state revenues crucial for welfare state financing (Gal, 2010). One major 
shift that has also affected the Cypriot labour market has been the influx of undocumented 
labouring migrants. 
According to Gal (2010), the democratic system of the welfare state of Cyprus does not 
differentiate fundamentally from any other colonial state. Cyprus has suffered many on-going 
ethnic and political strikes that have impacted on the democratic structure of the unitary state, 
which had a greater influence on the Cypriot political system, a system that appears to be 
more prone to crisis than those of its European counterparts (Gunther et al., 2006). In recent 
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years, many researchers have stressed that minimal welfare provisions and institutions appear 
to be highly vulnerable to partisan pressures in Cyprus (Ferrera, 1996, Sotiropoulos, 2004b, 
Gunther et al., 2006), which on many occasions, have left the state unable to regulate most 
spheres of social life and to control major social and economic institutions. Similarly, 
Gunther et al., (2006) has argued that Cypriot bureaucracy is characterised by an enduring 
party politicisation of the higher echelons of the civil service, patronage and clientelestic 
patterns of recruitment.  
In summary, the late industrialisation of the Cypriot economy, labour market segmentation 
and a shadow economy with a weak central state and deeply problematic and ineffective 
public bureaucracies have undermined the funding, structure and function of the Cypriot 
welfare state. These characteristics have also restricted the resources available for funding a 
comprehensive social protection system and have created complications in the administration 
of established programmes. The late industrialisation inevitably impacted the formation of the 
working class and the strength of broad-based working class political and labour market 
movements, whilst the limited democratic legitimacy and stability has encouraged the 
manipulation of social welfare programmes in order to gain political support and neglecting 
to engage in long term social welfare planning. Furthermore, it could be argued that ethnic 
tensions (particularly before the Turkish Invasion) by default, created the preconditions for 
minimal social protection provisions that cut across ethnic and class lines.  
4.12 Concluding remarks  
All in all, crime seemed to be relative irrelative in explaining prison rates, nor did prison rates 
have a connection in the development of crime. In a small country like Cyprus, politics is 
established in clientelistic relationships between the citizen on the side and politicians and 
political parties on the other. Indisputably, this chapter has allowed us to identify a more 
perplexed relationship between crime and politics in economically stagnated periods. First, 
dominant political discourse has linked the financial crisis with common property and violent 
offences. Second, political discourses towards crime was conflated with the presence of 
migrants. The strategy designed by dominant political parties was aiming at the displacement 
of public frustration and discontent of the newly arrived economic austerity agenda, and the 
unequal distribution of its consequences. But as has been seen, this strategy is successful as 
106 
 
public’s concerns about crime activity saw a dramatic increase since the advent of the 
financial crisis, as well as increased punitiveness against offenders, particularly those of 
immigrant origin. In the hands of politicians and the media, crime and penal policy in Cyprus 
has become a tool of general argumentation with the measures adopted to be influenced by 
motives other than evidence based criminal political analyses. Furthermore, the political 
culture in Cyprus continues to discourage economic security granted by the welfare state, 
which feeds on public fears and penal populism. The social and economic security granted by 
the Cypriot welfare state is characterised by rudimentary provisions that then lead to an anti- 
tolerant and exclusionary criminal policy. Thus, weak social security and equality feed public 
fears, punitive projections and reactive populist posturing. Today, Cypriot penal policy and 
practice is built on a moralistic, marginalised and exclusive platform especially towards 
foreigners. It has become clearer that, in Cyprus foreign nationals constitute a separate 
criminal justice system that is driven by penal populism and racist political campaigns, 
especially by nationalist and far right political parties, against immigrants, refugees and 
asylum seekers.  
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
 
This chapter explores, analyses, and reflects on the methodological approaches and 
procedures used in the thesis including: research design, sampling and population, data 
collection and analysis. Critical realism is discussed in detail in terms of the framework and 
philosophy it provided this research; and how this research ‘fits’ within the paradigm offered 
by a Critical realist approach. Since this thesis explores the reasons behind the rise in the 
Cypriot prison population, an interview-based approach was utilised, with twenty seven 
‘elite’ participants from the criminal justice system interviewed, their responses were then 
transcribed, translated and coded. All of human history is open to multiple, complex and 
often competing interpretation, including the rise of the prison, its nature, purpose, impact 
and challenges. Today, the Central Jail of Nicosia is facing a number of challenges to its 
legitimacy. This is evident in recent episodes of prison unrest, and the rise in self- harm, 
rapes and suicides. This chapter provides a breakdown of the many and complex stages 
involved in uncovering and understanding the views of those responsible for influencing, 
developing, and implementing criminal laws and policies in the Republic of Cyprus. 
5.1 Research Questions: 
1. Why is the prison population growing in the Central Jail of Nicosia?  
2. In relation to the on-going growth of the prison population, what type of challenges 
is the Central Jail of Nicosia facing? 
The main aim of this study is to provide an account of the structural causes behind the 
significant growth of the Cypriot correctional institution, the Central Jail of Nicosia. This 
study provides evidence which suggests that the rise of the prison population can be 
attributed to structural process through which individuals become prisoners. This section will 
outline how the researcher has theorised the rise in the prison population and the challenges 
that may bring in a critical realist framework.  
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5.2 The ‘critical’ strand of this study: Basic assumptions 
Critical realist philosophy has much to offer criminology researchers and theorists who 
investigate or comment on the rise in the use of imprisonment and prison conditions. Critical 
realism takes a transcendental realist ontology, an eclectic realist/interpretivist epistemology 
and a generally emancipatory axiology (Easton, 2010). While critical realism is a relatively 
new methodological positioning it has been utilised in many disciplines including economics 
(Lawson, 2006), sociology (Sayer, 2000; Layder, 1990), criminology (Pawson & Tilley, 
1997), religious studies (Robbins, 1999) and psychiatry (Hanley,1995). There are many 
different approaches and views to realism, however this study utilises Sayer’s account 
because it provides a more detailed and comprehensive justification. 
1.“The world exists independently of our knowledge of it.  
2. Our knowledge of the world is fallible and theory-laden. Concepts of truth and 
falsity fail to provide a coherent view of the relationship between knowledge and its 
object. Nevertheless knowledge is not immune to empirical check and its 
effectiveness in informing and explaining successful material practice is not mere 
accident.  
3. Knowledge develops neither wholly continuously, as the steady accumulation of 
facts within a stable conceptual framework, nor discontinuously, through 
simultaneous and universal changes in concepts.  
4. There is necessity in the world; objects—whether natural or social— necessarily 
have particular powers or ways of acting and particular susceptibilities.  
5. The world is differentiated and stratified, consisting not only of events, but objects, 
including structures, which have powers and liabilities capable of generating events. 
These structures may be present even where, as in the social world and much of the 
natural world, they do not generate regular patterns of events.  
6. Social phenomena such as actions, texts and institutions are concept dependent. We 
not only have to explain their production and material effects but to understand, read 
or interpret what they mean. Although they have to be interpreted by starting from the 
researcher's own frames of meaning, by and large they exist regardless of researchers' 
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interpretation of them. A qualified version of 1 therefore applies to the social world. 
In view of 4–6, the methods of social science and natural science have both 
differences and similarities.  
7. Science or the production of any kind of knowledge is a social practice. For better 
or worse (not just worse) the conditions and social relations of the production of 
knowledge influence its content. Knowledge is also largely - though not exclusively - 
linguistic, and the nature of language and the way we communicate are not incidental 
to what is known and communicated. Awareness of these relationships is vital in 
evaluating knowledge.  
8. Social science must be critical of its object. In order to be able to explain and 
understand social phenomena we have to evaluate them critically” (Sayer, 1992, p.5). 
Points 1, 4 and 5 highlight the key assumption of critical realists about ontology and 
similarly, this study utilises an ontology that assumes that reality exist ‘out there’ 
independently. Points 2, 3, 6 and 7 point out that reality is socially constructed but not 
entirely so. The ‘real’ world breaks through and eradicates the complicated and complex 
situations that we create, in order to understand and uncover the true causes of the rise in the 
prison population within the Cypriot prison establishment. 
As stated by Easton (2010) objects and entities: “provide the basic theoretical building 
blocks” and includes ‘things’ like people, relationships, attitudes, policies, ideas and 
resources” (p: 120). They can be human, social or material, complex or simple, structured or 
unstructured (Easton, 2010). For critical realists, entities are opposed to variables that 
dominate most social research traditions. Variables are measures of things, but not the things 
themselves. For critical realists, entities have significant causal powers; however, causality 
has a disputed meaning, with Sayer (1992) arguing that: 
“ To ask for the cause of something is to ask ‘what makes it happen’, what ‘produces’, 
‘generates’, ‘creates’ or ‘leads to’ it” (p:104). As Figure 5.1 indicates, for this study the 
causal mechanisms of the rise in the prison population in Cyprus can be found in the role of 
media, public opinion, penal policies, immigration policies, the role of political parties and 
the elites and the government.  
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Also Sayer (1992) argues that causality relies on assumptions that together with other 
assumptions create a system of thinking about the world that people find acceptable.  
Another vital element of critical realism concerns the existence of emergence. For example, 
the properties of entities at a higher level of aggregation emerge for the lower level but are 
not necessarily determined by them (see further Easton, 2010). For critical realists, for 
example, emergence involves some kind of connectedness. Frauley (2007) for example, 
argues that a potential rise in the prison population have emergent properties with the 
attention directed to the conditions from which the rise in the prison population emerges. 
Figure 5.1 The critical stance of this study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 BOUNDED 
                  REALITY 
         CYPRIOT CULTURE               
ELITES 
MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 
PENAL 
POLICIES 
POLITICAL 
PARTIES 
PUBLIC 
OPINION 
CAUSAL POWERS 
IMMIGRATION 
POLICIES 
JUDGES 
111 
 
 
5.2.1 Critical Realism and Social Reality: the Empirical, the Actual and the Real 
It is the interest in the deep and partially unobservable dimensions which distinguishes 
critical realism from other traditions such as positivism and social constructionism. Critical 
realist penologists, for instance, are interested in the forms categorised as punishments, but 
they recognise these as outcomes of deep and, in many cases, unobservable conditions that 
require identification (Frauley, 2011). There are number of important similarities and 
differences between critical realism ontology and other ontologies associated with positivism 
and social constructionism. Like positivist ontology, critical realist ontology argues that  the 
objects of inquiry exist independently of human knowledge of them but, unlike positivist 
ontology, also argues that knowledge and understanding has invasive nature to the production 
of events (Frauley, 2011). Like a social constructionist ontology, critical realist ontology 
regards the meanings used by subjects as central to the production of subjects’ actions but, 
critical realism holds that this is only a part of the story and deep and unobservable structures 
exist that produce subjects’ meanings. Therefore, deep and unobservable features of social 
reality such as inequality, power, and racism cannot be explained by searching for patterned 
regularities (positivism) or by relying on self- understanding of participants (social 
constructionism). Thus, unlike the strategy adopted for this study, these strategies (positivism 
and social constructionism) produce rich and interesting descriptions, but not in depth 
explanations of why imprisonment rates are increasing or what are the current challenges of 
the penal system due to the on- growing prison population. 
For critical realists such as Bhaskar (1978), Archer et al,. (2013) and Sayer (2000), social 
reality is stratified into three intertwined domains: the empirical, the actual and the real.  The 
empirical refers to subjects’/ participants’ understandings and perceptions of the phenomenon 
under investigation.  According to Manicas (2006) this is the ‘mechanism’- the populations  
deep, hidden and unobservable understanding/perceptions around social control – the ‘thing’ 
Realists attempt to uncover in order to explain the outcome. The actual refers to the 
observable events of a society including punishment, imprisonment and prisons. As stated by 
Manicas (2006) this is the ‘real’ part of Realism usually the ‘thing’ realist research is aiming 
to explain by uncovering the hidden mechanisms. Finally, the domain of the real refers to the 
realm of tendencies from which observable events emerge and also relates to the other two  
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an increase in the prison population emerges (Frauley, 2007). One influential way of thinking 
about social reality is by employing the stratification of social reality model of Layder. More 
specifically, Layder (1993) argues that social reality consists of four different interconnected 
domains: self, situated activity, setting and context, and those layers constitute the conditions 
for the prison population to grow. In the case of the Cypriot penal system, for example, the 
conditions of the rise in the prison population within the CJN might include domains of 
empirical and actual. The domain of real could be seen as the context – socio-political, 
economic, and cultural environment – the space from within which all else arises. Social 
explanation requires the consideration of all three domains. Consequently, for critical 
realism:  
“Scientific work is instead to investigate and identify relationships and non-
relationships, respectively, between what we experience, what actually happens, and 
the underlying mechanisms that produce the events in the world” (Danermark, 2002: 
p:21 ) 
For this study, the growth in prison population is not simply the outcome of individuals’ 
wrongdoing. The critical realist strategy for this study is not directed by the individual wrong 
doing but the deep ‘larger thing’, the conditions from which the structured interactions 
between social subjects (e.g. citizens and the government) within a ‘setting’ (e.g. the prison 
system) that is organised in a larger context (e.g. political economy).  
An examination of the CJN – its physical structure, architecture, facilities, regime, untoward 
incidents, staff profiles and numbers, and prisoner profiles and numbers - highlights the 
nature of a society because this is where the evidence and consequences of decisions about 
order and control, punishment and segregation, are felt.  Therefore, the nature of the Cypriot 
prison – who is sent to prison and how they are treated while there - depends on current 
thinking and attitudes towards ‘control’.  
Critical realism offers the opportunity to this study to elicit knowledge that would not be 
attained if working from a positivist or social constructionism research strategy. The 
ontological focus of the research questions for this study is in line with the substantive 
research that critical realism offers. For this study, for example, the overarching question is to 
understand the structural causes behind the rapid increase of the Cypriot prison population; it 
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looks unlikely that such a question can be adequately answered by the positivist or social 
constructionist approach. The critical realist approach sets out to identify the unseen 
processes and structures that generate the observable outcome of the increase in the prison 
population. What is important for this study is to explore questions about the nature of the 
Cypriot CJS, and about the interconnection with Cypriot culture, and the attitude, 
understanding and perceptions of the population, that positivists and social constructionists 
are not led to pose. Therefore, the critical reasoning for this study accounts what the objects 
of investigation consist of and how the knowledge of those objects are attained.  
The Italian Marxist thinker, Gramsci (1971), has stipulated the necessity to see beyond the 
understanding of punishment within criminology and to avoid the constraints externally 
imposed in taking punishment to be the thing that the discipline is organised around. 
Additionally, Gramsci (1971) notes that it is important for criminologists and social scientists 
to understand the nature of the critical realist metatheory: 
“Is it preferable to ‘think’  without having critical awareness, in a disjointed and 
irregular way in other words to ‘participate’ in a concept of the world ‘imposed’ 
mechanically by external environment, that is by one of the many social groups in 
which everyone is automatically involved from the time he enters the conscious 
world… or is it preferable to work out one’s own conception of the world consciously 
and critically, and so out of this work of one’s own brain to choose one’s  own sphere 
of activity, to participate actively in making the history of the world and not simply 
accept passively and without care the imprint of one’s own personality from outside? 
(1971, p: 38-39).” 
From the above it is possible to see how a Critical Realist framework supports the exploration 
of the impact of Cypriot culture and social structure on the penal modes, functions, forms and 
effects of modern punishment in the Republic of Cyprus. Additionally, this study argues that 
the rise in the prison population is the outcome of deeper and unobservable conditions that 
require identification. The following section will explore the research method employed by 
this study along with the data collection method.  
5.3 Social Research and reflexivity 
Reflexivity should be a fundamental research objective for social researchers. Today the 
relationship between the researcher and the subject and between the researcher and the 
research requires attention and is seen as a central element of the research process. 
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Accordingly, reflexivity plays a central role in this research study. For Gilbert (2008) 
reflexivity seeks to:  
“Have further value in helping us to reflect upon our position as sociologists and 
researchers and develop a more critical sensitivity towards the activity of social 
research” (p: 18) 
Also, Gilgun (2010) argues that: 
“Researchers are reflexive when they are aware of the multiple influences they have 
on research processes and on how research processes affect them” (p: 1). 
 Furthermore, Hughes and Sharrock (2007) posit: 
 “That the factual realities of social settings are permeated through and through by the 
ways in which participants in them know them for what they are and how they might 
change” (p: 199). 
Consequently, it could be argued that sociological observations and notes are strictly 
subjective.  A sociologist’s report is a personal response to a situation, as sociologists are 
social beings that cannot rise above the realities of social life (Hughes and Sharrock, 2007). 
Researchers cannot escape subjectivity so it must be embraced and accounted for as per 
Gramsci’s argument. Therefore, it is recognised that the relationship between the participants, 
the field work locale, and the fieldworker is not impersonal; it is instead interpersonal, related 
and convoluted (Hughes and Sharrock, 2007).  
5.3.1 Insider/Outsider perspective 
Reflexivity has been an important part of this research study. The relationships between 
researcher and subject as well as researcher and research are pertinent and require attention. 
Throughout the PhD process, the researcher remained self-critical and self-reflective. 
According to Holliday (2007) reflexivity requires researchers to recognize that they are:  
“Entangled with their methods and the politics of the social world they study” (p: 
138). 
Therefore, in the stages I identified, addressed and benefitted from the complexities of my 
presence within the research setting (see further Holliday, 2007). Traditional reflexivity 
discussions in social research assume that observation is subjective; however, researchers 
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cannot escape subjectivity, therefore it must be embraced and accounted for. The relationship 
between the participants, the fieldwork locale and the researcher is not impersonal but 
interpersonal instead. 
My position as a Cypriot and researcher has complicated my role in a number of instances. 
This dichotomous issue is known as insider/ outsider perspective (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009) 
related to reflexivity as a way of promoting and integrating subjectivity. Insider perspective 
refers to researchers who conduct research with populations of which they are also members, 
so that the researcher shares the same identity, language, and experiences as the study 
participants (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009). The insider role of the researcher for this study 
allowed for a rapid and complete acceptance by the research participants. The benefit to 
being a member of a group is the acceptance (Asselin, 2003). For this study, my Cypriot 
membership has offer me a high level of trust and openness from the study’s participants that 
would likely not happen had it been absent. For this study, commonality was the starting 
point to gain access into groups (especially elite groups) that might be closed to ‘outsiders’  
(Dwyer and Buckle, 2009). 
However, being an insider is not without its potential problems. Kanuha (2000), for example, 
argues that: 
“For each of the ways that being an insider researcher enhances the depth and breadth 
of understanding a population that may not be accessible to a non-native scientist, 
questions about objectivity, reflexivity, and authenticity of a research project are 
raised because perhaps one knows too much or is too close to the project and may be 
too similar to those being studied” (p: 445). 
During the course this study, the researcher recognised her complex and very often 
overlapping identities. As an Associate Lecturer, the researcher is trained to carry out both 
teaching and research, and she is also a member of the Cypriot community/society who 
participates and contributes to the welfare of the community. As a citizen, she is a middle 
class wife, 33 years of age, with Cypriot-based upbringing and education. Finally, the 
researcher is a researcher exploring the reasons behind the increase in the prison population 
in Cyprus, and the challenges this brings. No previous research on this topic is known; 
therefore, this study is breaking a new ground. 
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5.4 Method of Research 
This study explores the causes of the rise in the prison population in the CJN, the only 
correctional institution in the Republic of Cyprus as well as its nature and challenges of the 
prison estate. The qualitative method has been used extensively and successfully in the past to 
explore the causes behind the prison population growth in Greece  (Cheliotis, 2012; 2011; 
2013 ), however, this issue has not been studied before in this manner, and there are no social 
studies around the causes or challenges of the Cypriot prison establishment. Thus, the 
researcher, in order to obtain a great amount of in- depth information around these 
challenging penal issues, has chosen to implement a qualitative research strategy. The 
rationale behind the implementation of the qualitative paradigm is primarily due to its 
suitability to address this research question. As previously mentioned, the reasons behind the 
rise of the prison population in Cyprus is an unexplored phenomenon that requires a flexible 
approach to include all possible outcomes. For this study, a qualitative approach is more 
likely to be successful due to its holistic approach that considers the context of the culture-
imprisonment relationship. In an earlier chapter, it has been argued that prison is a reflection 
of current cultural norms and values, which can evolve. These are reflected by a society’s’ 
‘elite’ – those embodied with the power (given or won) to effect change, have an impact, and 
implement policies which are acceptable because they are in line with common norms and 
values. Therefore, the qualitative approach of this study emphasises: 
“…the importance of context, setting, and the participants’ frame of reference” 
 (Marshall and Rossman, 1999:p: 58) 
Marshall and Rossman (1999) note that the qualitative paradigm is recommended when there 
is little information on the topic that is under investigation, and argue that it is the qualitative 
depth rather than breadth that is advantageous in criminology. More specifically, Tewksbury 
states: 
“Qualitative data, whether collected from one on one interviews, observations, focus 
groups or immersion in a setting, provides an understanding of very specific 
individuals and settings, which while applicable beyond those specific settings and 
individuals, is limited in how widely generalizable such findings may be. But, 
overcoming this limitation is the value of learning about something deeply and in a 
complete context (p. 54)”. 
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Thus, the aim of this thesis is to explore reasons behind the increase in the prison population 
and the challenges this brings, it is not testing a hypothesis but rather aims to gain a deep 
understanding of the context and key influences in regard to a Realist framework.  
5.5 Data Collection 
Interview was the main method for primary data collection utilised in this thesis. The 
interview data collection method was utilised in order to obtain first-hand information 
including the rise of the prison, its nature, purpose, impact and challenges. Interviews are 
valid and widely used methods of data collection in social research permitting  ‘us to see that 
which is not ordinarily on view and examine that which is looked at but seldom seen’’  
(Rubin and Rubin, 2011, in Myers and Newman, 2007, p: 3 ). This research study employs 
interviews as a standalone-data collection method with participants from three central bodies 
of the Cypriot CJS: Legislative, Adjudication and Correction. Interviews are a recognised 
research data collection method for enabling participants to give detailed responses about 
perplexing issues. As stated by Seidman (2012), the implementation of interviews assists 
researchers to gain a straightforward understanding of the participants’ lived experiences and 
practices, and the meaning they make of those experiences. This is in line with the Realist 
framework and the discovery of the hidden and not clearly observable structures or 
mechanisms by which the prison population is increasing. 
5.5.1 Semi-Structured interviews 
For this study, twenty seven semi-structured interviews were conducted. The semi- structured 
nature of the interviews means that I identified certain issues to be explored but it also 
allowed participants to identify and discuss additional issues (see further Gubrium and 
Holstein, 2001, Holstein and Gubrium, 1997). Whilst structured interview can be useful, it is 
often a repetitive closed system with the same questions, wording and sequence, an aspect 
that restricts the freedom of data exploration. Conversely, semi-structured interviews offered 
flexibility to the researcher to clarify participants’ responses and to probe for further 
examples and details. However, despite the explorative nature of semi-structured interviews, 
the interviewer has the significant responsibility to guide the interview and keep participants 
on topic – hence minimising the dross rate - that can be a risk with unstructured in-depth 
interviews (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). 
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The questions utilised in this thesis were guided by the following elements: 
1. Questions that comprise the main focus of this research; 
2. Follow up questions that help to uncover important topics of interest and; 
3. Probing questions. 
A prior review of the relationship between potential factors contributing to the rise of the 
prison population was performed by the researcher and used to inform the interview structure. 
The resulting interview guide is presented in Appendix 1, with the intention of guiding the 
researcher in the extraction of as much relevant information as possible. It is important to 
note that these interviews were designed around emerging concepts and themes mainly 
because this research approaches a yet an unexplored topic. Relational elements were judged 
more valuable for this research. The relational approach suggested that the rise of the prison 
population is the outcome of other significant dynamics such as high crime rates, the levels of 
welfare expenditure and social protection, punitiveness, political and media discourses 
towards immigrants and, more recently, institutional trust and legitimacy. Since there is no 
available research for the factors that contribute to the prison expansion of the Cypriot prison 
establishment, identifying those explanatory factors is therefore necessary to assess the 
relationship between culture (shared norms and values) and imprisonment. 
The twenty seven semi-structured interviews obtained for this study were in-depth interviews. 
With in-depth interviews individuals are seen as a source of unique and important knowledge 
and the study can benefit from exploratory and descriptive data (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 
2011). In this study, in–depth interviews are used to acquire ‘deep’ information and 
knowledge relating to the rise of the prison population, its nature, purpose, impact and 
challenges (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2010). Critical Realists, for example, emphasise that 
social action emerges in a pre-existing context of social relations and structures which have 
both constraining and facilitation implications for such action (Smith and Elger, 2012). In this 
sense, the social world has an external reality and exerts power over individuals’ acts, but as 
Elder-Vass (2010) argues “human action may be affected by social causes without being fully 
determined by them” (p: 87-88). This means that Critical Realists utilise interviews and - in 
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the case of this research - semi-structured interviews to appreciate the interpretations of 
participants and to analyse the social contexts, constraints and resources within which those 
participants act (Smith and Elger, 2012).  
The critical realist approach of this study investigates the relationships between the 
underlying causal mechanisms that contribute to the rise of the prison rates – including 
participants’ understanding and actions – the varying contexts in which those mechanisms 
operate and the resultant outcomes (Smith and Elger, 2012). Drawing on the mechanisms, 
context and outcomes paradigm, Pawson and Tilley (1997) recognise the active roles of the 
researcher and participants: 
“People are always knowledgeable about the reasons for their conduct but in a way 
which can never carry total awareness of the entire set of structural conditions which 
prompt an action, nor the full set of consequences of that action … In attempting to 
construct explanations for the patterning of social activity, the researcher is thus 
trying to develop an understanding which includes hypotheses about their subjects’ 
reasons within a wider model of their causes and consequences” (p: 162-163). 
The in-depth semi-structured interview is a suitable data collection method because it:  
1. Implements open-ended questions, 
2. Elicits depth of information and, 
3. Involves relatively few participants. 
5.5.2 Text translation Method: A note of caution 
Translation is central to this qualitative study. This study seeks to explore and understand the 
causes behind the significant growth of the only correctional institution in Cyprus and to 
explore the various challenges that the prison estate is currently facing.  The researcher has 
utilised a wide range of books, journal articles, reports, governmental documents and policy 
documents in the Greek language as there is scarce literature on the functioning and operation 
of the Cypriot penal establishment. Accordingly, for the purpose of this research, a wide 
range of books, reports, policy documents and governmental documents have been non-
literally, idiomatically, translated from Greek to English in three stages: 
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1. Analysis of the text: the researcher had to analyse the text comprehensively by 
following these steps: 1. Read carefully the source text 2. Underline difficult words or 
concepts 3.  Close reading of the source text after understanding the difficult words or 
concepts (Nord, 1991). 
2. Transfer the text to the target language: after the text source has been wholly and 
fully understood, the researcher had to transfer the text to English language following certain 
steps.1. The researcher produced a simple draft of the translated text from Greek to English 
language. 2. The researcher had to pay extra attention to the grammar and spelling. 3. 
Another interesting feature of the translation process for this study was the protection and 
safeguarding of the wider socio-cultural context.4. Make the text sound and look natural 
(Nord, 1991). 
3. Revision of translation: after the text has been analysed and translated, the 
researcher had to ensure that the translation process is the correct one by: 1. Checking the 
spelling and grammar of the translated text 2. Ensure that all the main ideas, concepts and 
details can be found in the translated text.3. Ensure that the final version of the translated text 
sounds natural (Nord, 1991). 
After the process of translation, the researcher had to ensure that an appropriate referencing 
style was in place, and all the authors and sources were properly referenced. The researcher 
referred to them in the Reference List where the researcher had translated the name of the 
author into the English language. 
5.5.3 Interviews Translation Method 
All interviews obtained for research study were in the Greek language. The researcher 
decided to follow this specific strategy for two main reasons. Firstly, English was only 
spoken by a relatively small number of research participants and secondly, this research sees 
the use of language as a vital part of the data construction process. For example, research 
conduct in English will not accurately reflect the full meaning and interpretation of the social 
actors participating in it (Griffee, 2012). Data is regarded as a product of the interaction 
between the researcher and the research population, and primary researchers are understood 
as developing an intimate bond, especially by communicating in the same language. 
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After data collection, the researcher had to transcribe the tape recorded interviews and then 
translate them from Greek to English through the non-literal text translation method, as 
described above. The researcher decided not to provide the interview transcriptions to an 
approved translation centre for translation, in an attempt to safeguard fundamental values of 
this study, such as participants’ anonymity and confidentiality.  
5.5.4 Translation as a ‘cultural trip’ 
With participants and researcher speaking the same language, no language differences were 
present in data gathering and transcription. The first language differences occurred in the 
coding phase during data analysis. The latter was a fragile phase with multiple interpretations 
being under discussion in the Greek language because it was not always clear how to express 
the meanings as interpreted. Themes identified and selected during the coding phase, needed 
a good understanding of subtle differences in meaning in order to come to the best English 
wordings. A good example is that of the word ‘rousfeti’ (ρουσφέτι). While ‘rousfeti’ 
describes any act of granting a favour or service, the term political patronage was considered; 
however, the word was not fully suitable to express the intended meaning. Melossi (2000) 
argues that a straightforward ‘translation’, strictly speaking, is impossible, however an 
intercultural dialogue is possible and desirable (see further Parekh, 1996). 
The translation of criminological practices is a challenging conceptual issue for foreign 
researchers. Similarly, translation had a significant role to play in this study, not only because 
of the practical issues but also because of the importance of this on interpretation of findings. 
Melossi (2001), for example, points out that any term or concept is ‘embedded’ within a 
cultural milieu that gives it its meaning (p: 144). Even the simple term ‘envelope’ is not 
‘φάκελος’ or ‘φακελάκι’. The point that Melossi (1998; 2001) is making is that a given 
cultural and linguistic environment has a crucial role to play in shaping the experience of a 
word or a concept. Let us try to explain this better. Envelopes are flat paper containers with a 
sellable flap used to enclose letters, mails, bills, documents and manuscripts, the envelopes 
with a number of documents relating to criminal and interrogation cases, the envelopes that 
contain important information during negotiations between Cyprus and the IMF and Troika 
or with meetings between the Cypriot President Anastasiadhs and the Turkish Cypriot leader 
Mustafa Akinci. Finally, ‘envelopes’ as a payment when Cypriots need to be treated by 
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doctors; excluded from penal processes; and excluded from the ‘pains of imprisonment or 
having problems with tax auditors.    
Therefore, the term envelope suggests a set of practices that is different for each one of us. In 
spite of these individual variations, however, the culture we come from offers a ‘sameness’ 
condition for those who share it, hence, ‘translatability’ becomes an issue in our attempt to 
establish a relationship with another culture (Melossi, 2001). In the same vein, Simon (1996) 
argues that a ‘good’ translation cannot be found in synonym and syntax: 
“The solutions to many of the translator’s dilemmas are not to be found in 
dictionaries, but rather in an understanding of the way language is tied to local 
realities, to literary forms and to changing identities. Translators must constantly 
make decisions about the cultural meanings which language carries, and evaluate the 
degree to which the two different worlds they inhibit are ‘the same’. These are not 
technical difficulties; they are not the domain of specialists in obscure or quaint 
vocabularies. . . . In fact the process of meaning transfer has less to do with finding 
the cultural inscription of a term than in reconstructing its value” (p: 137-8). 
The understanding of processes and experiences of translation is of paramount significance, 
in the sense that, the ‘embedded’ findings are not simply translated from one ‘embeddedness’ 
to another (Melossi et al., 2011). The ‘cultural trip’ of the findings presented by this PhD 
thesis, is not a mere transplant or transfer of discourses from ‘there’ to ‘here’; but instead it 
problematizes with the ways in which findings have been transformed, to a lesser extent, in 
the process of moving across space and between contexts (Melossi et al., 2011).  According 
to Sozzo (2011, in Melossi et al., 2011) discourses which travels from one space to another 
undergoes some sort of alteration, and the local actors who take on the work of translating 
any kind of discourse have to adapt to the local problems and vocabularies.  
Therefore, for this study, the translation has been surrounded by rejections and adaptations in 
order to preserve certain cultural-historical elements. Due to this, it could be argued that the 
findings of this study produce its ‘metamorphosis’ acting as ‘traduttori, traditori’ (Sozzo, 
2006; Melossi et al, 2011). 
Schuetz (1944) provides an important conception of why translation is of paramount 
significance when meanings, terms and concepts are moving across space and between 
contexts: 
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“The discovery that things in his surroundings look quite different from what he 
expected them to be at home is frequently the first shock that stranger’s confidence in 
the validity of his habitual ‘thinking as usual’. Not only the picture which the stranger 
has brought along of the cultural pattern of the approached group but whole hitherto 
unquestioned scheme interpretation current within the new group becomes 
invalidated. It cannot be used as a scheme of orientation within the new social 
surroundings. For the members of the approached a group their cultural pattern fulfils 
the functions of such a scheme. But the approaching stranger can neither use it simply 
as it is nor establish a general formula of transformation between both cultural 
patterns permitting him, so  to speak, to convert all the coordinates within one scheme 
of orientation in those valid within the other” (p: 503- 4). 
Consequently, translation is in fact an imperfect and Utopian enterprise and usually risks 
producing ‘ugly’ and ‘unpleasant’ meanings from ‘there’ to ‘here’. For this study, translation 
has seen as a peculiar ‘cultural trip’ in which specific concepts and practices have been 
transformed to an extent in the process of moving space and context.  
5.6 Research Sample 
At an early stage of this research, sampling constituted a crucial decision. For this study, it is 
not possible to include all members of the Cypriot population in order to get reasonably 
accurate results (see Appendix 2). Neuman and Kreuger (2003) for example, states that in 
qualitative research, sampling does not necessarily aim to reproduce an accurate cross-section 
of the population, but instead selects a sample based on its relevance to the research topic. 
Therefore, this study selected participants’ depending on their:  
• Relevance and,  
• Privileged knowledge (see further Denscombe, 2014). 
In other words, in order to ensure and maintain research validity, this study, has adopted a 
purposive sampling technique. 
5.6.1 Purposive sampling 
For this study, a hand- picked purposive sample is utilised. The point of purposive sample 
operates on the principle that a study could get the best of information by focusing on the 
selection of a relatively smaller number of people based on their known attributes and 
expertise (Denscombe, 2014). This approach is in contrast with other forms of research 
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sampling techniques used in qualitative research such as random sampling and systematic 
sampling. A purposive sample works best for this study and researcher deliberately selected 
specific people because they were seen as the best participants to produce the most valuable 
data (Maxfield and Babbie, 2014). 
The critical realist methodology framework utilised for this study, requires an in-depth 
investigation of the causes behind the increase in the prison population and the challenges 
this brings; this can be achieved by implementing a purposive sampling technique. For this 
study, a purposive sample of twenty-seven participants from the three main bodies of the 
Cypriot CJS is utilised. The three main bodies of the Cypriot CJS are: 1. Legislative, 2. 
Adjudication, and 3. Corrections. Participants from the Legislative body include politicians, 
and Senior Counsels and Attorneys from the Law Office of the Republic of Cyprus. 
Participants from the Adjudication Body include Judges and Public Prosecutors, whilst 
Participants from the Correction body encompasses prison staff, prison officers, senior staff 
of the prison governance and selected officers from the Ombudsman. The data for this study 
were collected in five phases: March 2012 (two pilot interviews), March 2013, and August 
2013, January 2014, and July 2014. 
The interviews with Judges were identified and arranged via the list of judicial officers 
provided by the Cypriot Ministry of Justice and Public Order. Public Prosecutors were 
contacted and recruited personally through the list of public prosecutors provided by the 
Cypriot Ministry of Justice and Public Order. Also, politicians were contacted personally via 
personal connections and recruitment letters in both languages, English (Appendix 3) and 
Greek (Appendix 4). Prison staff were contacted and recruited personally, including 
obtaining written permission from the Acting Prison governor of the CJN (Appendix 5). 
Furthermore, prison health care staffs were contacted personally several times, as prison 
healthcare staff are seen as important participants of this study. However, despite various 
recruit attempts, no prison healthcare staff agree to participate. 
5.6.2 Sample Size 
Regarding the number of interviews, twenty seven are utilised for the analysis of this study, 
although, the number of transcripts used does not accurately reflect the actual fieldwork 
undertaken, as many more interviews were planned and then cancelled or completed but the 
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transcript was not represented in this thesis. Interviews were cancelled for many reasons, 
including when ten prison staff participants cancelled their interviews following official 
police investigations. Additionally, an interview was completed without the use of an audio 
voice recorder at the request of one participant. One interview was left incomplete as the 
participant was forced to terminate the interview due to unanticipated family issues. One 
particular politician offered to take part in this study but a transcript was never obtained as 
the interview was cancelled several times for various reasons, such as social and 
parliamentary obligations. To summarise, thirty nine interviews were planned, thirty one 
were booked, and twenty seven were conducted. 
According to Patton (2002), the qualitative inquiry is concerned with the information richness 
of the selected participants and the analytical capability of the researcher and not the size of 
the sample, since: 
1. Increasing the sample size beyond a certain point does not significantly contribute 
to the research validity because “there will come a point where very little evidence is 
obtained”.  
2. The generalisation of the results that require statistical precision is not the primary 
requirement or goal in qualitative research. 
3. The richness, in terms of information, in each individual case in qualitative research 
obligates the researcher to limit the sample size for him or her to be able to manage the data. 
Therefore, the determination of sample size for this thesis was based on the saturation point. 
Saturation point occurs when all parameters of the causes/ reasons behind the increase in the 
prison population and the challenges this brings are finally exhausted. Along the same lines, 
this PhD thesis is concerned with the richness of the data and not the amount of the data, and 
it is the depth of investigation of various factors that potentially contribute to the increase of 
the Cypriot prison population that is seen as crucial. The researcher, by interviewing a 
relatively small group of people, had the opportunity to spend a considerable amount of time 
with relevant people discussing potential causes that may contribute to the rise of the prison 
population in the CJN. More specifically, more than forty hours were spent discussing 
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potential reasons of the causes behind the rise of the prison, its nature, purpose, impact and 
challenges with the participants. 
5.7 Interviewing the Cypriot ‘elite’ 
Interviews with judges, politicians, and senior counsels and Attorneys from the Law office of 
the Republic of Cyprus, are elite interviews and have been advantageous for this research 
study. As stated by Cohen (1983) “if we wish to study society, polity, and culture, it is 
necessary to study those at the top, those whose positions are powerful and enviable” (p, 63). 
Therefore, interviewing those elite groups, the researcher aimed to uncover and understand 
the views and beliefs of those responsible for influencing, developing and implementing the 
criminal justice system in Cyprus, an important component of the critical realist strand 
utilised for this research study. 
During the last two decades, there has been a growing body of literature on interviews of elite 
groups, as scholars have become increasingly interested in exploring and understanding the 
perspectives of leaders in politics, business and society as a whole (Harvey, 2011).  
Scholars across the social sciences have adopted different approaches to coin the term ‘elite’. 
Zuckerman (1972), for example, has used the term ‘ultra elite’ to describe individuals who 
hold a significant amount of power and authority within a group that is already considered 
elite (Harvey, 2011), whilst McDowell (1998) coined the term ‘professional elites’ to 
describe a highly skilled and professionally competent  and class-specific working class. In 
addition, Parry (1998) used the term ‘hybrid elites’ to highlight the informal, hybridised and 
fragmented critical knowledge by invisible networks of elite actors. Hence, it becomes clear 
that the term elite is significantly contested, and still there is much confusion and debate 
surrounding its definition, with many scholars shaping their definitions to match their 
respondents (Harvey, 2011). 
 This study, utilised twenty seven interviews in order to critically explore the indirect and 
unseen underlying mechanisms that contribute to the unprecedented levels of imprisonment 
rates in Cyprus and to critically identify the current challenges of the prison establishment 
due to the high numbers of prisoners. The definition of the term ‘elites’ utilised for this study 
involves:   
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• Individuals with close proximity to power; especially those who decide on or influence 
penal policy making processes; 
• People with unique position within the Cypriot Criminal Justice System and; 
• People who have participated or continue to participate in significant situations. 
 Furthermore, elite interviews are utilised in a discrete protocol and are tailored to give: 
1. Individual insights; 
2. First-hand accounts and 
3. Rich depth. 
The implementation of elite interviews allows the researcher to learn about the attitudes, 
values and interpretations of politicians and penal policy makers in Cyprus. The researcher 
acknowledges that elite interviews are employed to elicit subjective perceptions for the 
reasons behind the rapid growth and the challenges this brings in the Cypriot carceral estate. 
5.7.1 Conducting ‘elite’ interviews 
Once the elite subjects had been identified, the researcher had to consider the mode of 
approach. In keeping with scholarly convention, elite subjects were approached using an 
official letter request. Locating those people was not difficult, as most of them are currently 
holding key positions within the Cypriot Criminal Justice System or are active members in 
the Cypriot political sphere. Briefly, the invitation letter provided the respondents with 
information on the researcher and their work, the nature of the research project, the 
sponsorship for the work, the length of the interview, the handling of the data and addressed 
issues around confidentiality and anonymity.  
After the acceptance of the researcher’s invitation for participation, a second letter was sent 
to establish the date of the interview. Although politicians receive extensive media training, 
on several occasions the researcher was asked by the personal assistants of various elite 
members to provide a sample of the interview questions prior to the interview. In one 
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instance, a secretary of a politician asked to meet the researcher, to establish a better 
understanding of the nature as well as the aims of the study. The researcher agreed an a priori 
meeting where the researcher explained in thorough detail many aspects of the research study 
including the research questions, recording equipment, and issues around confidentiality and 
anonymity.  
According to Lilleker (2003) preparation is an important component when interviewing ‘high 
calibre’ people. Before any of the elite interviews, the researcher ensured that she was well 
prepared. On several occasions, elite participants consciously challenged the knowledge of 
the researcher.  In one instance, for example, I found myself being asked questions about 
recent changes in penal policies. Therefore, interviewing elite subjects demands thorough 
knowledge and understanding of the issues under investigation, and interviewers have to take 
care of their own reputation and credibility (Smith, 2006, Stephens, 2007). 
5.7.2 Elites and open- ended questions 
According to Harvey (2011) the best way to conduct interviews with elite members is by 
avoiding closed-ended questions. For this study, semi-structured interviews with open- ended 
questions were determined as the best strategy. There are three considerations that the 
researcher considered when applying open-ended questions to the Cypriot elite members. 
 The first consideration for implementing open-ended question and not closed-ended 
questions is the citation of prior research on the factors behind the rapid growth of the 
Cypriot penal establishment. Prior research gives the opportunity to the researcher to define 
the questions and  to design the response options with clarity (Aberbach and Rockman, 
2002). The implementation of closed-ended questions and the tight structuring of the 
interview guide would not provide a comprehensive exploration of the elite styles of thinking 
and perceptions. The second consideration for implementing open-ended questions was based 
on the maximisation of response validity. Open-ended questions offer the opportunity to elite 
respondents to organise their answers throughout the interview process. This increases the 
validity of responses and suits the exploratory nature of this in-depth study (Aberbach and 
Rockman, 2002). The third consideration consists of the receptivity of elite subjects. 
Members of the elite dislike closed and pre-fabricated questions, simply because they prefer 
to articulate their views in their own words. 
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5.7.3 Being on fieldwork in a period of momentous change 
The fieldwork data collection period for this study coincided with the untoward incidents of 
January 2014 and is discussed earlier in Chapter 3. In brief, on January 9th 2014, the President 
of the Republic, following five prison suicides and a rape, ordered the Police Rapid Response 
Unit (PRRU) to raid the Central Jail of Nicosia. This political intervention resulted in the 
dismissal of nine prison guards, and the instant removal of the prison governor. The police 
were in control of all prison areas whilst they were conducted official investigations on the 
causes of the suicides and the rape. During the police investigation, prison staff where banned 
from participating in any kind of interviews. Two days after the prison raid, all prison staff 
cancelled their participation in this research. 
This unprecedented situation left the researcher anxious and deeply concerned. The first 
concern related to the prohibition of all prison staff – from most junior to the most senior 
prison employee – from making statements or taking part in any kind of research whilst the 
department of police was conducting official investigations. The second concern was the 
unclear estimations of the police department around the timeframe for the termination of the 
prison investigations. Prison staff had to give evidence for five different cases and in private 
conversations between myself and staff it became clear that they were uncertain about the 
future and terrified of losing their jobs. Under these very difficult circumstances, I had to re-
convince prison staff to take part in this study. Ten prison staff agreed to take part once the 
police investigation was completed. 
The President’s intervention was an important event in Cypriot prison history as, for first 
time, the highest-ranking government official openly accused prison guards and officers of 
corruption, bribery and abuse of power. Prison guards, staff and administrators found 
themselves in the spotlight, charged with a series of criminal offences. In private 
conversations with myself, it was clear that they were uncomfortable with the resultant social 
outcry. The decision of the President to send the police to the prison had a significant impact 
on the number of prison staff ‘voices’ represented in this research.   
Initially, the researcher decided to stay in Cyprus and carry out interviews with other 
important stakeholders, but unfortunately the chaotic situation that followed and the busy 
schedules of the participants forced the researcher to revise her decision and to return to the 
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UK. In the UK, the researcher developed a new field work plan as access to the prison and 
prison staff had become highly restricted.   
5.8 Thematic analysis 
As explained at length, the most appropriate method for this type of research was deemed to 
be semi-structured interviews in order to elicit deep and expansive responses from a variety 
of participants. The following section will outline the analytical method adopted for this 
study and its limitations. 
According to Braun and Clarke (2006) thematic analysis is “a method for identifying, 
analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (p: 6). Thematic analysis is widely 
used in social sciences, and many scholars have applied it in many disciplines - politics, 
sociology, psychology, criminology, anthropology. However, Boyatzis (1998: p 6) argues 
that there is no exact definition of what constitutes thematic analysis or how we go about 
doing it (see further Attride-Stirling, 2001, Tuckett, 2005, Braun and Clarke, 2006). An 
important element of thematic analysis is its flexibility, which, according to Crabtree and 
Miller (1992) can be applied in various traditions of qualitative research, regardless of 
adopted ontology and epistemology (Boyatzis, 1998). 
Another important element for choosing thematic analysis for this study is the ‘latent’ level of 
patterned response at which themes are identified. Latent themes have assisted the researcher 
to identify underlying ideas, assumptions, conceptualisations and ideologies (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006). Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of latent themes is the deep and ‘big 
picture’ it offers to the researcher to identify the ‘hidden’ features that gave a particular form 
of meaning; this is another important attribute within the doctrine of critical realism (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006). 
 5.8.1 Thematic Analysis of the Interview Data: 
Interview data from participants of this study evolved around questions relating to their 
involvement and experiences within the Cypriot Criminal Justice System. The resulting 
interview data were reviewed using thematic analysis which is a process that searches for 
patterns and meaningful themes within the interview data (see Chapter 4).  In conducting this 
analysis, Braun and Clarke's (2006) guide to a six-phase analysis was used. Throughout this 
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process, the data was coded, the fruit of which consists of identifiable themes related to the 
causes of the prison expansion in the Cypriot prison establishment and the challenges of the 
prison due to the unprecedented levels of prisoners 
In coding the interview transcript, the block and file technique was used as recommended by 
Grbich (2012). In summary, this coding and analysis process is comprised of two stages: (1) 
each interviewee transcript is individually and manually coded, line by line, an example of 
which is to be found in Appendix 6; (2) similar quotes are gathered from interviewee 
manuscripts, grouped into segments, and organised in a table for further analysis (as 
illustrated in Appendix 7). After identifying potential patterns, I search for themes and groups 
on the basis of relational similarities and differences that could produce a bigger picture, this 
being a thematic map, which is in itself a visual representation of the relationship between 
themes. Here, the thematic map consists of themes and sub-themes related to the overarching 
theme of the role of the police (Braun and Clarke, 2006). In the initial stages of this chapter's 
thematic process, four themes were identified (as illustrated in Figure 1). In reviewing these 
four themes by refining and defining them, they were developed further. 
5.8.2 A Number of crucial decisions 
It is essential for researchers applying this method to make their underlying assumption 
explicit (Holloway and Todres, 2003). The first crucial decision around the implementation 
of thematic analysis was to address what counts as a theme, and what size does a theme have 
to be (see further Braun and Clarke, 2006). As this is a purely qualitative analysis there is no 
clear cut answer to the question of what proportion of the dataset needs to re-appear in order 
to be considered a theme. Not all themes were present in fifty per cent of a participant’s 
dataset. For this study, a theme was given a considerable space in some interviewee 
transcripts, and limited or none in some others or it may have limited appearance across the 
dataset. Therefore, the role of the researcher was crucial in thematic identification. For this 
study, the ‘keyness’ of a theme is not dependant on a quantifiable measure but whether it 
captures an interesting and important feature of the reasons behind the rise in the prison 
population within the CJN. For example, six ‘key’ themes were identified in relation to the 
structural factors behind the rise in the prison population. These themes were not necessarily 
the most prevalent themes across the data set - they appeared in between 4 and 24 of the 27 
interviews – but together they captured important elements, including for example the 
132 
 
correlation between imprisonment rates and the level of public expenditure. Therefore, in this 
case, thematic analysis was driven by this particular analytic question (see also Braun and 
Clarke, 2006). The prevalence of themes was counted and measured in a number of different 
ways, for instance, the prevalence of the correlation between imprisonment rates and the level 
of public expenditure was measured in terms of the number of different interviews who 
articulate the theme across the entire data set or each individual occurrence of the theme 
across the entire data set (see also Braun and Clarke, 2006). As stated by Braun and Clarke 
(2006) part of the flexibility of thematic analysis lies in to the ability of the researcher to 
determine themes in a large number of ways. 
 5.8.3 Inductive thematic analysis versus detailed account 
Another important decision was around the claims that this research was to make in relation 
to the data set. For this study, thematic analysis provides a detailed and nuanced account of 
one theme or group of themes within the data set, and not a rich thematic description of the 
entire data set. Therefore, themes and patterns within data are driven by the researcher’s 
theoretical analytic interest. This form of thematic analysis offers a considerably narrower 
description of the data (inductive thematic analysis), and a more detailed analysis of some 
aspect of the data (theoretical/deductive thematic analysis), (Braun and Clarke, 2006). For 
example, when the researcher was interested in discussions about penal punitiveness as a 
possible explanation for the recent penal expansion that we witness today in Cyprus, attention 
was paid to previous themes that previous research has discerned such as Cheliotis (2013) 
influential research identifying penal punitiveness towards ethnic minority groups in Greece. 
5.8.4 Semantic of latent themes 
Another decision was involved the level at which themes were identified: at a semantic level 
or at a latent/interpretative level (Boyatzis, 1998). According to Patton (1990) this analytic 
process involves a progression from description (semantic) to interpretation (latent). For this 
study, thematic analysis was achieved at the latent level. According to Braun and Clarke 
(2006) thematic analysis in the latent level: 
“goes beyond the semantic content of the data, and starts to identify or examine the 
underlying ideas, assumptions, and conceptualisations- and ideologies- that are 
theorised as shaping or informing the semantic content of the data” (p:84). 
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For this study the themes identified seek to ascertain the features that gave a particular 
opinion and meaning. Thus analysis at this ‘level’ tends to uncover hidden assumptions, 
structures or meanings that are theorised as underpinning what is actually articulated in the 
data. In the following section the researcher provides an outline of the six phases of thematic 
analysis implemented for this study as described by Braun and Clarke (2006) including: 1) 
familiarisation with the data; 2) generating initial codes; 3) looking for themes; 4) reviewing 
themes; 5) defining and naming themes; and 6) producing the report. 
5.8.4.1 Familiarisation with the data 
After all data were collected, the researchers’ principal aim was to immerse herself with the 
data, by repeatedly listening to the interview tapes and searching for meanings and patterns ( 
Braun and Clarke, 2006). According to Braun and Clarke (2006) the main aim of the first 
phase is:  
“To get familiar with the depth and breadth of the [data] content” (p 16). 
After this stage, all interviews were transcribed verbatim into Greek, and then translated into 
English. Translating the interviews was an important process that required careful handling. 
Although, it is impossible to produce an identical English transcript (Cronin, 2006), the 
researcher translated all transcripts in a manner where original meanings were preserved. 
Although the translation process was ultimately completed by the researcher, additional 
consultation was sought from people working for the Translation Department of the Press and 
Information Office (PIO) in Cyprus, without exposing participants’ identity. Once the 
English transcripts were completed, the researcher was then ready for the next step: the 
thematic analysis.  
5.8.4.2 Generating initial codes 
With the data familiarisation process complete, the researcher began to produce initial codes 
from the dataset. According to Boyatzis (1998) thematic analysis is: 
“The most basic segment, or element, of the raw data or information that can be 
assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon” (p: 63). 
In the same vein, Patton (2002) describes this process as a way to look at what exists in the 
dataset and to give it a name or a label.  During this phase, the researcher organised the data 
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into meaningful groups and searched for repeated patterns (themes), and coded as many 
potential patterns (themes) as possible (see Figure 5.2). The researcher worked manually and 
searched for interesting issues and topics. When coding the interview transcripts, the “block 
and file” technique was used (see further Grbich, 2012). The block and file coding process 
was completed in two stages: interviewee transcripts were individually and manually coded, 
line by line and the categorisation of similar quotes was organised into segments and 
arranged in a table for further analysis. Once the patterns were identified, the researcher 
started to search for themes. This was achieved by re-reading the coded segments and 
contrasting them to each other in order to generate similarities as well as differences that 
potentially offer a bigger picture of the rise in the prison population and the challenges that 
the Cypriot prison establishment is facing. Braun and Clarke (2006) call this a thematic map, 
which is a visual representation of the relationship between themes. 
Figure 5.2 Data extract, with codes applied 
Data extract Coded for 
Of course they are committing more 
crime… they are threatening our society. 
Those people are carrying their silly 
customs and religion with them, they only 
think that they know to do is to ask for 
work permits and housing benefits. Well, 
Cyprus today is in huge debts and we don’t 
necessarily have to support Muslims and 
Buddhists [the participant is laughing 
sarcastically]…Today our aim should be 
the solution of the national problem and not 
how to get rid of them, in this sense they 
are  not only threatening our society but our 
sovereignty too. 
1. Racism and xenophobia 
2. Criminogenic effect of 
immigrants. 
3. Opportunists. 
4. The participant is placing great 
emphasis on the national problem 
and national sovereignty and well-
being. 
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5.8.4.3 Looking for Themes 
After the initial coding of the data set, this phase involved sorting the different codes into 
potential themes, by collating the relevant coded data segments into identified themes and 
sub- themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). At this stage it was helpful the visualisation of the 
data to sort the different codes into themes (see Figure 5.3). Also the focus of the researcher 
was shifted to the relationship between codes and themes and between different levels of 
existing themes. At this point, the researcher identified five themes (Crime, immigration, 
welfarism, tougher penalties, and racism and xenophobia) however, a set of codes left 
without ‘fitting’ somewhere, though, the researcher, following the Braun and Clarke’s (2006) 
recommendation has created a theme called ‘miscellaneous’ (see further Figure 5.3). For this 
study, themes consist of ideas and descriptions within the dataset that can be used to explain 
causal events for participants’ stories (see further Saldana, 2015). In addition, themes were 
the outcome of repeating ideas, indigenous terms, metaphors and analogies, shifts in topics 
and similarities and differences of participants’ linguistic expression. At this point, it is 
crucial to avoid discarding themes even if they are insignificant (at least for time being) as 
they may be important themes in the analysis process. 
For this study, a theme captures patterned responses or meaning within the dataset. One of 
the most important requirements is to be consistent throughout the process of determining 
themes. According to Bazeley (2009) themes only attain full significance when they are 
linked to an explanatory model, for example, describe, compare, model is a three step 
formula. For this study, describing was an important starting point. At this point, it was 
necessary to provide details and information about the origin of the data, including 
demographic features of participants and their interconnections. These give necessary 
background and provides the foundations for a comparative analysis. For this study, the 
researcher described and recorded the characteristic of each theme and its boundaries. 
Questions and queries revolved around: How did participants talk about certain issues such as 
the connection between crime rates and imprisonment rates; the ‘criminogenic’ effect of 
immigrants and refugees and how many talked about it? The second step of the model seeks 
to compare differences in the characteristics of themes across contrasting demographic 
groups. At this point, questions were stressing whether themes occurred more or less 
frequently for different groups and the different expressions presented by other groups. The 
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last step of the model was seeking to relate a theme to others already written about. This step 
was of paramount significance because the researcher was concerned with the underlying 
conditions, interactions and strategies that themes emerge. These three steps have been 
repeated for every theme in this study. The description, comparison and relation of each 
theme was achieved with an enquiring mind and an eye for evidence.  
5.8.4.4 Reviewing Themes 
This stage involved the refinement of the themes. During this phase, it became evident that 
some candidate themes had not enough data to support them and on occasion data were too 
diverse, while some themes collapsed or were merge into each other. In this step, the 
researcher returns to the original text to review and refine the themes. This was achieved in 
two levels. The first level requires the thorough examination of all collated extracts for each 
theme, and establish whether they appear to form a clear pattern (see further Braun and 
Clarke, 2006). Level two involves the review and refine of the entire data set. At this level, 
for example, the researcher was trying to establish the validity of each theme in relation to the 
data set, but also to confirm that the thematic map was accurately reflecting the meaning of 
the whole date set. To some extent, what counts as accurate representation for this study 
depends on the researchers’ theoretical and  analytic approach. 
5.8.4.5 Defining and naming Themes 
Phase 5 begins with the creation of the final thematic map. During the defining and naming 
themes phase, the focus was to define and refine the themes ready for analysis. Here the 
terms ‘define’ and ‘refine’ refer to capturing the essence of what each theme is about (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006). During this phase, collated data extracts of each theme have been 
organised in a coherent and consistent manner with accompanying narratives. For each 
individual theme the researcher has wrote and conducted a detailed analysis. 
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Figure 5.3: Initial Thematic Map, showing the five main themes 
 
At this point it was important to identify the ‘story’ of each theme and to fit into the overall 
‘story’ in relation to the research questions of the study. So themes were seen in relation to 
others and part of the refinement included the creation of sub-themes. As Figure 5.3 
indicates, sub-themes were useful and meaningful data from particularly large and complex 
themes. For instance participants’ talk about the causes of the rise in the prison population, 
five overarching themes were identified: Racism and xenophobia, crime activity, 
immigration, welfarism and tougher penalties. Within racism and xenophobia two subthemes 
were identified, ‘societal’ and ‘institutional’. Within crime activity, three themes were 
stressed, ‘financial crisis’, ‘foreigners and immigrants’, and ‘fear of crime’. For immigration, 
the subthemes were ‘criminogenic effect’ and ‘national protection’ and for welfarism the 
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subthemes were more ‘vulnerable groups’, ‘limited welfare programmes’, and 
‘fragmentation, exclusion and dualism’. Lastly, for tougher penalties three subthemes were 
recognised: ‘soft crime responses’, ‘politicians’, and ‘victim rights’. Once themes have been 
identified by using the describe, relate, compare formula and named, the researcher had to 
build the foundation for the analysis of the found themes and subthemes. Thus, analysis of 
the data was centred on integrating ideas, with arguments supporting those emerging from the 
interim analysis. For this study, the final opportunity for analysis was achieved by carefully 
selecting vivid and compelling participant extracts relating back to the research questions and 
theoretical literature. 
5.8.4.6 Producing the Report 
Phase six begins once the final thematic map is completed (see Appendix 8). This last phase 
requires a good organisation of the data and involves the final analysis and write-up of the 
report (Braun and Clarke, 2006). The report that results from this thematic analysis can be 
found in Results Chapters 6 and 7.  
5.9 Ethics 
The main goal of this section is to exemplify the various ethical dilemmas throughout the 
conduct of this research study. The moral integrity of the researcher is seen as a crucial 
element of ensuring that for this study the research process and findings are trustworthy and 
valid. The ethical implications of studying the factors behind the rise of the prison population 
in the Cypriot penal system, includes the participation of the Cypriot ‘elite’ - judges, 
politicians, and counsels of the Republic- intensifies the importance of ethical deliberations. 
The study of the ‘elites’ requires a nuanced and sophisticated approach to ethical 
considerations. More importantly, non-maleficence is vital. For example, common ethical 
pitfalls such as deception, revelation of participants identities, and dubious bargaining are 
unacceptable (Silverman, 2006).  According to Ryen (2004) ethical implications within social 
science research is a deeply complex and contentious process, because ethics varies across 
cultures and research environments. 
The following section will outline the ethical considerations that this study adopted 
throughout the research process: contacting participants, during the interview and during data 
analysis. 
139 
 
5.9.1 Confidentiality 
According to Christians (2010) confidentiality refers to the primary safeguard of unwanted 
exposure. In order to ensure confidentiality and to protect participants from unwanted 
exposure, this study has omitted names and any other kind of information that may result in 
the revelation of an individual’s identity. In the case of the Cypriot ‘elite’, the researcher does 
signify the political party that politicians belong to but not revealing their representative 
constituency. In the case of judges and public prosecutors the researcher does not indicate the 
District Court in which they are currently appointed. For the purpose of identifying the quotes 
from the interviews, each participant was described according to his/her occupation: prison 
staff, prison administrator, judge, public prosecutor, politician, senior counsel of the 
Republic, Counsel of the Republic, Commissioner for Administration, Head of the Anti- 
Discriminatory Body, officer of the Commissioner for Administration Office. Furthermore, 
the transcripts and signed consent forms (Appendix 9) of the participants containing their 
identity were locked and secured in safe places throughout the research process and accessed 
only by the researcher.  
5.9.2 Anonymity 
For this study, anonymity was granted to those participants who requested it. The researcher 
respected participants’ choice to keep their anonymity, but also participants who wanted to be 
known and identified.  For example, the Commissioner for Administrator (Ombudsman) and 
the Head of the Anti-discriminatory body (Ombudsman Office) requested to disclose their 
identities. Also, in relation to anonymity, the researcher has ensured that participants are not 
identifiable via this thesis or any subsequent publications based on this research. 
Furthermore, the researcher has reassured participants that the given data will be used for the 
purpose for which they gave their permission; data will only be retained until the end of the 
research period, and then destroyed.  
Moreover, all processing of personal data was in compliance with Northumbria’s Safe 
Storage Data Policy as well as the Data Protection Act (1998). As the primary source of the 
qualitative data of this PhD consisted of semi-structured interviews I had to ensure that 
accurate records were maintained and securely stored for the duration of the research. More 
specifically, the interview tapes were stored securely in a lockable filing cabinet, along with 
the given consent forms, databases, interim results, interview translations and transcriptions. 
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5.9.3 Transparency 
The researcher provided a complete description of the study to all potential participants.  
According to the British Sociological Association, it is necessary to: 
“explain as fully as possible, and in terms meaningful to participants, what the 
research is about, who is undertaking it and financing it, why it is being undertaken, 
and how it is to be disseminated and not as a  once-and – for- all prior event, but as a 
process, subject to re- negotiation over time” ( in Gomm, 2008). 
Once participants accepted and agreed to participate, a signed consent form was obtained 
(Appendix 9). According to Dickson-Swift et al. (2007), informed consent can be assessed 
with the following criteria: 
1. Disclosure = full explanation of the study and forewarn participants of sensitive topics 
to be discussed. 
2. Understanding = a clear understanding of the research and to what they are consenting 
to. 
3. Voluntariness = participants enter the study voluntarily, and without any form of 
coercion 
4. Competence = competence for consent has to be discussed with a third party. 
Therefore, for this study all participants took part voluntarily. Additionally, all participants 
were told that they could stop the interview at any time; however, this situation did not arise. 
5.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the design steps and involved explanation and discussion of 
important aspects such as data collection method and analysis. This work has followed 
meticulous preparation, and well defined tasks of sorting and organising data. The intention 
in this chapter was to clearly articulate the choice of methods and the appropriateness of these 
methods in answering the research questions. The application of a Critical Realist approach, 
for example, has added to development of Critical Realist methodology as it proposes an 
emergentist and relational rather than conflationary or epiphenomenal descriptions of both 
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structure and agency. For this study the strategy of critical realism was directed by the deep 
‘larger thing’, the conditions from which an increase in the prison population emerges. The 
next chapter of this thesis presents the results and analysis of the causes behind the expansion 
of the prison population within the CJN. 
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6. Results Chapter: The causes of the rise in the prison population 
This is the first chapter in the analysis section of this thesis and provides a critical 
examination of the causes behind the rise of the population in the Cypriot prison 
establishment. In the following chapter, I examine the hidden structures and mechanisms that 
caused the rise in the prison population by applying the techniques of thematic analysis in 
order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the real but often unseen structures and 
mechanisms behind the rise in the prison population in Cyprus. In the following pages, the 
interview data are discussed then summarised using the analytical model. At the end of this 
chapter, the reader should have an intimate understanding of the structural forces behind the 
rise in the Cypriot prison population.  
6.1 Thematic Analysis of the Interview Data: 
This chapter presents the results of the thematic analysis including participants’ conceptions 
of the growth in the prison population in the Central Jail of Nicosia. Interview data provided 
by prison staff, prison administrators, judges, public prosecutors, politicians, senior Counsels 
of the Republic, the Commissioner for Administration, the Head of the Anti-Discriminatory 
Body and Officers of the Commissioner for Administration Office is explored. Participants 
were asked questions relating to their involvement and experiences within the Cypriot 
Criminal Justice System. These questions are presented in Appendix 1. The resulting 
interview data were reviewed using thematic analysis which is a process that searches for 
patterns and meaningful within the interview data. In conducting this analysis, Braun and 
Clarke's (2006) guide to a six-phase analysis was used. Throughout this process the data was 
coded, which yields identifiable themes related to the causes of the expansion in the Cypriot 
prison establishment. Each of these is linked to expansive supporting excerpts /quotes.  
In coding the interview transcript the block and file technique was used, as recommended by 
Grbich (2012). In summary, this coding and analysis process is comprised of two stages: (1) 
each interviewee transcript is individually and manually coded line by line (see Appendix 6), 
(2) similar quotes are gathered from interviewee manuscripts, grouped into segments and 
organised in a table for further analysis (see Appendix 7). After identifying potential patterns, 
the researcher searched for themes and groups on the basis of relational similarities and 
differences that could produce a bigger picture, a thematic map, which is a visual 
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representation of the relationship between themes. Here, the thematic map consists of themes 
and sub-themes related to the overarching theme of the causes in the rise of the prison 
population (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  
6.2 Crime  
While crime rates were levelling off over the last decade, participant narratives appear 
unaware of this pertinent trend. The quantitative and qualitative dimensions of crime activity 
in Cyprus have been viewed as the most persistent problems with a direct impact on the 
prison population. In the following passages participants develop their opinion and views on 
crime levels, crime trends and the connection between criminal activity and immigrants in 
Cyprus today. 
6.2.1 Perceptions of crime 
Studies on crime levels in other jurisdictions throughout the world have shown that public 
opinion is often exaggerated. In the UK for example, Hough and Roberts (1998) found that 
public opinion overestimates the rates of crime (see also Flatley et al., 2010, Ashcroft, 2011). 
Furthermore, Roberts and Stalans (1997) have argued that in the USA, public opinion related 
to violent crimes is often exaggerated. In the same vein, results of an Australian study have 
shown a notable misconception that crime rates were rising where in fact they were declining. 
Regarding Cypriot crime rates, although crime remained relatively stable between the years 
2005-8 and significantly dropped in 2009, the prison population saw a marked growth. 
Despite clear evidence in the form of official crime statistics suggesting that crime was 
actually falling, a significant proportion of the public and the overwhelming majority of 
politicians selected for this study believe that crime rates are actually soaring. What has 
emerged in the case of Cyprus, is the perception of crime as a serious political issue by the 
majority of political parties - particularly those of the left-wing AKEL, social democratic 
EDEK, centre-right DIKO, and right-wing DISY. According to Simon (2000, 2007), political 
order has rallied around the ‘problem’ of crime in a way that legitimises government activity 
(see further Mauer, 2001; Mauer and King, 2007;). Similarly, in this study, the participating 
politicians’ views on the crime rate were exaggerated, with politician interviewees seemingly 
alarmed and worried about the perceived ‘excessive’ levels of crime - particularly of property 
and violent offences. 
144 
 
Politician 20: Well, it is true that crime in Cyprus is everywhere and crime rates are 
very high. The prison population is rising because criminal activity in society is 
terrifyingly excessive. Burglaries and vehicle thefts, for example, are part of our daily 
lives. Additionally, serious crimes such as rapes and assaults have reached 
unprecedented levels. 
A similar view can be seen in a statement by another participant: 
Politician 15: What worries me the most is firstly the excessive amount of criminal 
activity in our country and secondly the violent nature of those crimes. Crime has 
taken [on] new dimensions and since 2000; we have witnessed an upward trend in 
crimes such as domestic burglaries, thefts and robberies. 
 In the same vein, a participant stated: 
Politician 21: Oh god, the situation is really bad, anywhere you go there is a story of a 
theft, burglary etc… Turn on your TV tonight and you will see what I mean; every 
night there is something new and I do not mean minor offences but cruel and violent 
ones. 
Yet another participant states: 
Politician 19: Of course, crime is rising and right now, the situation is out of control, 
especially with serious offences like assaults, robberies, thefts and homicides. 
Despite the proffered opinions of the interviewees toward serious and property offending, 
penal statistics published by the Ministry of Justice and Public Order in Cyprus in 2013, 
clearly indicate that violent and property offences have significantly reduced, hence 
confirming  the ‘crime-incarceration’ disconnect hypothesis.  
6.2.2 Who is committing crime? 
A significant number of interviewees appeared to associate the presence of immigrants with 
the increased levels of crime. Although the study of Indermaur and Roberts (2005) revealed 
no causal relationship between high crime rates and immigrants, a third of their participants 
reported that the presence of immigrants increase crime levels. Similarly, participants of this 
study suggested a connection between increased levels of immigrants and high crime rates in 
two ways: the first implies that immigrants are criminals because they entered the country 
illegally which resulted in increased levels of crime. For example, politicians responding to 
the question of whether immigrants contribute to crime rates in Cyprus asserted: 
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Politician 19: Definitely, they contribute. Fifteen years ago, when Romanians and 
Bulgarians first came illegally to Cyprus, criminality was at its peak. Today, fifteen 
years later, the situation remains the same with them but we have new ‘waves’ of 
immigrants from Syria, Egypt and Palestine.  
Politician 15: Hell yes they contribute, especially those of Arab origin, they are 
involved in all sort of criminal activities. 
The second view describes a connection between crime, immigrants and the “Cyprus 
problem”.  For example, Politician 20 commented: 
Very recently they [immigrants] seem to commit a variety of crimes, which worries 
me. This situation is clearly distracting us from focusing on important matters like to 
find a solution to our [national] ‘problem’. 
In the same vein, Politician 15 argues: 
Well, they [immigrants] do not come here with good intentions… criminal activity 
has increased because of them, we have to keep in the back of our minds that our 
country is still occupied and divided, therefore immigration policies should have a 
restrictive nature. 
Media and political discourses posit a causal relationship between immigration and 
crime( see further Simon, 2007; Wacquant, 2010, 2015); however, empirical research on the 
causal relationship between crime activity and immigrants has been limited due to weak 
instruments for determining causality. According to Bell et al., (2010), the problem with 
causality revolves around the endogenous location of migrants which means that immigrants 
disproportionately live in geographically deprived areas where crime activity is relatively 
higher, or because they tend to reside in areas where a large proportion of the population 
consist of the same ethnic background. Recent empirical evidence suggests that in the US, the 
connection between immigration and crime is negative (Reid et al., 2005; Ousey and Kubrin, 
2009); the results for Europe are mixed regarding property crimes but no correlation was 
recorded for violent crimes. In Cyprus, recent empirical research findings suggest that 
politicians usually express a strong relation between immigrants and crime in connection with 
the ‘Cyprus problem’ to pursue exclusionary immigration policies (Trimikliniotis, 2014).  
According to Bianchi et al (2012) however, what is important for recipient countries are the 
determinants of the widespread perception that correlates crime and immigrants. As 
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Wacquant (2010) argues, this issue is of paramount significance given that those perceptions 
have far-reaching consequences for immigration policy. See for example, the following 
statements: 
Politician 17: I dare you to watch the news tonight. Nineteen out of twenty crime 
stories will involve immigrants. I watch the news and read all newspapers every 
single day, and most of the perpetrators are immigrants. That is why we had to revisit 
our immigration policy and took some action by changing a few sections preventing 
them from entering, living or working in Cyprus.  
Politician 20: Hopefully the new immigration policy will stop them from coming here. 
We do anything to keep them away but the uncontrollable state of the Northern part of 
Cyprus enables them to come in and do their ‘stuff’. 
Participants’ attitudes towards the causes in the rise of crime rates help us to understand 
certain major penal developments in Cyprus today, such as the growth of prison population. 
Participants’ narratives underscore a clear-cut division between social and individual causes 
of crime. More than ninety-five percent of the politician participants utilised for this study 
supported a strong relationship between crime and illegal immigration. Although a fuller 
discussion follows this matter in a later section of this chapter, it is vital to explore the 
participants’ perceptions, attitudes and discourses around illegal immigration. Politicians’ 
narratives suggested that immigrants are the main source of crime and when those numbers 
decrease, Cyprus will revive its former crime-free “good old days”. This was very often 
presented such as: 
Politician 18: We lost our sleep with them [immigrants].Ten years ago, you were able 
to sleep at night with the doors and windows open, but today we are afraid to leave 
our car parked outside for more than two hours. They [immigrants] do many sorts of 
things, to name a few of the most common crimes: robberies, thefts, burglaries etc. 
Another important issue related to illegal immigration is that of unemployment and its 
connection to higher crime rates. The vast majority of interviewees suggested that individuals 
with a low socio-economic status are more likely to commit crimes, especially in financially 
stagnated periods, as the following excerpt demonstrates: 
Judge 8: What to say, this cursed [financial] crisis has changed our lives. Cyprus 
before the advent of the financial crisis was a country composed of a large middle 
class. Also, before the advent of the financial crisis, there were jobs for everyone - 
locals, immigrants and foreigners. Cyprus had celebrated many financially glorious 
years, however nowadays things have dramatically changed and we have to adapt in 
this new environment. In 2012, the bailout was agreed with the conditions that people 
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sacrifice 10 per cent of their deposits… They didn’t lose only their money but their 
jobs too. Twenty percent of the population is unemployed, from what I know this is 
the second highest unemployed rate in Europe right now. Even after the [Turkish] 
invasion massive unemployment was not an issue. But today, wherever you go people 
are talking about the crisis and their debts because they are unemployed… A vast 
majority of immigrants are unemployed too, and the only way to survive is by stealing 
from you. Unemployment affected them in the same way that affected us too. 
The fieldwork for this study coincided with the advent of the financial crisis and the protests 
against austerity measures. Most of the participants narrated a distinction between 
unemployment and crime for both ‘them’ and ‘us’. Indeed, recent research evidence suggests 
that there is a causal relationship between crime and unemployment in many jurisdictions 
worldwide (see further Levitt, 2001; Phillips and Land, 2012; Saridakis and Spengler, 2012). 
Nonetheless, it is important to explain why participants view socio-economic factors as the 
main sources of crime. Durkheim’s strain and Merton’s anomie theories argue that strain is 
the outcome of poverty and a less opportunistic social environment, whilst anomie is a 
condition that provides little moral guidance to individuals and an absence of legitimate 
aspirations. 
6.2.3 Punitiveness, ‘orderliness’ and ‘toughness’  
Hough and Roberts (2012) in their attempt to understand public opinion, crime and the 
function of criminal justice system, found the role of politicians of paramount significance. 
Roberts (1992) suggests that public opinion is a vital and decisive tool adopted by politicians. 
More specifically, Roberts (1992) found that the public in the UK have limited knowledge of 
real crime rates or the nature of the criminal justice system including recidivism rates and 
average sentences. Similarly in Cyprus today, public opinion expresses the views that 
sentencing is often too lenient, punishment should be harsher and criminals should remain 
incarcerated for longer periods (Harrendorf et al., 2010). The notion that crime is rising - 
despite the rates of property and violent crimes declining - dominates the public opinion (see 
further Pratt, 2007). Taking this into consideration, elected politicians and members of the 
Cypriot parliament are responsible for the rise in the prison population, as shown in the 
following statements: 
Politician 15: We value our people’s voices. We always have to keep in mind that we 
are elected by the people so our service must comply with peoples’ voices, fears and 
anxieties. 
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Politician 16: …well we are not appointed but elected members of the parliament, and 
our election to the seats of the parliament it means a lot to us. It means that we have 
orders and commands from our people to solve their problems. Nowadays, the 
problems are too many and clearly much more than previous years. Therefore, we 
must keep our eyes and ears open to give solutions to the peoples’ ‘headaches’. For 
the past four years, I try to involve [myself] more with the public by visiting 
community centres and discuss[ing] their problems. 
Cohen (1996) argues that today crime is a major political tool and dominates the 
contemporary political rhetoric of industrialised western democracies. Similarly, participant 
narratives for this study indicate that in Cyprus, ‘law and order’ has been highly politicized, 
with politicians increasingly beginning to use ‘orderliness’ and ‘toughness’ as a major 
political response. This was typically presented as: 
Interviewer: Can you see any other way of dealing with crime apart from 
imprisonment?  
Politician 21 (left of centre): No, criminal activity in Cyprus has taken threatening 
dimensions and any other way of dealing with crime is not going to be effective. We 
have to provide effective responses and in my opinion imprisonment is the best way 
of dealing with crime because you have a greater chance to bring back order. 
Politician 16: You need to be tough sometimes, because you want to send some 
messages outside there. Obviously monetary fines do not seem to deter offenders any 
more. I think taking a more serious and disciplinary stance will deter people from 
committing a crime. In my opinion with prison sentences we can achieve that. 
According to Lyons and Scheingold (2000) crime control policies are politically constituted 
and policy choices are driven by and respond to prevailing values. The political climate in 
Cyprus has changed dramatically over the past fifteen years and this has caused significant 
changes in crime policies. A substantial body of evidence on the politics of crime indicates 
what Edelman first suggested: ‘words that succeed and policies that fail’ (Lyons and 
Scheingold, 2000), a situation where politicians often believe that getting ‘tough’ on 
offenders carries significant political benefits (Hough and Roberts, 2012). A burgeoning body 
of research suggests that the instant effect of this is penal populism (Roberts et al., 2003; Pratt, 
2007, Matthews, 2005). 
As stated by Matthews (2005), one of the main points of consensus is the belief that we are 
witnessing a surge in penal punitiveness. In fact in Cyprus, recent crime control is dominated 
by punitive mentalities that are promoting harsher punishment for offenders, the mass 
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production of criminal sanctions and laws, the extensive use of imprisonment and more 
recently the introduction of strict immigration control policies. There is a clear division of the 
determinants driving the surge in punitiveness between those who see the angry and anxious 
public as responsible and those who believe that the harsher punitive policy is an essential 
process used by ambitious and manipulative politicians playing on public confidence, fears 
and opinion in order to pursue a tough-on-crime rhetoric to attract more voters (see 
Matthews, 2005). Anthony Bottoms (1995) first saw ‘populist punitiveness’ as a key 
component of British sentencing and penal policy. Garland (2001) has also incorporated the 
notions of populism and punitiveness in his discussion of the causes behind the changing 
nature of crime control by suggesting that penal politics are no longer in the hands of 
technocrats or practitioners, but decided by the ill-served public. Furthermore, Garland 
(2001) argues that contemporary sentencing and penal policies have taken a punitive turn that 
promotes: 
“harsher sentencing and increased use of imprisonment, ‘three strikes’ and mandatory 
minimum sentencing laws; ‘truth in sentencing’ and parole release restrictions; ‘no 
frills’ prison laws and ‘austere prisons; retribution in juvenile court and the 
imprisonment of children; the revival of chain gangs and corporal punishment; boot 
camps and supermax prisons; the multiplication of capital offences and executions; 
community notification laws and paedophile registers; zero tolerance policies and 
Anti-Social Behaviour Orders; There is now a long list of measures that appear to 
signify a punitive turn in contemporary penalty” (p: 142).   
Similarly, a noticeable increase in punitiveness was recognised in Cyprus by certain 
participants. Some participants notably perceived the notion of punitiveness thus: 
Judge 7: …and of course an unnecessary punitiveness has contributed significantly to 
the soaring level of people trapped in the prison today. The sentences that we have to 
impose are clearly more punitive and in my opinion are unnecessary. Immigrants for 
example, that overstay their visas; I don’t understand why we have to impose a prison 
sentence when we can deport those people and put them on stop list in case they want 
to come back…. Party leaders usually are making populist statements aiming in my 
opinion at cheap sensationalism. 
Senior Counsel of the Republic: In recent years I noticed that there is a focus in 
criminalisation. For the past three years the government has been proposing stricter 
crime responses. I remember two years ago, politicians sought amendments to the 
Immigration Bill; however we oppose the amendments because such a thing was 
against ground rules of EU law. 
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Garland (2001) and Pratt (2000) argue that the introduction of ‘ostentatious and emotive’ 
forms of punishment is the outcome of a new axis of penal power – neo-liberal penality, 
where “state bureaucracies attempt to follow the public sentiments” (in Koros, 2011). In 
addition, Wacquant (2001c) sees the punitive turn of the US criminal justice system as an 
outcome of neo-liberal policies. Prison expansion has no relation to crime rates and prisons 
are institutions that contain and control individuals from the lower classes instead (Wacquant, 
2000, Wacquant, 2001a, Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2000, Wacquant, 2009a). Interestingly, in 
this study when participants discussed the notion of punitiveness, the connection between 
imprisonment and underclass was apparent: 
Senior Counsel of the Republic: The type of people we see today in the prison is the 
same all over the world. We see unemployed people, people with serious and chronic 
addictions, and individuals with minimal savoir-faire, basically people of lower class.  
Prison Administrator: Eighty-five percent of the ‘clients’ of our institution are poor 
people with limited social support. However, recently we see middle class people too.  
Commissioner for Administration (Ombudsman): We [the Ombudsman Office] are in 
regular contact with prisoners. Throughout our meetings with prisoners we have 
found that most of the prisoners are illiterate and most often seek assistance to place a 
complaint or to fill forms. Demographical statistics of the prisoners show that today 
the prison detains unprivileged people, individuals with addictions and immigrants.  
6.2.4 Fear of crime and public opinion 
Like Pratt (2000), Simon (2000) argues that new penality is based upon severe and harsh 
forms of punishment. Like (Wacquant 2000; 2001b; 2005; 2006; 2009a). Simon (2007) 
argues that contemporary penal policies and sanctions “reflect a punitive public opinion, 
deeply affected by a culture of fear of crime and the resurgence of the demonization of the 
‘criminal other’” (p: 21). In the same vein, a participant added: 
Officer of Commissioner for Administration Office: …ethnic minority groups for 
example, are more often the victims of increased punitiveness from the entire criminal 
justice system, I mean police, courtroom, policies and prison… penal policy is taking 
into account the experiences of victims and ignores ostentatiously the circumstances 
of offenders. 
Willow and Simon (1999, in Koros 2011) highlight that within a penal climate that is 
significantly characterised by moral panics; governments are involved in a new form of 
cruelty where the ‘criminal’ becomes a legitimate target of public hostility. Similar remarks 
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could be made regarding the perceptions on crime and criminals in Cyprus - especially with 
the advent of the financial crisis - it seems that the government have shown great willingness 
to engage the public in criminal justice debates. The last three governments in Cyprus for 
example, have shown a marked commitment to citizens from their elected areas by listening 
to their victimisation experiences. However, as the participants of this research argue, this 
model of criminal justice policy is made rather populist, vengeful and emotive (see further 
Koros, 2011): 
Commissioner for Administration (Ombudsman): The myth that crime rates are 
dangerously rising serves some interests. Politicians and media are trying to convince 
the public that criminal activity in Cyprus is soaring by playing [with] fictitious 
statistics to justify and promote imprisonment as the most appropriate response.  Of 
course, such a claim is not true; in my opinion [it] is a tool for politicians and their 
political parties. Politicians are deploying the concept of crime by using quite often 
emotive and racist language. For example last week I was browsing through a 
newspaper and my eye caught a ridiculous headline: ‘Immigrants, drug usage and 
crime is thriving’.  Such wording is mainly used to justify the unprecedented levels of 
prisoners but also to target specific marginal groups such as immigrants and drug 
users. 
Similarly, the Head of the Anti-Discriminatory Body commented: 
Well, in my opinion there is no correlation between the levels of crime and the rise in 
the prison population. Members of the public construct opinion about criminal activity 
by politicians. People take their words for granted. Crime is not a problem but an 
instrument of ‘knowledge’. A big number of politicians in Cyprus see crime as a 
major problem - for electioneering purposes of course.  
Furthermore, Durkheim laid focus on the emotional dimensions of punishment (Garland, 
1990), and their relation to the reaffirmation of the ‘conscience collective’ by addressing the 
‘honest people’ (Melossi, 2008). Indeed in Cyprus, the current policy strategies of 
demonization reflect the Durkheimian analyses of punishments’ goals as psychologically and 
not penologically driven (Johnstone, 2000, Zimring and Johnson, 2006) and the policy is also 
guided by images, archetypes and anxieties. Hence these results point to what Zimring (2001) 
calls the ‘symbolic denunciation’ of criminals, where ‘morally defiled’ individuals are 
imprisoned and kept separated from the ‘honest ones’. This notion frequently echoed in 
statements like: 
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Judge 8: Unfortunately today, enacted laws and adopted policies regarding the 
reduction of crime are based on specific images and archetypes that mutate over time. 
There is an increased concern with crime by the public asking for continuous 
protection from criminals. The problem of crime is everywhere from schools to 
hospitals and every week a new crime event captivates the attention of the law-
abiding public. 
It is naïve to complain about politicians being responsive to public opinion as this is a 
significant component of representative democracy (Roberts, 2002). In fact, politicians are 
mandated to serve the interests of the constituency they represent and often penal populist 
politicians are pursuing crime policies to win votes rather than to reduce crime or to promote 
justice. In several instances this was summed up in fairly direct terms as shown in the 
comments of the following participants: 
Politician 19 (political right): In my opinion, the increased crime activity plays a key 
role… the situation will aggravate if we [politicians] don’t intervene by adopting 
tougher crime policies. I think recent penal policies are too soft….. Judges and police 
officers seem to be soft. We have to make sure that our messages... We are elected 
members of the Parliament and our prime responsibility is the protection of the public, 
who trusted us by voting for us, and punishing those who violate the law. 
In the same vein, Politician 15 commented: 
“We are listening to what our voters have to say, and then collectively we are trying 
to find solutions… they honoured us with their votes”. 
According to Roberts et al (2003) there is a widespread perception that the public view crime 
prevention as a soft approach towards crime, and demand tougher alternatives. Hough and 
Roberts (2012) argue that being soft on crime is often a vote-loser whilst a tougher stance is 
electorally decisive.  
6.2.5 From penal populism to penal nationalism 
At the same time, there is an element that is different in the Cypriot culture of crime and 
punishment. This element emerged from the populist politics during the 1990s and entails 
features of penal nationalism, pulling moderate populists towards desperate penal stances. 
See for example, the following extract: 
Politician 15: …crime exists like any other issue that demands restoration…you 
cannot restore a serious matter by being soft and tolerant, let’s take our national 
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problem for example, do you believe that we should show any tolerance to the 
Turkish positions?  
These powerful penal nationalism sentiments are very common in Cyprus. In some countries 
like Cyprus, penal discourse is getting stronger and more elaborate at critical moments. 
Additionally, penal nationalism has become a vital instrument to pull moderate penal 
populists from ‘soft’ crime control discourses (see further Roberts, 2003). The pull towards 
penal nationalism has significant differences from common penal populism in form and 
content. In terms of its form, although there is no method to accurately measure punitiveness 
in discourses around crime, Haney (2016) argues that nationalist sentiments appear to be 
more pervasive by small ‘Law and Order’ political parties, but they are also voiced by 
political figure in mainstream political parties. In Cyprus for example, ELAM is a 
particularly small political party which has remained faithful to penal nationalist ideas and 
ideals. In addition, DYSH (the largest party in Cyprus today with twenty parliamentary seats) 
is the main voice of nationalist punitiveness. Penal national sentiments are articulated and 
then embedded in their political campaigns and slogans. During the presidential elections in 
2013, two thirds of the campaigns were promising to protect the public from internal and 
external threats – such as the bailout, the gas and a new Anan plan. In terms of its content, 
penal nationalist discourses evolve around the ‘nation’ and the ‘people’. For them crime 
control is not associated with security as is happening in other European countries such as 
France and Germany, it is rather a matter of national protection (see further Haney, 2016). 
Therefore being tough on crime means securing national protection, and the punishment of 
offenders is essential to national welfare. Punitiveness is then described as a vital 
characteristic of national survival and often Cypriot politician participants linked the war on 
crime to the Turkish invasion. Indeed, it was this nationalist discourse that caused 
international outcry last year when responding to the Syrian migrant crisis, the Interior 
Minister posited that Cyprus is small country and that it is more preferable to ‘us’ to 
accommodate Syrian migrants of Christian faith. Religion is a vital tool used by penal 
nationalists for national well-being. Additionally, the migrant crisis has also revealed that for 
penal nationalists being ‘soft’ means that national sovereignty and autonomy is under threat. 
The following excerpt elucidates how toughness will safeguard independence and 
sovereignty: 
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Politician 15: Today, tackling serious problems, in my opinion, requires tough and 
uncompromising positions. Cyprus is a divided country and before we [politicians] 
take any decisions on crime and immigrants we have to promote and safeguard our 
independence and sovereignty. 
6.3 Immigration to Cyprus 
In September 2014, sixty percent of the prison population in Cyprus consisted of non-
nationals. Today, the excessive numbers of incarcerated non-citizens has been normalised, 
with pervasive media and political rhetoric and images. The majority of the foreign nationals 
are illegal citizens and serve a prison sentences for committing an immigration offence. 
Baldwin-Edwards (2001) argues that migration is an important component of penal policy 
and has become a regular feature of southern European countries. Over the last two decades, 
immigration into Cyprus has continuously increased, with immigrants arriving from 
collapsing neighbouring countries such as Syria, Egypt, Libya, Palestine, and Lebanon 
(Baldwin-Edwards, 2005, Baldwin-Edwards, 2002). A consistent pattern has been highly 
restricted access to the formal labour market despite a series of failed attempts to amend this 
problem (Baldwin- Edwards, 2001). The resultant burgeoning informal sector in the 1990s 
resulted in the attraction of more illegal workers and immigrants. It was during the 1990s 
when the Cypriot government decided to uplift restricted migration policies due to a shortage 
of indigenous labour to unpopular sectors. As a result, the policy aimed to create a regime of 
short-term contracts for migrants restricted to specific sectors of the economy (Trimikliniotis, 
1999, Trimikliniotis, 2005). Today, Cyprus has been transformed into a society which acts as 
a ‘host’ to immigrants from different countries who occupy a range employment positions, 
from labourers, to professionals and entrepreneurs (Trimikliniotis, 1999). 
One of the most specific characteristics of the immigration situation in Cyprus today – though 
visible in many parts of Southern Europe – is that of the ‘criminogenic’ effect of the presence 
of migrants. However, national and international crime statistics have shown that Cypriots’ 
contribution to crime is much more than that of foreigners, especially taking into 
consideration the demographic profile of the two groups. As noted previously, in Cyprus the 
legal status of immigrants is fluid and multi-faceted (see further Trimikliniotis, 2005; 2006; 
2008; 2011, Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, 2005). 
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6.3.1 Immigrants as a threat: the political and media effect 
Today the global order has transformed the notion of society by the increased trans-border 
flows and cannot be seen as a separate and discrete entity (Aas, 2007). As Giddens (1990) 
points out, local transformations are the outcome of globalisation and the meaning of entities 
such as home, community and nation are transformed by the global order and hybrid 
identities are created. It has been argued that the nation has multiple tasks (Castells, 1996; 
Bauman, 2000) for example, the ‘sovereign state strategy’ (Garland, 2001) provides 
protection and security from threatening and unwanted mobilities. The following excerpts 
make clear the discriminatory perceptions of the interviewees towards unwanted immigrants 
and asylum seekers: 
Interviewer: So do you feel that immigrants pose a threat to the Cypriot society? 
Politician 15: Of course they are… they are threatening our society. Those people are 
carrying their silly customs and religion with them, they only thing that they know to 
do is to ask for work permits and housing benefits. Well, Cyprus today is in huge debt 
and we don’t necessarily have to support Muslims and Buddhists [participant laughs 
sarcastically]…Today our aim should be the solution of the national problem and not 
how to get rid of them, in this sense they are not only threatening our society but our 
sovereignty too. 
Politician 21: Without them we will be without stress. I do not feel safe when I am 
around them. 
According to Aas (2007; 2011; 2013), a central element of contemporary mobilities is that of 
insecurity. The connection between mobilities and insecurity was first captured by the School 
of Chicago as disorienting and destructive of local social control forms (see further Valier, 
2003). Today, immigrants and asylum seekers are classical examples of Simmel’s concept of 
strangers, marking the distance and division between ‘them’ and ‘us’ within societies and 
‘serving to crystallise the symbolic and cultural limits of community’( Aas, 2007,p: 287).  
Nowadays, the ‘deviant immigrant’ has a central place in media and political discourse in 
most Western democratic counties and immigrants and asylum seekers are often portrayed as 
criminals (Bosworth, 2008). This view was noted in interviews, such as: 
Politician 16 (political right): I understand that the political conditions in these 
countries are appalling, but this is not our problem……. Today, in Cyprus we have to 
sort out our own problems, the financial crisis for example has caused extremely 
unpleasant financial and social problems to our people and I do not believe that we 
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have to show any empathy to what is going around the Middle East or Eastern 
Europe.  
The punishment of immigrant crime is a focal issue in Cyprus, and serves not only to 
strengthen social solidarity in a Durkheimian sense, but also as a purifying filter aiming to 
protect the local and national identity from threatening elements (see further Aas, 2007). As 
the following excerpt indicates, discourses on law and order are thus correlated with demands 
for restoration of the nation and with clear and distinctive assumptions about national identity 
and moral boundaries (Bosworth, 2008). 
Politician 15 (political right):  Unfortunately today their presence is dominant and 
suffocating… You go to the coffee shop - the waiters are from Romania, you go to the 
supermarket - the cashiers are from Georgia, you call a plumber and a Syrian 
appears… you feel a foreigner in your own country. 
Politician 21: The truth is that we are a minority in our own country.  
However, the need for a more culturally tolerant approach has also been narrated by 
participants, arguing that immigrants and refugees are vulnerable social groups that need 
protection rather than Cypriot nationals needing protection from them: 
Commissioner for Administration: Immigrants are poor people seeking a better life; in 
this sense I will agree that it is wrong to constitute the entry of these vulnerable 
groups a criminal offence. This situation can be treated differently. In 1974, for 
example, thousands of Cypriots have migrated to England, Australia and America in 
search of a better life and stayed illegally in these countries for long periods. As far as 
I know, those people they been treated with respect and governments in these 
countries took immediate humanitarian measures. It is not a solution to criminalise an 
offence…. An offence is not a crime… and committing an offence doesn’t make you 
a criminal. 
Another similar view can be seen in a statement by the Head of the Anti-Discriminatory 
Body: 
Immigrants and refugees are not here because they want to cause trouble, but because 
they want to have a better life. Unfortunately today media and political discourses 
have created this drama around refugees and immigrants which has resulted in fear 
and the need for more protection from them. 
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6.3.2 ‘Crimmigrants’ and the meaning of the borders:  
The criminalisation of immigrants has been well documented in many jurisdictions 
throughout the world (Bauman, 2000; Melossi, 2003; Valier, 2003; Hughes, 2006; Aas, 2007; 
2011; 2013). The discourse about criminal immigrants suggests that in many western 
countries the presence of immigrants has a polluting element which accompanies 
transformations, mainly socio-political. Wacquant (1999) for example, in his attempt to 
analyse contemporary penal developments in Europe, suggested that foreigners and asylum 
seekers are the new ‘blacks’ of Europe, emphasising the explosive numbers of non-nationals 
in European prisons. In Cyprus, foreign national and asylum seekers are defined as matters of 
security and justice as the following excerpt shows: 
“I don’t think that they come here with good intentions. Look at the levels of 
criminality in Cyprus today… We have to increase police patrols and security. The 
Green Line is a huge obstacle because we do not have the full protection of our 
borders and we cannot keep them out”. 
The protection of borders is an intrinsic and stratified global condition (Bosworth, 2008). In 
Cyprus, the de facto division of the state has created an ultra-strict, intense and heavily 
militarised border. Recent literature on global mobilities and penal order (Bosworth 2013; 
Aas, 2011; 2013) suggests that national borders establish the limits of a state by selecting 
those who are allowed to enter and those who remain outside. This line of thinking is 
demonstrated in the following excerpts: 
Politician 15: … well I am not suggesting that all non-citizens should be banned from 
entering our country. What I mean is that we need to secure our borders from those 
immigrants who are coming here to cause troubles. Tourists are very much welcome, 
our economy is based on them. 
Public Prosecutor 13: Indeed some non-natives are more welcome than others but that 
does not mean that those who are desirable are coming with the best intentions and 
those who are undesirable are here to cause trouble. This occurs everywhere; 
however, in Cyprus the Green Line intensifies the selection process. 
The protection of border has a practical and symbolic meaning and is mostly orchestrated by 
what Simon calls ‘governance through crime’. Similarly Garland’s (1990) ‘criminology of 
the dangerous other’ argues that ‘monstrous others’ challenge the limits of the traditional 
views of justice (Aas, 2007). In 2015, the infamous statement made by the Minister of 
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Interior Xasikos - while a big proportion of refugees were fleeing Syria, and questioning the 
EU refuge quota plan to relocate thousands of migrants - that he would ‘prefer’ refugees to be 
Orthodox Christians. He also added that “it is not an issue of being inhuman or not helping if 
we are called upon, but to be honest - yes, that is what we would prefer” ( Kathimerini, 
2015). This view clearly expresses not only his reluctance to accommodate immigrants but 
also the view of the religious other. In this study, this was echoed in narratives such as: 
Politician 21 (left of centre): They [referring to immigrants and asylum seekers] are 
not coming here with good intentions. Today we are going through  the worst 
financial crisis that we ever had , however, this does not prevent them from coming 
here….they are having two and three jobs while our people are unemployed, also they 
are marrying our sons and daughters to get the stay visa and more recently the 
conversion of Cypriots into Islam. 
As stated by Bosworth (2008) contemporary mobilities represent an enormous challenge for 
the state apparatuses trying to control them. Also Bauman (2002) states, their speed and 
movement make them difficult to spatialise. Mavratsas (1999) notes the symbolism of the 
Green Line, is not only a barrier between the two sections ( Greek-Cypriots and Turkrish-
Cypriots) per se, but also a constant reminder for physical border protection from external 
threats and ‘dangerous’ cultures and religions ( see further Bosworth and Kaufman, 2011). In 
addition, recent media and political discourse often regards Muslim identity due to the on-
going crisis in Syria as primitive and uncivilised, in contrast to the safe ‘zones of prosperity’ 
of the West (see Aas, 2007). Before the September 11 attacks, it was argued - perhaps 
optimistically - that globalisation would usher in a borderless world. However, according to 
Bosworth (2008) the reality today is different as national governments invest heavily in 
border controls. Border controls have become stricter than ever and the countries requiring 
visa to enter the EU (the so-called black list countries) are now standing at 130 in 2016 from 
only 70 in 1985. Moreover, the militarisation of borders represents an essential aspect of the 
globalising condition ( Bauman, 1998). In Cyprus for example, the freedom of movement is 
available only to privileged individuals, while others are taking clandestine and dangerous 
routes. Therefore, in Cyprus clandestine migration has risen significantly in recent years. 
While the fall of the Berlin wall was a momentous event and defined a ‘free’ world, in the 
case of Cyprus - the last divided country in Europe – new, advanced and expensive 
immigration strategies are in place (see further Aas, 2005). These sentiments were expressed 
by the Commissioner for Administration as follows:  
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“Ninety-five percent of the immigrants and refugees are undocumented which is a 
serious number when exploring the connections between immigrants and criminality. 
In Cyprus for many years, immigrants as well as refugees are treated with suspicion, 
exclusion as well as expulsion…over the years, various governments invested in 
practices and policies to keep unwanted migrants outside Cyprus, but we don’t see 
policies and initiative for integration and protection for those people”. 
6.3.3 Financial crisis, racism and xenophobia 
Melossi (2003) provides a rigorous account of how the problem of the relationship between 
documented status and deviant behaviour has been evolved in Italy. Melossi (2003) argues 
that the documented status concerns many countries of the EU, because of the complex 
nature of entry procedures. In Cyprus, for example, unskilled labour was for many years in 
demand, however the advent of the financial crisis has slowed down the ‘flood’ of migrants 
and indubitably the on-going financial crisis in Cyprus has heavily affected migrants’ 
unemployment.  
According to Papadimitriou (2001) “since the onset of the global economic crisis, temporary 
worker flow, business migration, and ‘unregulated’ flows such as illegal immigration and free 
movement within certain parts of the EU have experienced the largest decreases” (p: 1). In 
the case of Cyprus, overall migration has slowed sharply as a result of the economic 
downturn, the attitude of hostility and exaggeration towards migrants presence has been 
persistent, mostly by political actors. The following excerpt clearly indicates acute 
discriminatory views:  
Politician 15 (political right): we do not need any more dirty immigrants, we have 
more than enough. Since I remember myself we have been controlled by other nations 
[the participant is referring to the Turkish invasion and the period during British 
colonialism]… but today we are swamped by immigrants…  
Whilst the political culture in Cyprus is stressing the ‘chords’ and ‘floods’ of immigrants, a 
significant number of interviewees spoke of a great movement outside Cyprus: 
Officer of the Commissioners for Administration Office: The economic crisis has not 
affected to a greater extent only the Cypriot citizens but immigrants too. The 
perception that immigrants have swamped us and they are the cause of evil in these 
financially difficult times is sustained by certain political actors and the media. Recent 
statistics have shown that since 2013 a large number of immigrants return to their 
countries of origin or immigrate to another country. 
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Judge 12: Despite the fact that we see a massive increase of legal cases, the presence 
of immigrants and foreigners is significantly reduced. 
Public prosecutor 13: ...there is a noticeable movement outside Cyprus not only by 
immigrants but by Cypriots as well.  
A new body of literature goes beyond party politics and populism and “stresses the structure 
of sovereignty and the dynamic process of group membership to penal outcomes” (Barker, 
2012). Immigrants, asylum seekers and other ethnic minorities have been caught in conflicts 
over multiculturalism and neo-nationalism that are often expressed through the penalisation 
and criminalisation of the ‘other’ (Melossi, 2013a, 2013b). The criminalisation of immigrants 
in Cyprus, through confinement and expulsion, enables the Cypriot state to reaffirm its 
sovereignty and control borders (Bosworth and Kaufman, 2011). Similarly, Weber (1965) 
argues that penal sanctioning is the most powerful expression of national sovereignty. As the 
Cypriot government struggles over economic and political interdependence, criminal justice 
agencies use expressive forms of punishment such as imprisonment to restore public trust and 
confidence, according to Bosworth (2008) border control became a central feature of this 
penal strategy.  
6.4 The significance of the Welfare State 
 The ‘Welfare State’ and other related forms of social provision to address human needs were 
seen by politicians as the principal aim of government after the Turkish invasion in 1974. The 
zenith of that system of beliefs can be summarised in the concerted effort of the Cypriot 
government, political parties and trade unions to prevent the “Palestinisation” of the expelled 
Greek-Cypriot refugees who were expelled from the northern part just after the Turkish 
invasion (Trimikliniotis, 2005). The generous welfare practices of the late 1970s and 80s 
were soon dashed and accordingly in Cyprus over the last twenty years, penal reformers and 
politicians have failed to acknowledge welfare as a means of reducing crime and punishment 
alike, even during periods when welfare investment and provision was at its peak. Therefore, 
today in Cyprus, welfare ideals and aims are not seen as key variables in criminal justice 
policy and practice. The connection between welfare and penal severity recurred frequently 
during the interview process. With the welfare worldview, interviewees narrated how the 
withdrawal of welfare provision correlates to social marginality which then impacts on the 
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prison population. For example, Judge 12 narrates how meagre welfare programmes can 
force marginal groups or individuals into criminality: 
“Of course we cannot bypass the correlation between penal expansion and welfare 
contraction. Welfare spending and welfare programmes are there to help those people 
in need, but when those programmes are limited and have significantly reduced from 
earlier years then yes, this  has a direct impact on the prison population. The financial 
crisis back in 2012 has created more vulnerable social groups and significantly 
reduced social expenditure spending”. 
Downes and Hansen (2006) offer the most systematic study of the interaction between 
welfare and imprisonment. Specifically, Beckett and Western (2001) argue that penal and 
social policy are inextricably linked (Downes and Hansen, 2006, p:44) with the former 
arguing that welfare regimes “vary according to their commitment to including or excluding 
marginal groups”. Inclusive regimes aim to identify and understand the social causes of 
marginality, with great emphasis on integration of those marginal groups by providing 
generous welfare programmes and provisions. Therefore, those regimes are built upon 
tolerant attitudes and views towards crime activity and are more likely to have lower 
imprisonment rates. By contrast, exclusionary regimes place responsibility for social 
problems in those people who are socially marginalised and poor. These regimes provide 
limited welfare services, and follow a harsher response towards crime and are more likely to 
endorse incarceration. As the following excerpt demonstrates: 
Judge 8: Welfare programmes are of paramount significance when we seek to 
understand the levels of crime and incarceration. The purpose of social protection is to 
ensure that specific social groups have sufficient support regardless of the government 
in power at any time. But in Cyprus it has been proven that some governments were 
more generous in terms of the money invested in social protection. 
The notion that social and penal policy are crucial components of government response 
towards social marginalisation has rich sociological pedigree (Garland, 2001, Garland and 
Sparks, 2000, Morgan et al., 2012, Innes, 2003). Kirchheimer and Rusche (1939) for 
example, first correlated penal institutions to social policy and institutions. Furthermore, 
Garland (1985) has developed this argument explicitly by arguing that the amendments of the 
British social and penal policy during the 19th and 20th century were part of a larger shift in 
the regulation of social marginality. Garland’s (1985) philosophy is known as ‘penal-
welfarism’ or ‘penological modernism’, and sees deviant behaviour partially caused and not 
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freely chosen (Garland, 2001). In the same vein, Wacquant (2010) argues that the greatest 
political transformation of the post- civil rights American era is characterised by a stingy 
social state and the make of the gargantuan penal state that have assisted the reproduction of 
the country’s stratification, cities, and civic culture (p: 74). Together, those thrusts have 
succeeded to redraw the perimeter and mission of public authorities to manage, deprive, and 
stigmatise population that stuck to the bottom of the class, ethnic and urban hierarchy 
(Wacquant, 2010, p: 74). Similarly, in Cyprus contemporary political discourse has moved 
away from the nature and causes of the problems associated with social marginality. 
Contemporary political discourse defines problems such as poverty as security issues and not 
as a social issue. This reduces the priority to integrate the socially marginal, and places more 
emphasis on the dangerous and underserving nature of the poor ( see further Garland, 2001).  
Over the last decade for example, politicians in Cyprus have made a concerted effort to 
promote more exclusionary responses to marginal groups and individuals. The subsequent 
quote details further the exclusionary and security-minded rhetoric towards marginal groups 
and individuals in Cyprus today: 
Politician 16 (political right): Handing out money to poor people, alcoholics, 
unemployed and immigrants is not a wise thing to do and in a way is a total waste. 
Those people rely on the assistance system and become idle. We shouldn’t be 
investing in lazy people pretending that they can’t work for x reasons or because they 
come from Syria and they need a place to stay and money to live on until the political 
situation back in their country becomes safer… this is not the kind of message that we 
want to send to people who are willing to follow the same path. 
Recent political discourse about welfare in Cyprus exists within a populist agenda. Populist 
politicians, for example, demonstrate not only xenophobic attitudes but a great scepticism of 
including and integrating marginal groups and individuals such as immigrants, the poor and 
unemployed (see further Wacquant, 2004 Pratt, 2007; Sparks, 2001; Matthews, 2005). In 
2013, for example, the political campaign was held on a welfare agenda that promised to curb 
‘welfare scroungers’ who were allegedly waiting for the opportunity to ‘come in’ and exploit 
the opportunities that were available (see further Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, 2005). 
Penal and social policy in Cyprus has become harsher and more exclusionary after borrowing 
the concept of ‘policy regimes’. In the comparative literature on welfare systems, Cyprus has 
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been considered part of the conservative corporative model (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 
Andreotti et al., 2001) but very recently scholars have questioned Esping-Andersen’s 
inclusion of Italy, Greece, Spain and Cyprus in the corporatist welfare policy regime type, 
suggesting that a fourth Southern European or Mediterranean welfare regime exists with 
characteristics that distinguish those countries from other welfare regimes (Gal, 2010, Bonoli, 
1997, Ferrera, 1996, Rhodes, 1996).  Gal (2010) argues that Italy, Greece, Spain and Cyprus 
belong to a single welfare model not only because of their geographic proximity but also due 
to common historical and cultural legacies, two significant elements when exploring welfare 
regimes and policies (Wacquant, 2014, Nelken, 2009, Karstedt, 2001). In those countries and 
most particularly Cyprus, expenditure levels remained lower than those in the social-
democratic and corporatist welfare states.  
The welfare and social protection systems in Cyprus have been described as weak and 
problematic by participants. Participants recognise how meagre welfare provisions contribute 
to the increase of social problems and concurrently lead to the increase of the prison 
population. The following excerpt supports the claim that public assistance is not only weak 
but poses as a perennial problem for governments: 
Public Prosecutor 14: In my opinion, the financial crisis significantly affected the 
assistance to vulnerable individuals and groups, but social protection in Cyprus was 
always problematic and not sufficient in dealing with social problems and marginality 
in particular.  
Mouzelis (1994) explored ethnographically the nature of social policies in Southern-
European countries and noted that in Cyprus, welfare state services and benefits to assist 
individual and family needs have often been characterised by clientelistic relations, nepotism,  
corruption and populist logic of political domination (see further Mouzelis, 1986, Ferrera, 
2005). In particular, politics in Cyprus at present has been tainted by patron-client relations 
that entail the provision of substantial resources in return for political support. Eisenstadt and 
Roniger (1984) contextualised clientelistic relations in Cyprus in a historical perspective and 
produced a more nuanced definition of the phenomenon: the Turkish origin word rousfeti 
(see further Kaymak and Faustmann, 2010, Ker-Lindsay and Faustmann, 2008). The term 
rousfeti describes any act of granting a favour or service.  In a political context it is used to 
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describe a favour by a minister or a member of the Cypriot parliament to party followers, 
local elites, friends or acquaintances.   
The following excerpt validates the perception of the excessive use of rousfeti, corruption and 
political patronage within the social services in Cyprus: 
Commissioner for Administration: I do believe that social problems play a crucial 
role, but the financial crisis in 2012 has worsened the situation because the financial 
crisis is also a crisis of human rights. So we have a setback precisely because of the 
economic crisis that was inevitable. For example, people have the fundamental right 
to have a job; another example is the cuts to social benefits and placing people in 
extremely difficult situations to an extent compromising their dignity at the minute. 
Also, our office many times came across allegations that citizens were receiving 
benefits for years that they were not entitled to because they knew the right people.     
Interviewer: So you are suggesting that some political actors interfere? 
Commissioner for Administration: It is well known how the employees in the public 
services in Cyprus are working, especially in the services of social benefits. The 
employees in those departments have become mouthpieces of political parties. They 
do as they are told. Our office has dealt with hundreds of complaints last year as 
people with real disabilities have been excluded by the system because some 
politicians wanted to ‘satisfy’ their people… complaints about rousfeti, favouritism, 
corruption and patronage and non-transparent procedures regarding welfare 
provisions today are not placed anonymously. 
Faustmann (2010) explicitly explains the importance of personal connections in Cypriot 
society by suggesting that: 
“In small societies, personal connections inevitably become vital for the interaction of 
the individual with the state and the promotion of personal goals. The members of the 
elite know each other but also most ordinary citizens have personal contacts to 
leading politicians or at least know somebody who has the contacts needed. As a 
result, public and private interaction is shaped by a highly developed system of 
mutual favours, through which one can achieve almost anything, if one only has the 
right connections” (p:270). 
Subsequently, promotion, recruitment, assistance and transfers of the public and semi- 
governmental sectors are often influenced by political interference and remain a critical tool 
to understand the nature of the Cypriot welfare state. Furthermore, Sotiropoulos (2004a) 
argues that in Cyprus and Greece the involvement of certain family oligarchies and 
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traditional local elites of specific communities intend to influence the decisions of 
administrative bodies, especially those bodies that determine the eligibility to any kind of 
social benefits, which is a particular form of clientelism, often linked to the Greek and 
Cypriot welfare states (see further Sotiropoulos, 2004b). 
In line with this, Rhodes (2014) argues: 
“While social heterogeneity and the existence of extensive informal or parallel 
economies militate against universalism and the establishment of forms of solidarity 
based on more than particularistic group structures, the institutional factors (…) - that 
is, the absence of a strong state technocracy, the prominence of political parties as 
aggregators of social interests, alongside the weakness of civil society, and the 
persistence of clientelism - have also undermined the effectiveness of policy and 
helped fuel undisciplined spending” (p, 8). 
Existing literature on the connection between welfare and penal severity suggest that 
generous welfare states have a moderate mode of punishment (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; 
Lacey 2008; Lappi-Sappala, 2007, 2008). How societies structure their economies and 
political systems produces distinctive forms of social integration that vary significantly across 
capitalist democracies (Barker, 2012). Cavadino and Dignan’s typology of political economy 
for example, links inclusionary and exclusionary penal regimes with high and low 
imprisonment respectively. In individualistic and neo-liberal societies such as the USA, UK, 
Australia and New Zealand, we witness a harsh, punitive response towards crime with higher 
prison populations because crime (like unemployment, immigration and addiction problems) 
is perceived to be an individual failure encompassing personal responsibility. In contrast, 
inclusive and egalitarian societies such as the Nordic and Scandinavian countries are 
acquiring more protections against social marginality (essential conditions responsible for 
crime) and have in place a milder penal mode with significantly lower imprisonment rates 
(Lappi-Sappala, 2011). 
On an empirical level, the political economy approach offers a limited appreciation of 
analysis on ethnic diversity and how significant migratory changes in Europe informed the 
process of social integration and penal order. Lacey’s (2008) findings show how highly 
coordinated market economies (mainly Scandinavian and to a certain extent German) tend to 
protect insiders from social marginality but appear reluctant to include outsiders in the labour 
market. Similarly, Karstedt (2003) in her ‘Cultures of inequality’ thesis, argues how the 
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transition to democracy in Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Hungary, 
and Czechoslovakia) created specific structures and (sub) cultures of inequality. According to 
Karstedt (2003), the transition to democracy, market and civil society came with an 
extraordinary rise in crime. The work of Karstedt (2003) focuses on the characteristics of 
cultures of inequality that were inherited from the past, but which became worse in recent 
years and is now related to  corruption, economic elite crime and violence. 
Similar discoveries were found in this study, suggesting that the penal regime in Cyprus 
appear to be milder and more lenient to ‘insiders’ and more punitive towards ‘outsiders’. 
Politician 16: The social protection of our citizens is one of our priorities. However, 
the recent financial crisis in some way has tied our hands, as the management of 
recent welfare programmes is chiefly controlled by Troika. In my opinion, the 
financial crisis has created more indigenous vulnerable groups, which is something 
that we are dealing with. 
In a similar vein, a participant stated: 
Politician 15: In these difficult financial times, in my opinion, we have to see who is 
in need ‘inside our house’ before we help other people. A big percentage of our 
population is unemployed while a significant number of our citizens developed 
mental health issues from being unemployed and having huge debts. 
Recent research by Van Der Waal et al (2013) shows how political parties have developed 
particular welfare states based on chauvinistic and populist elements, which entails discourse 
of conflicts about immigration and disconnection in Europe. Similarly in Cyprus, discussions 
and debates of who is entitled to welfare assistance -while the country is undergoing its worst 
financial crisis- have become a focal feature of Cypriot politics as the above excerpts indicate. 
The welfare agenda holds a significant role for political parties and in difficult economic 
times has been used by politicians endlessly (see further De Koster, 2013). Additionally, 
entitlements to welfare services are restricted depending on claimants’ origin. Right-wing 
political parties for example, fiercely argued that welfare entitlements should be available 
only to the native population, especially in economically stagnated periods. What we see in 
the case of Cyprus is an ethnically exclusionist dimension to the welfare state, which is a 
socioeconomic issue par excellence (see further De Koster, 2013). 
Similar sentiments can be found among the Cypriot public as the native population consider 
immigrants less deserving of welfare services than entitled natives e.g. elderly, unemployed 
etc. According to Van Der Waal et al., (2010) the resistance to distributing welfare services 
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towards immigrants has become known as ‘welfare chauvinism’. This underlying sentiment 
was articulated by a large proportion of interviewee narratives: 
Politician 20: I don’t understand why we should include immigrants and refugees in 
welfare services. Welfare provisions such as benefits should be given where there is 
more need, and Cypriots appear to be needier that ever. 
 Another interviewee commented: 
Politician 17: We used to be very generous with immigrants but unfortunately today 
we cannot afford this… I think benefits should be restricted to our own citizens only, 
it is fairer. 
Surprisingly, the idea that welfare services should be restricted to our ‘own’ was first 
introduced by Andersen and Bjorklund (1990), in their attempt to understand the political 
dimension of welfare chauvinism. According to Van der Waal et al., (2010) welfare 
chauvinist politicians do not oppose economic redistribution entirely, but they want the 
redistribution to be enjoyed by the native population. This is of course highly amenable to a 
significant proportion of the electorate. These public sentiments have arguably been 
generated and sustained by rightist populist parties in many jurisdictions throughout the 
world. 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
Probably the strongest conclusion to emerge from this chapter is that penal policies and 
practices in Cyprus today are inexorably related to social policies and practices and to deep 
cultural characteristics. Penal policies in Cyprus became harsh and exclusionary, an 
important contributor to the increase in the prison population. Today, crime control policies 
are driven by a misinformed public and crime rates and responses are often exaggerated by 
politicians for electioneering purposes. Discriminatory media and political discourse have 
also linked the presence of immigrants to criminality and unemployment, especially in 
economically stagnated periods. As a result, crime and its causes have been highly politicised 
and today the Cypriot culture of crime has shifted away from penal populism towards penal 
nationalism where concepts such as ‘nation’ and ‘the people’ are of paramount significance. 
Therefore, being ‘tough on crime’ in Cyprus means securing national protection, and the 
punishment of offenders is essential to national welfare. Additionally, this chapter reveals 
how the presence of immigrants entails criminogenic effects and is highly associated with 
national threat and insecurity. Criminalising immigrants through confinement and expulsion 
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enables the Cypriot state to reaffirm its sovereignty and control its borders. Another 
important finding of this chapter is the significance of the welfare state and its ability to assist 
vulnerable individuals and groups outside the prison walls. Yet again, the Cypriot welfare 
state appears reluctant to assist those in need, and instead creates a deep division between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’, based on a welfare chauvinistic agenda. Consequently, the rise in the prison 
population in Cyprus has occurred based on distinctive social and political component. 
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7. Results Chapter: The challenges of the prison establishment 
After considering perspectives on the rise in the prison population, this chapter turns our 
attention to the second research question of this thesis which stresses the impact of the 
unprecedented level of prisoners on the Cypriot prison system. This chapter is the second 
comprising the analysis section of this research which includes the current challenges of the 
Central Jail of Nicosia. This chapter thematically analyses participants’ narratives and 
experiences and incudes aspects embodied within the emergent experiences from the total 
institution including important information regarding the incarcerated, the internal hierarchy 
of the institution, the institutional culture, the relationship between captives and captors and 
the consequences of political rhetoric towards prisoners and criminals in general. Recent 
sociological knowledge on the prison suggests that there has been a significant shift in the 
discourse of prisons and prisoners. While it was once primarily focused on the growth of 
imprisonment rates, instead today there is an emerging concern of the prison regime as a 
primary problem (Simon, 2000, Robertson, 1997; Haney, 1997). The work of Robertson 
(1997) and Haney (1997) for example, is concerned with the notion of pure custody or 
‘warehousing’ of prisons where prisoners ‘survive rather live’ and prisons do not instruct or 
correct but merely contain instead. Furthermore, Simon (2000) argues that prisoners in 
warehousing systems are defined as unchangeable and dangerous and when they are 
‘recycled’ back to the society are treated and seen as contaminants and toxic. This chapter 
extends the discussion of the ‘warehouse’ styled prison system by looking at the sociological 
knowledge of the prison as a whole. 
7.1 Thematic Analysis Results 
The CJN occupies a central position within the Criminal Justice System in the Republic of 
Cyprus. This centrality of imprisonment as the main tool for the deterrence and incapacitation 
of deviants has increased significantly in Cyprus, as the substantial growth in the prison 
population shows. This section of the thesis provides a critical exploration of the current 
challenges and problems that the prison system in Cyprus is undergoing. The chapter 
thematically analyses the participants’ perspective of the current prison challenges.  
Questions revolving around who is sent to the prison, for how long, under what conditions, 
and when they should be released became persistent topics in the media - as recently as two 
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years ago - following the events of January 2014. Today in Cyprus, the politicization of crime 
and imprisonment has a direct impact not only on the number of people who enter the 
establishment, but also on the conditions in which prisoners and prison staff live and work 
respectively ( see further Dilulio, 1987; Useem and Kimball, 1989; Sykes, 1958; Sparks, 
2007). Undoubtedly this new era of the politics of imprisonment influences the number of 
people who enter the prison, including demographical elements such as age, sex, ethnic and 
religious background etc., and in matters of security and control, issues have often been 
handled and resolved quietly behind prison walls ( see further Simon, 2007). Furthermore, in 
Cyprus the public construct their views and perceptions of the prison enterprise; what 
prisoners eat (Godderis, 2006), how many baths, visits and phone calls they are allowed to 
receive, what educational programmes are available to them (Page, 2004) and medical access 
(Sim, 2002) are just a few of the hundreds of issues that preoccupy penal reformers and 
prison administrators but are rarely witnessed by the public. However as we will see, when 
these issues enter the public discourse, they are debated with great intensity.   
This chapter is the first empirical attempt to uncover the factors that epitomise the state of the 
c-word (crisis). The high level of the prison population is primarily responsible for 
overcrowding and understaffing in the CJN, both of which exacerbate the deteriorating 
physical condition of the prison. The combination of poor conditions and inadequate numbers 
of staff has a significant impact on staff morale, which further worsens conditions. This 
chapter also indicates an overall legitimacy crisis within the prison system evident in recent 
high incidence of suicides and self-harm amongst prisoners, large numbers of prisoners with 
mental health problems, the over representation of immigrants and refugees and instances of 
corruption and injustice. 
7.2 Penological resources:  
At the present time, it is not controversial to claim that the penal system in Cyprus is in a 
state of crisis. This penal crisis did not emerge unexpectedly nor is it something new; for 
many years, media reports have acquainted the public with a sky-rocketing prison population, 
poor infrastructure, escapes and violence. Evidence for the existence of a ‘crisis’ can be 
found in international watchdog organisations and most importantly the Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture of the Council of Europe (CPT) as well as the news media. Recent 
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times have seen a decrease in scandals and embarrassment yet still include the imprisonment 
of the Prison Governor for assisting a lifer to escape, the corrupt behaviour of prison guards, 
drunken prisoners and rapes. As it may be expected, there is a problem of limited resources in 
the Cypriot prison system such as space and a general shortage of prison officers/guards. 
Bottoms (1980) first identified a crisis of penological resources that affects the entire penal 
system and most importantly the provision of non-custodial sentences and post-custodial 
supervision (in Bottoms and Preston, 1980). An ever-present issue of the material aspect of 
the crisis can be found in buildings, educational programmes, infrastructure and staff as has 
been documented by participants for this study.  
7.2.1 Overcrowding 
For the last several years, there is an alarmed attention to the unprecedented growth of the 
correctional population in Cyprus (CPT, 2008; CPT, 2013). Overcrowding conditions have 
been identified as one of the most recognised penological resources that the CJN is currently 
suffering from. In 2014, the prison establishment in Cyprus was at 150 percent of the 
Certified Normal Accommodation figure. Similarly, participants’ narratives and experiences 
confirm overcrowding as a persisting challenge: 
Interviewer:  What is the most persistent challenge in the prison today? 
Prison Staff 1: A persistent challenge of the prison estate - not only today but for the 
last five to eight years - is that of overcrowding. The Central Jail of Nicosia is 
dangerously overcrowded, but the authority [the participant is referring to the 
Ministry of Justice and Public Order] does not take our suggestions and views very 
seriously. I see the prison population growing day by day, and we have already 
converted most of the prison facilities into dormitories to accommodate all those 
prisoners. Prisoners are constantly complaining of sharing the same cell with three 
and four other prisoners, but we can’t do anything about it… It is very difficult for us 
[prison staff] as well to work in congested environments. 
Prison Staff 4: Without a doubt, overcrowding is number one. Since 2004 we warned 
the prison governance as well as the Ministry of Justice and Public Order that there is 
more available space within the jail.  
Prison Staff 2: Overcrowding is the number one challenge… it has always been. 
Judge 8: One of them is congestion. We know that prisoners in many cases are 
squeezed in cells under very difficult conditions. 
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Technically in Cyprus, overcrowding conditions can be attributed to the justice system 
sending more people to the prison and for longer periods, which then exceeds the official 
prison capacity. The official capacity of the CJN is 550, with an estimated prison population 
of 1300 in September 2015 (Ombudsman Report, 2015b). Albrecht (2012) notes that it is 
easier to produce overcrowded prisons than to develop and implement effective strategies to 
reduce prison populations. However in Cyprus, the debates on overcrowding are located at an 
intersection where important elements of police and crime research topics coexist (see further 
Albrecht, 2012). These topics involve the role of prison sentences, the standards embraced 
regarding prisoners’ accommodation, healthcare and rehabilitation programmes, the 
development of crime (especially crime that is punishable by a prison sentence), the prison 
budget and prison construction and expansion. Crucially, overcrowding is associated with all 
these topics.  
The definition and identification of overcrowding is not straightforward and depends on 
irreconcilable normative and factual elements (Albrecht, 2012). Normative elements to the 
definition of overcrowding are offered by international and regional human rights observation 
mechanisms which prohibit cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment and 
guarantee human dignity. Besides the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966) contains provisions that prohibit cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment and punishment (art. 7) and provides a monitor mechanism of prison conditions 
through visits and reports of a special rapporteur.  
In the case of Cyprus, the evaluation of the CJN with regard to overcrowding does not rely on 
a single indicator but considers a range of multi-dimensional assessments of certain prison 
conditions such as the prison regime, rehabilitation programmes, healthcare, prison staff and 
prisoners’ safety, sanitary facilities, visiting programmes and facilities for work and 
education and outdoor exercise. The CJN adheres to the decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights on the space available for each prisoner as summarised by the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT). Nonetheless on many occasions, it has been reported that prisoners have 
been living in spaces measuring less than two by two metres squared. The CPT states that 
two to three metres squared per prisoner is not a satisfactory living space and has repeatedly 
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recommended adopting a standard of four metres squared per prisoner. This matter was 
highlighted by the CPT Report (2014) which has called upon the government to adopt and 
implement a coherent strategy designed to combat prison overcrowding. 
Participants’ narratives not only present overcrowding as a persistent challenge but also a 
serious one. Of particular note, when participants discussed overcrowded conditions, the 
dormitory accommodation that houses ‘underclass’ prisoners was mentioned. Participant 
narratives suggest that stark and chronic overcrowding conditions have resulted in the 
conversion of recreational spaces into warehouses of prisoners. The following excerpt 
demonstrates this aspect: 
Prison staff 5:  Hmm, not effective at all. Since 2010 the prison is continuously 
expanding and new buildings exist now… also the governance has turned several 
communal areas used by prisoners for relaxation and entertainment purposes into 
dormitories of thirty to forty people, mainly immigrants… In addition, a recent 
‘effective’ [participant makes a sarcastic gesture] method of dealing with 
overcrowding conditions is the detention of prisoners in police stations across the 
country. 
In relation to dormitory facilities, Simon and Sparks (2012) highlight that in prison facilities 
which are chronically over-capacitated, dormitories are an unquestioned necessity. The CJN 
is a paradigmatic example in this regard. In 2014, the state’s penal system housed 3 male 
prisoners for every permanent bed and occupancy at 150 percent of the official design 
capacity. However, the following excerpt from a prison staff interviewee indicates that 
overcrowding is not spread evenly and some wings are more overcrowded than others.  
Prison staff 3: Well, the main challenge within the Central Jail of Nicosia is that of 
overcrowding. For many years now, the number of prisoners has seriously risen. 
Today overcrowded conditions have created many problems but are more persistent in 
male wings, where three or four - more recently - men have to share the same cell... 
More recently, the prison governance has turned the theatre from a facility that was 
previously used for the entertainment of prisoners into a human dormitory where 20 
to 40 prisoners are currently under very challenging circumstances. 
From the interview transcript narratives, it appears that the prison establishment is not 
effective in dealing with overcrowding conditions. In relation to the reallocation of detainees 
across establishments, this is also echoed in the interview transcripts as: 
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Prison staff 6:  The conditions within the Central Jail of Nicosia are insanely crowded. 
We have tried everything, from sending most illegal immigrants to Menogia 2  to 
reallocating prisoners to police stations. Today space is our biggest challenge… they 
are trying to address this situation by expanding existing infrastructure or adding new 
extensions, however the existing conditions are still suffocating and is impossible to 
accommodate the immense number of prisoners sent to us. 
Marshall and Rossman (1999) highlight that overcrowding amongst carceral estates is not 
spread evenly throughout the system. Cheliotis (2012) notes that overcrowded conditions in 
Greece are persistent in male prisons in big cities such as Korydalos prison in Athens (see 
further Tewksbury, 2009, Cheliotis, 2013, Holliday, 2007). Similarly in Cyprus, chronic and 
severe overcrowding conditions, according to the narratives of prison staff participants, occur 
in the wings housing male convicts. More specifically: 
Commissioner for Administration: Well, overcrowding is a serious and chronic 
condition within the Central Jail of Nicosia but is not evident across all wings of the 
prison establishment. Alongside international watchdog organisations, our office 
published a lot of reports recognising that overcrowding conditions are more 
prominent in the wings with men. The wing with women prisoners is currently 
standing at normal levels. 
Likewise, the Head of the Anti- Discriminatory Body stated: 
Head of the Anti-Discriminatory Body Ombudsman Office: Generally speaking, our 
prison system is unsustainably overcrowded… overcrowding conditions are in an 
explosive situation in the closed prison especially in the wing with male prisoners. I 
would say that, so far, the situation in the wings of women and juveniles is still safe 
and under control. 
Prison overcrowding came as a result of a slow, steady and long term increase in the number 
of prisoners. In contrast to the male wings, the wings with female and juvenile prisoners do 
not show signs of overcrowding. This facet was also depicted by the International Centre for 
Prison Studies in 2014, describing the conditions within the Cypriot prison system as cruel, 
inhuman and degrading, which is concentrated in the pre-trial part of the system.  
                                                          
2 Menogia Detention Centre is a detention centre for illegal immigrants arrested for illegal entry and/or work in 
the Republic of Cyprus. Menogia Detention Centre has been in operation since 2013 and in March 2014 was at 
full capacity. 
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Notably, where prison staff participants discuss the notion of overcrowding, narratives 
indicate how overcrowding extends to all parts of the prison. The Cypriot Ombudsman (the 
main alternative inspectorate body) has repeatedly warned the Ministry of Justice and Public 
Order as well as the prison governance that overpopulation has put pressure on utilities such 
as available water and the capacity of the sewage system. Overcrowded conditions within the 
Cypriot prison system also affect the ability of the kitchen facilities to produce enough meals 
as well as other facilities such as toilets, showers and washing facilities: 
Commissioner for Administration Ombudsman: In many of my visits I witnessed 
prisoners living in less than one square metre per prisoner…  prisoners were queuing 
for long times to take a shower while most prisoners were complaining that there is 
not enough food…. the conditions are life threatening. 
In relation to overcrowding and its effects and consequences, the narratives of judges and 
public prosecutors are equally important to the critical examination nature of this study.  The 
subsystems of the Cypriot criminal justice system are independent from one other, however 
the operation of those subsystems such as the district courts are crucial: 
Judge 8: Hmmm I think yes, our role contributes a lot to the high number of prisoners 
today…it is true that we send more people to prison today, but this our job. Our role is 
to introduce and implement policies and sanctions that each government decides to 
impose. During the past five years I conformed to policies and sanctions that I didn’t 
agree with. Overcrowding conditions pose a real and serious challenge - not only to 
the prison establishment - but to the whole Cypriot Criminal Justice System. The 
courts for example, are too overcrowded today. I haven’t seen the courtrooms so 
crowded in my professional life. 
Counsel of the Republic: Yes we do contribute but not significantly, today for 
instance, overcrowded conditions can be found at police stations and courtrooms. The 
whole criminal justice system is overcrowded. 
Seemingly, overcrowded conditions not only persist in the prison estate but are evident across 
the subsystems of the Cypriot criminal justice system as well. Today, the three main 
parts/agencies of the Cypriot CJS (correction, courts, and police) are permeated with the 
notion of fragmentation. According to the Handbook on Strategies to Reduce Overcrowding 
in Prisons (UNODC, 2013), those agencies are interdependent and interrelated. For example, 
the more criminals the police arrest; the greater the workload of the judges and the more 
congested the prison environment. In Cyprus, police, courts and the prison are separate 
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government institutions with different goals, procedures, histories and operating processes. 
Despite being separate, they have to interact with one another. Additionally, the Handbook on 
Strategies to Reduce Overcrowding in Prisons (UNODC, 2013) states that the role of courts 
is pivotal within the criminal justice system because many formal actions pertaining to 
suspects, defendants and convicts involve the courts. Only the judiciary can hold a suspect in 
the prison awaiting trial, find a defendant guilty and sentence a guilty person to prison. The 
decisions that courts make have significant consequences for other components of the 
criminal justice system. Judges decide what happens to a person arrested by the police, 
likewise, prison staff are affected by judges’ decisions and burdened by the size of the prison 
population.  
7.2.2 Bad detention conditions 
Another important element of the crisis of penological resources as narrated by research 
participants is that of bad detention conditions. Interviewees characterised prison conditions 
as squalid and deplorable - in many cases degrading - with serious shortages. In fact, bad 
conditions were the second most discussed prison challenge. Participants’ narratives and 
perspectives around bad conditions have produced four sub-sections/ themes. 
7.2.2.1 Hygiene and ventilation 
Partly as a consequence of overcrowding, the conditions of imprisonment within the Cypriot 
correctional establishment are critically described as squalid and deplorable. National and 
International Reports (Ombudsman 2012; 2013a; 2013b; 2014; 2015a; 2015b and CPT 2000, 
2004, 2008, 2013) have repeatedly called upon the prison governance and the Ministry of 
Justice and Public Order to take serious action on fundamental violations associated with 
material conditions and to guarantee that a system is in place to ensure all prisoners who need 
to access the sanitary facilities during periods of lock up are able to do so in a timely manner. 
Correspondingly, the Ombudsman Reports recommend a serious strategy to deal with 
insufficient floor space, limited sanitation, lack of ventilation and hot water, poor hygiene and 
unsuitable room temperature.  
Pertinent to bad conditions, sanitary facilities and ventilation appeared in most interviewee 
transcripts: 
177 
 
Prison staff 1: Existing sanitary conditions are indecent… Prisoners do not have 
twenty-four hour access to the toilet… also, prisoners are not allowed to take a 
shower on daily basis, even when the temperature reaches 43 degrees (Celsius) and 
[are] having to share the same cell with three others in the absence of ventilation… 
moreover the sanitary conditions in the toilet facilities are appalling, the smell of urine 
is prevailing with prisoners usually queuing for hours to take a shower.   
CPT pays particular attention to good hygiene levels and practices and suggests that prisoners 
from minority religions/faiths should have regular access to a toilet, especially before 
praying. On numerous occasions, the European Court of Human Rights has imposed penalties 
on the Cypriot State for inhumane and degrading treatment of detainees especially those of 
Muslim faith. The excerpt below perhaps elucidates this appeal: 
Prison staff 5: Sanitary conditions in the toilets are disgusting… and the 
unprecedented levels of prisoners using the toilet and shower facilities every day 
contribute to the decomposition of those facilities. Also Muslim prisoners are 
worsening the situation … they refuse to use the toilet in the way that is familiar in 
developed countries. 
For the past five years, prisoners and ex-prisoners, media reports and national pressure bodies 
have accused the prison governance of unjustified water and power cuts, with prisoners held 
without electricity or running water for days. The interview excerpt below demonstrates how 
this situation has been exaggerated by the prison governance through unjustified practices: 
Commissioner for Administration: The current prison conditions are indecent and 
unacceptable. Unfortunately, prisoners are treated as soldiers and when they do not 
cooperate or listen to the chief, the power and water supply is cut off. Those acts are 
against the European Prison law as well as Human Rights. Power and water cuts in a 
prison which faces serious hygiene problems - especially under extremely difficult 
weather conditions - are barbaric and cruel. That is why our prisoners are constantly 
on hunger strikes. 
Interviewer: What worries you the most? 
Commissioner for Administration: The absence of political interest… unfortunately 
politicians took my role seriously [only] when it was too late [the interviewee is 
referring to the events of January in 2014]. 
Pratt (2007) underscores the importance of political forces and institutions in shaping the 
practice and social meaning of punishment. Penal practices are the outcomes of political 
decision making and the salience of ‘politicisation’ of penal policies belies their prominence 
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in electoral campaigns. Political structures and institutions (parties, electoral systems, 
organisation of political representation, political mentalities and interests, climates of political 
opinion) are all vital factors that call for consideration. Unlike crime in Cyprus, the prison 
and its society is not a highly ‘politicised’ topic, therefore prisoners’ living conditions have 
not captured yet political interest as is evident in the latest political campaigns. The police 
raid at the CJN in January 2014 has visibly called attention to the problems besetting the 
prison estate in Cyprus. 
7.2.2.2 Health provisions, understaffing and staff morale 
Medical provision in Cyprus has long been minimal. In 2014, the Cypriot prison 
establishment recorded a disconcertingly low number of healthcare staff to accommodate the 
unprecedented levels of prisoners within the prison system (CPT Report, 2013). Specifically, 
two general pathologists, a periodical dentist, seven nurses, one psychiatrist, two part-time 
clinical psychologists, one occupational therapist, and two mental health nurses; with the 
most serious cases being referred to the general hospital in Nicosia. Those numbers differ 
significantly from the situation in other Southern Mediterranean countries such as Spain and 
Italy, where prison healthcare staff amount to 541 and 967, respectively (Space I, 2010). 
Furthermore, Cheliotis (2012) points out these staffing levels have always been problematic 
and too meagre in Greek prisons also, despite the oversupply of medical specialists in Greece 
and Cyprus. Further to this, Sayer (2000) highlights that Cyprus and Greece have an 
oversupply of physicians and specialists that is markedly higher than European standards (see 
further Danermark, 2002). 
The levels of healthcare staff in the Cypriot correctional establishment are in fact so low that 
prison officers and guards are, in effect, running the healthcare centre by distributing 
medication to long term patient-prisoners. Prison staff participants articulated that as follows: 
Prison staff 7: Well, sometimes we have to be their friends, psychologists, doctors and 
confessors. There are several times especially when I am on a night shift where I have 
to make my medical ‘round’ and distribute medication to prisoners who suffer from 
high blood pressure, diabetes etc. or any other type of chronic illness.  
Visits by outside healthcare specialists such as dentists and dermatologists are periodical and 
too brief to meet the needs of prisoners. It is worth noting that new prisoners are not required 
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to undergo physical examination by a medical doctor, personal  medical records are not kept 
systematically  and  medical confidentiality is not respected (CPT, 2008). With respect to 
mental health services, in Cyprus there is only one psychiatrist but he did not have a 24 hour 
presence in the prison. The Country Report on Human Rights for 2013 has shown that mental 
health issues are hardly recognised and dealt within the mental health unit of the correctional 
institution. Delayed appointments and mental health are depicted (albeit unacceptably) as a 
common feature of prison life: 
Officer of Commissioner for Administration Office:  Prisoners are waiting for long 
periods to see specialist doctors. Sometimes prisoners have to wait for two or three 
months to be seen by a dentist. Also prisoners with mental health issues are diagnosed 
after months or years.  
According to Liebling (2011) the understanding of prison life and the quality of ‘moral 
performance’ - as dubbed by Cambridge University Prisons Research Centre - is of 
paramount significance. Several developments have affected prison life and quality, with 
prison understaffing posing a crucial element. Participant narratives did not indicate only 
shortages of medical staff but also shortages of prison guards in general: 
Commissioner for Administration: The ellipsis of resources within the prison walls 
does not refer to the educational programs or the infrastructure building only, but also 
concerns the number of prison staff; I am referring [not only] to the prison staff that 
work in offices but prison staff and those who interact on a daily basis with prisoners. 
Unfortunately, the number of prison guards is very low and I think we have the lowest 
prison staff/ prisoner ratio in the EU. 
By the same token, the CPT Report (2014) has noted that the Cypriot prison establishment 
was 30 percent down on the approved staffing positions. According to Liebling (2007, 2011, 
2014), prison staff are not seen as ‘glamorous’ peace makers such as police officers, which 
significantly contributes to the lack of interest in prison work. Additionally, the CPT Report 
(2013) depicted low morale of prison staff due to insufficient staffing levels, which is 
identified in the following evidence:  
Prison Staff 2: Every day I come in here [prison] to do my job and then go home; how 
many times can someone complain? Nobody was listening for years but now with the 
police in the prison things will change I believe. 
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Prison Staff 4: Sometimes prisoners believe that we have a good job, but I don’t feel 
lucky or happy with what I am doing. The job itself is boring and so are the people I 
am working with. On top, nobody appreciates our hard work and efforts. 
It is not only the governments parsimony in hiring more prison guards but also poor 
management and lack of incentives that contributes to low morale amongst prison guards in 
Cyprus. The CPT Report (2013) clearly highlights limited promotion and training 
opportunities offered to prison guards, which has intensified with the on-going economic 
crisis. Similarly, Ombudsman Inquiries (2004, 2008, and 2013) advised the prison 
governance to encourage prison guards to take on more responsibilities and not to restrict 
their role to the security and order of the prison. In respect to lack of essential training, the 
Ombudsman argues: 
“The tragic event of last January could have been avoided if prison wardens were 
more informed and trained around serious situations such as suicides and self-harm. 
When the first suicide took place, the CCTV cameras have shown that three of the 
prison wardens were staring at the body hanging from the roof for five minutes not 
knowing what to do. Through their testimonies it became clear that those people were 
never trained to deal with these kind of situations.” 
7.2.2.3 Self–harm and Suicide  
Recent discussions on prison suicides evolve around the environmental and structural causes 
of self-inflicted deaths within total institutions (Liebling, 2002; 2005). On an international 
scale, prison suicides in Cyprus were relatively low, although suicides saw unprecedented 
levels in 2014 (CPT, 2013). In 2004, in Cyprus there were five self-inflicted deaths recorded 
in the CJN. Four of these deaths occurred among foreign national, young males.  
According to Liebling (1995, 1999) the individual prediction approach provides little 
explanation of the understanding and prevention of suicides in total institutions, giving the 
opportunity to social scientists to understand self-inflicted deaths in prisons in terms of the 
institutional conditions under which prisoners are detained. Similarly, this notion was 
touched on by the Commissioner for Administration: 
“… anyway self-harm and suicides within prisons can be associated with individual 
factors such as depression and alcoholism but what about the environment? We all 
know how damaging the prison environment is today… and I am going to start with 
overcrowded conditions, the lack of categorisation, and the ridiculously high number 
of foreign national prisoners. I do believe that individual factors could be eliminated 
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or developed further within the prison environment, therefore we have to implement a 
prison environment that is adequate and generous in space, infrastructure, material 
conditions, and offers immediate access to health care and adequate health provisions 
in general.” 
According to the Guiding Principles for the Prevention of Suicides in Prison and other 
Detention Facilities (Ombudsman 2015a), overcrowding conditions, weak health provisions 
and the absence of mental health screening of newly arrives prisoners have contributed 
significantly to the epidemic proportions of prison suicides within the Central Jail of Nicosia 
in 2014. A participant stated: 
Prison Staff 5: The absence of examinations when prisoners are admitted in the prison 
is a key component which in my opinion could prevent suicides in the prison … 
prisoners are deprived of their freedom and this is a difficult situation because they 
have to adapt to a new environment… but this loss could have less impact if the 
conditions and the overall environment of the prison is promoting access to 
rehabilitation and educational programmes etc. 
In contrast to the deprivation perspective, Sutherland et al. (1992) argue that the importation 
model attributes the characteristics of prisoners which largely determine behaviour in prison. 
According to Sutherland et al:  
“A clear understanding of inmate conduct cannot be obtained simply by viewing 
‘prison culture’ or ‘inmate culture’ as an isolated system springing solely from the 
conditions of imprisonment” (1992, p: 531). 
In an attempt to explain prison suicide, the importation model suggests that prisoners’ 
demographic, social and psychological characteristics rather than prison conditions best 
explain suicide in practice. For importation theorists such as Irwin and Cressey (1962), prison 
poses an opportunity rather than a cause. Supporting this notion, recent research studies 
suggest that suicides’ in the general population risk factors encompass depression, anxiety, 
substance abuse, post-traumatic stress disorder, schizophrenia and mental retardation as well 
as demographic correlates such as sex, age and race being prevalent amongst suicide cases in 
correctional institutions. (Frauley, 2007). Diagraph 
Cause of prisoner deaths is a matter long beset with vagueness and uncertainty and in the case 
of the CJN does not include deaths during hospitalisation or temporary release (Gilbert, 
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2008). Consequently, these inadequate recording practices make it impossible to precisely 
determine the cause or actual number of prisoner suicides and self-harm attempts. 
Commissioner for Administration: My views about deaths and suicides in the 
correctional institution have been known for years. Prisoners commit suicide in the 
prison more often and the numbers that appear in statistics are not only inaccurate but 
misleading too. On many occasions the prison governance - from fear I assume - 
classify prison deaths and suicides under the category ‘found dead’… also cases 
where prisoners suffer from heart attack or a stroke while they do time in prison and 
later die,  are not recorded properly or at all. 
Within the Cypriot prison system, most suicides involve male prisoners. In 2011, official 
prison statistics have indicated that the total number of prisoners consisted of 1255 male and 
149 female prisoners. Based on the assumption that female prisoners are under represented 
among prison suicides, suicide in prison is often perceived as a problem that affects male 
prisoners (Liebling, 1999, Pratt, 2015). 
The controversial nature of the circumstances of self-inflicted deaths within the prison raises 
questions regarding accountability, the safety of prisoners and the use of imprisonment. The 
epidemic proportions of suicides of January 2014 received negative publicity particularly in 
light of the short period of time in which the suicides occurred. The inquests that followed 
were critical, especially after the revelation that four of the deaths were of non-native 
prisoners: “…immigration origin, ethno cultural background and religious beliefs are factors 
that increased the risks of suicide among prisoners” (Ombudsman 2015a). Discussing this 
notion the Commissioner for Administration stated: 
“In many interviews with foreign national prisoners, it was evident that their detention 
conditions and experience was pretty harmful. The Syrian man [the last death before 
police intervention] for example, was in prison for an immigration offence and was in 
the prison for three months. Two weeks before he commits suicide, he sends us a 
letter saying that he has to talk to Syria because another prisoner told him that his 
mum died during the war - but the prison staff were constantly ignoring his demand 
and advised him to stop lying instead. The same person also was refused permission 
many occasions to pray during Ramadan because of his ‘attitude’. Why do I say all 
this? Because some people and groups are more vulnerable that others and  the prison   
personnel has the duty to protect those in need.” 
Prisoners in this category, often experience strong feelings of marginalisation or 
abandonment due to the absence of family support which places them in a vulnerable position 
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and often makes them victims of discriminatory, racist and degrading treatment or behaviour. 
These factors may significantly affect the mental health of prisoners and consequently 
increase the risk of suicide in this category of detainees.  
Regarding the relationship between age and suicide in the Cypriot penal establishment, recent 
research is inconclusive as to whether the risk of suicides is higher in younger or older ages 
(Dwyer and Buckle, 2009). In spite of this, the current report (2015) published by the 
Ombudsman Office in Cyprus providing the guiding principles for the prevention of suicides 
in prisons and detention facilities points out: 
“The general profile of prisoners who commit suicide is young men (20-25), 
singletons [who] have violated the law for first time and have been imprisoned for a 
low gravity offence under the influence of drugs and commit suicide in early stages of 
their detention”.   
Another important element depicted in the Guiding Principles for the Prevention of Suicides 
in prison and other Detention Facilities (Ombudsman, 2015a) is that of categorisation 
amongst prisoners.  The population of prisoners in the Cypriot prison estate is heterogeneous 
in regard to age, offences, psychopathology, health problems, socio economic background, 
religious and cultural origins, job skills, and more. Through this diverse prison population 
groups can be discerned with common problems such as: prisoners with alcohol problems; 
use and abuse of toxic substances; prisoners with chronic psychiatric problems; sex 
offenders; prisoners convicted for debts; foreigners detained for offences related to illegal 
entry, stay or work in Cyprus; Juveniles and women prisoners. 
The notion of a ‘toxic mix’ seems to have the most vocal critics, insisting that the prison 
governance, the Ministry of Justice and Public Order and the Cypriot government have to re-
examine the detention of convicted and unconvicted prisoners or prisoners with addictions 
and mental health issues. This chemical reaction metaphor of toxic mixes of prisoners 
(Sparks and Bottoms, 1995, Marshall and Rossman, 1999) is in contrast with  rehabilitation 
and reintegration ideals. The toxic mix is depicted by prison staff as an (albeit unacceptable) 
facet of the prison: 
Prison staff 3: Well, this is not a new situation for us… and if prison is a rehabilitation 
centre then a vast majority of the prison population have no benefit from being here. 
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People with depression, schizophrenia and chronic addictions such as drugs and 
alcohol shouldn’t be here in the first place. We cannot treat prisoners with severe 
health problems with penal terms. Also the coexistence of healthy prisoners with 
people who are in medical need is hopeless and questionable. 
Head of the Anti-Discriminatory Body: It is unacceptable for a prison to allegedly 
adopt and implement the European prison standards, to [then] keep convicted 
murderers with a 20 year old young man who has been convicted for a minor offence 
and he has to serve a three month sentence.   
7.3 The ‘January Events’: the ultimate symptom of legitimacy crisis  
Disorganisation and suicides are complex events that ‘raise profound questions over human 
action, social structure and political reasoning’ (Carrabine, 2005, p: 896). Any convincing 
reasoning has to be in line with the structural circumstances of confinement e.g. material 
conditions, power relations and state organisation. Although those events are often described 
by recognising human agency, such a hypothesis ignores the social processes and structures 
underlying them. Participants’ narratives on the causes of the ‘January events’, provide a 
clear understanding of legitimacy as a crucial component for institutional stability and order. 
In fact, the ‘January events’ were a set of disorganised events in the institutions’ history and 
as Sparks et al., (1996) highlights ‘they pose a special problem of the occasional complete or 
near - complete breakdown of order (p: 2). The subsequent quote details further the structural 
circumstances of the events: 
Officer of the Commissioner for Administration Office: The unpleasant prison 
developments last January can be better understood if we put them in a context. For 
example, for many years, prisoners were complaining of abuse, squalid prison 
conditions and deprivation of basic human rights like the provision of food as well as 
adequate electricity and water supplies. During interviews with prisoners we came 
across serious accusations, not only against conditions themselves, but also against 
the prison governance. Those accusations were associated with beatings, humiliation, 
degrading behaviour - especially towards foreign and ethnic minority groups… and 
when we were looking for answers and explanations to those allegations, there was a 
general climate of covering-up that is very hard to describe with words. One week 
before the last suicide we were systematically refused entry to the prison... I can recall 
three times where we were stopped from entering the prison based on silly 
accusations that we spread rumours to the media etc. 
The ‘January events’ were not only a significant finding of this research study but also a 
significant episode of the institutions’ history. The legal case is still on-going, ultimately 
shaking public opinion and trust in the Cypriot correctional system. The intensive media 
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coverage of the topic has added more stress to participants’ before, during and after their 
interviews. While some prison staff participants politely refused to comment on the events, 
some others appeared more to open to discuss it. Because of the centrality of the ‘January 
events’, it is vital to briefly re-examine the chronicle of the events at this juncture.  
On December 2013, a 21 year old Romanian prisoner arrived at the General Hospital of 
Nicosia from the Central Jail of Nicosia a few hours after he was gang-raped by a group of 
prisoners. Immediately, the incident attracted media attention. The following morning, the 
President of the Republic Nicos Anastasiades accompanied by the Minister of Justice and 
Public Order and the Minister of Health on their way out of the General Hospital Of Nicosia 
where the prisoner was held, issued the following statement: 
“After this new atrocity that has been committed in the prison, it was impossible to 
stay indifferent. I am here to give courage to the young person who is suffering, but 
also to send a message that we will not tolerate these kinds of acts; there is no more 
tolerance for what is happening in the prison and for those involved”.  
Two days after the President’s statement a 22 year old prisoner was found dead, hanged from 
a bed sheet. The President immediately ordered the Police Rapid Response Unit to raid the 
Prison Department. These events were televised extensively and a national outcry followed. 
Soon afterward, the Minister announced eighteen immediate measures including:  
 The immediate return of the Acting Prison Director to his police duties. 
 The immediate suspension of a prison officer (performing administrative duties) 
and seven guards (performing custodial duties). 
 The establishment of a panel to investigate any criminal responsibilities for the 
two recent suicides and abuse of detainees. 
 The disciplinary investigations of the above cases would be carried out by officers 
from the legal office, and expected to be completed within 30 days, for purposes 
of transparency and objectivity. 
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 It was decided to implement the continuous presence of the Police Rapid 
Response Unit within the prison walls, to be responsible for the daily control of 
cells, common areas and facilities used by the prison staff and the redesign of the 
closed circuit system in the prison. 
 Stricter controls for prison staff entering and leaving the prison. 
 As stated by the Minister of Justice in order to prevent and combat corruption, all 
prison staff - including their relatives - required to declare their assets.  
 Measures included the movement of prison administrators and inspectors in 
wings, for better control and communication with prisoners. 
 It was also decided to create a prison psychiatric ward, which would transfer 
people who need psychiatric support and care and implement an immediate 
psychological evaluation (screening) and tighter control for self-injurious 
prisoners and prisoners who have shown signs of psychological depression. 
 The instant categorisation of prisoners. 
The interviews for this study coincided with the events of January 2014 and consequently the 
interviews with prison staff and prison administrators were rescheduled while the police 
investigations were ongoing. In many passages, participants’ responses are parsimonious 
while throughout the duration of interviews showing visible signs of fear and discomfort. The 
following excerpt is typical. To the question of ‘To what extent to do you think that prison 
conditions were responsible for the events’ Prison Staff 3 replied:  
“The prevailing prison conditions at the time were not the best. We had to deal with a 
variety of issues, people on hunger strikes, people who were trying to kill themselves 
nearly every day, rapes and a lot of abuse. I can understand that those people were 
reacting to the regime but we are not responsible for the regime, we follow orders…..I 
agree that the situation aggravated after August [2013] and we finally lost the control 
of the prison”. 
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Security and control are vital components of prison life. Roy King (1985) has suggested that 
maintaining security and control is a prime element of legitimate environments such as 
prisons. In his pessimistic viewpoint, King (1985) argues that: 
“It is best to acknowledge at the outset that there is no solution to the control problem 
in prisons, nor can there be. The control problem - of how to maintain 'good order and 
discipline' - is inherent and endemic. For as long as we have prisons - and an 
institution that has become so entrenched in our thinking shows no sign whatever of 
becoming disestablished - then we will continue to hold prisoners against their will. 
At bottom that is what it is about” (King, 1985: 187, in Sparks and Bottoms, 1995, p: 
51). 
Similarly, Sparks and Bottoms (1995) argue that a central feature of delegitimized prisons is 
that of weak control, security and a dysfunctional relationship between captives and captors.  
Following the January events, the Ombudsman Inquest (2015a), did not use the word 
‘legitimacy’ but drew on the notion of injustice amongst prisoners, a vital component of  the 
legitimacy thesis (see further Scraton et al, 1991; Sparks at al., 1996; Bottoms, 1999; Bottoms 
and Tankebe, 2012; Jackson et al., 2010; Tyler, 2003). Most social scientists can agree that 
order is not the opposite effect of disorder but entails a more positive dimension as it implies 
a degree of regularity and trust amongst those involved (see further Jackson et al., 2010). 
Liebling (2004) defines order within prisons ‘as the degree to which the prison environment 
is structured, stable, predictable and acceptable’ (p: 291). In this sense, social order is of 
paramount significance as it minimises potential problems or difficulties and paradoxically 
such order is more necessary in prisons than in other social institutions (see further Sparks et 
al., 1996). However, the smooth running of a prison depends heavily on the acquiescence and 
cooperation of the prisoners (Jackson et al., 2010). A potential absence of this cooperation 
can lead to disastrous arrangements as contemporary penological history has shown us. As 
regards the CJN, the staff-to-prisoner ratio is significantly low, which means that prisoners at 
any time can reverse and take over the penitentiary ‘system’.   
Prisons are not merely warehouses for incarceration, but a reformative agent with a huge 
responsibility towards both offenders and the public. Crimes for which most of the prisoners 
are held responsible are deemed against the general values of society and it is therefore 
important to reconnect prisoners with mainstream societal values and norms before their 
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release (see further Beetham, 1991). This was summed up by the following interview 
excerpts: 
Prison Staff 1: Locking up people is an easy solution, in my opinion the most difficult 
part is to re-introduce those people [prisoners] to what is socially acceptable and 
permitted. 
Prison Staff 2: The public very often believe that by keeping criminals behind bars the 
society is then safer. However, this is a huge lie as criminals return to society [as] 
worse criminals. 
In the face of all these contradictions, scholars’ findings on prison life (Liebling, 2004; 
Bottoms and Sparks, 1996; Sparks et al., 1996; Tyler, 2006) have turned our attention to the 
notion of legitimacy. Applied to a correctional setting, legitimacy as described by Tyler is 
defined when decisions and rules enacted by prison officials or other authority figures are in 
some way ‘right’ or ‘appropriate’ to be followed (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012, p: 124). 
According to the procedural justice perspective, this approval stems from the level of fairness 
by which prisoners perceive they are treated. Sparks and Bottoms (1996) call this the 
‘representational dimension’ of experiences and treatment, where prisoners believe that the 
behaviour of prison officials is representative of the system as a whole. Therefore, prisoners 
who perceive the prison regime to be legitimate believe that rules and regulations are vital 
components of the prison regime and should be followed (Jackson et al., 2010). Applied to 
the Cypriot correctional setting, rules and regulations as part of a delegitimized regime were 
expressed by the Commissioner for Administration: 
“Before the events there was an intense climate of frustration and discomfort from 
prisoners and our office raised questions over fair treatment. In many cases, prisoners 
- especially non-natives - were victims of unnecessary rules and regulations such as 
compulsory every day shaving and much more”.  
Prisons are governed by external mandatory rules - in the case of the CJN, the Ministry of 
Justice and Public Order and the parliament - with the ‘origin’, content and personnel 
involved in its application of rules and regulations to be distant, as many rules are often seen 
as unnecessary (Jackson et al., 2010). The notion that a rule should be followed because it 
comes from a legitimate authority has often been seen as a detriment to a good relationship 
between ‘captives’ and ‘captors’. 
As Jackson et al., (2010) highlight, prisons are environments of draconian surveillance and 
exerting force with prisoners being forced to do what they are told. Order in this sense is 
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problematic and will not maintained as excessive use of force against prisoners who do not 
perceive the regime as legitimate will result in more violations and resistance. Therefore, how 
the establishment exercises its authority is of paramount significance, especially since the 
parties involved (prisoners and prison personnel) have no say in defining the rules. 
7.3.1 Deprivation and coercion in a prison of poverty 
An extensive set of literature suggests that there is a strong relationship between precipitating 
events such as riots, suicides and violent protest and a deep set of grievances within prisons 
(Sparks et al., 1996; Sparks and Bottoms, 1996; Tyler, 2006, 2010; Jackson et al., 2010). Fox 
(1971, 1973) in his powder keg theory, suggests that inhuman and degrading prison 
conditions are in fact a time bomb waiting to explode and can be sparked by a trivial incident. 
Many accounts imply that unjustified and accumulated levels of deprivation and coercion can 
generate frustration amongst prisoners and ‘the resulting explosion of cathartic violence 
against conditions’ (Carrabine, 2005, p: 899). The most recognisable position on deprivation 
is offered by Scraton et al., (1991) discussing the protests in Peterhead prison. Scraton et al., 
(1991) provide an account where alienation, boredom, the capricious enforcement of rules 
and the psychological desolation through lack of outside contact were seen as legitimate 
complaints about the ‘system’: 
“the alienation and boredom, the rigorous enforcement of petty rules, the 
psychological desolation through lack of outside contact and the fear and reality of 
violence’ experienced by long-term prisoners” (Scraton et al., 1991: 132). 
Similarly, the below excerpts depict the cultural, environmental and material context of the 
CJN and the arbitrary use of power within it. 
Commissioner for Administration: The conduct of most prison staff, including 
members of the prison governance and prison guards, was not proper - neither legal 
nor humanitarian. To name only few of their tactics; beating for unimportant reasons, 
locked up for long periods and kapetanata3. 
Prison Administrator 6: A prison is not church, it is a place where violence exists with 
the use of force to be an everyday calling. Prisoners are living in a certain place and 
under specific rules that they don’t really like and very often refuse to comply with 
                                                          
3 Kapetanata (in Greek καπετανάτα): pejorative characterization of a group of people, 
working as a clique imposing their views and personal interests. 
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those rules… our role is to make sure that order and control is always well 
maintained. 
Marx and Engels’ (2002; orig. pub. 1848: 258) position helps us to understand how prisoners 
cope with grievances, deprivation and coercion in institutionally powerful environments. The 
quote below is similar in its message:  
Prison Staff 1 …prisoners are not following orders by consent but by fear. They fear 
that they will lose their right to see their relatives or families [which] forces them to 
accept anything… don’t forget that our prison is a place of coercion and violence, 
prisoners have to live in an extreme enforcement environment, have minimal contact 
with their families and in the case of our prison, food and water supply has been 
proven to be problematic. 
7.3.2 Authority disintegration and the problem of legitimacy 
 Carrabine (2005) argues that delegitimized prisons combine key elements of authority 
disintegration, control and operation of prisons. Participant narratives on the operational state 
of the CJN suggest a variety of struggles and challenges such as poor communication, 
scandals, incoherent rules, an unstable chain of command and fractured relationships between 
prison staff and administrators. In effect, it is the disorganisation of the prison system rather 
than the organisation of the prisoners that triggered the events in January 2014. For example, 
Useem and Kimball’s (1989) analysis on the riots in nine American prisons, emphatically 
argue that: 
“Inmates are not propelled to riot merely because they are deprived of the amenities 
available outside of prison—for punishment is the purpose of prison—but because the 
prison violates the standards subscribed to concurrently or previously by the state or 
by significant groups outside of the prison. Well managed prisons, with adequate 
staffing and physical resources perpetuate a feeling among inmates that the system 
conforms to reasonable standards of imprisonment. When stability and uniformity are 
not present, inmates look to other standards to judge their conditions...[W]here 
administrators and guards are powerful, unified and competent, the conditions of 
imprisonment themselves seem more legitimate; the captors are seen as authoritative 
rather than merely powerful” (Useem and Kimball 1989: 219). 
Useem and Kimball’s analysis is in line with British work on the significance of legitimacy in 
producing order within prisons and identifying  the conditions in which ‘captives’ consent to 
the regime (see Sparks, 1994; Sparks and Bottoms, 1995; Sparks et al., 1996). A central 
feature of the legitimacy thesis on both sides of the Atlantic (both the USA and UK) is that of 
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injustice as a major symptom of delegitimized prisons. One participant responding to whether 
today the Cypriot prison environment is broken asserted: 
Prison Staff 4: Without any shadow of doubt. Prisoners do not have twenty-four hour 
access to toilets, adequate food and those who are willing to riot find themselves in 
isolation for days. Does all this sound like a well organised and ordered prison? 
Useem and Kimball (1989) argue that in well-managed prisons with adequate resources, 
prisoners perceive the prison surroundings as acceptable. In a similar vein, Jackson et al., 
(2010) suggests that prisoners who perceive the prison regime to be legitimate, believe that 
the prison should have rules and those rules should be followed. However, the notion of 
legitimacy in a prison environment has been debated. 
In a widely known paper, Sparks (1994) posed the question if ‘prisons can be legitimate?’ 
Sparks’ (1994) analysis convincingly argues that despite the coercive nature of the state to 
punish, the internal dynamics of prison life rely on prison order and legitimacy. Prisons have 
to fulfil a wide range of functions that in many cases compete with each other. Liebling 
(2011) commented on the dynamic of legitimacy in respect to power holders such as the 
prison staff and argues that obedience of rules is an ongoing process negotiated by the 
behaviour of both the captives and captors. Despite the coercive root of prison life, prisoners 
have to comply with established rules and prison offices have to ensure that rules are 
enforced in a fair and consistent manner. Scholars such as Sparks et al., (1996) and Carrabine 
(2005) emphatically argue that established rules and forms of compliance reflect on current 
conditions of prison life such as safety, humanity and standards of living but also indicate 
current thinking on moral beliefs about treating confined individuals with dignity and respect.  
Carrabine (2005) challenged the central premise of legitimacy arguing that what appears to 
be a cohesive prison environment cannot be necessarily viewed as an indication of 
compliance and higher legitimacy but rather a ‘dull compulsion of rituals’ where resignation 
and acceptance of powerlessness within the penitentiary produces obedience amongst 
prisoners. Thus, it is not clear whether rule obedience is strictly an acquisition of the regime 
or whether it can be explained by internal dynamic factors such as trust, feeling safe and 
secure and having good relationships with prison staff (see further Brunton-Smith and 
McCarthy, 2015). 
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Crewe’s (2011a) analysis on ‘soft power’ utilized by prison staff in order to provide a more 
meaningful form of engagement with prisoners can enhance legitimacy, however the role of 
the prison officer is of paramount significance if they do not perform these roles in a 
consistent way (Brunton- Smith and McCarthy, 2015). Nonetheless, the role of prison 
officers can be altered due to the ‘institutional’ culture, as participants have articulated: 
Prison Staff 1: …I was constantly reminded of my duties, I remember once; one of the 
administrators told me that building relationships with prisoners is not something that 
he will advise new prison guards of doing because we are not getting paid for that. 
Another day I was told that prisoners are not my friends and I shouldn’t trust them, 
because the negative image of us is merely caused by them and their silly complaints. 
Prison staff 4: We [have] been told to ‘filter’ anything prisoners are saying or 
suggesting. When I first started, like anyone else I wanted to help and be close to 
them [prisoners], because I know how important it is to develop a good and ‘healthy’ 
relationship with prisoners. However, I soon realised that the association with 
prisoners was based on a strict and distrustful basis… for example prisoners from 
time-to-time were approaching for a little chat and I found most of my colleagues and 
superiors unwilling to engage in any form of conversation. 
Similarly Crewe (2011b) found the interaction of public British prison staff with prisoners 
based on a culture of cynicism and suspicion. What is clear from existing work on prison 
legitimacy from the perspective of prisoners is that it depends on a variety of factors such as 
the organisational culture, prison conditions and actions of prison staff. Additionally, 
participant narratives of this study, suggest that there are some prison group that have 
experienced prison as less legitimate: 
Head of the Anti-Discriminatory Body: The state of the prison from the top to bottom 
was appalling. Our office came across insidious behaviours and attitudes mainly from 
the administration office. Last year we were refused entry to the prison after prisoners 
complained about the obligatory shave and haircut. The rules and regulations are not 
followed by all prisoners, for example, Cypriot prisoners enjoy more privileges and 
comforts and are often acting as the owners of the prison… very often prison staff and 
guards sneak in letters and traditional food to Cypriot prisoners, and if my job taught 
me a lesson it is that these practices have catastrophic consequences for both prisoners 
and prison staff. 
Cheliotis and Liebling (2006) found that prisoners from ethnic minority groups in the UK are 
often more likely to hold negative perceptions of prison legitimacy because of higher 
victimisation incidents, especially amongst black prisoners. In the case of the Cypriot prison 
establishment it could be argued that non-native prisoners are analogous to black prisoners in 
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the UK. For example, the excerpt below states non-native prisoners in Cyprus are very often 
the victims of the unfair exercise of power: 
Prison Staff 3: Despite the fact that foreign national prisoners cooperate with us more, 
we often see them suffering and struggling more with the detention conditions. For 
example, you barely see any Cypriot cleaning the toilets; also privileges and furloughs 
are strictly available to Cypriots only. 
Foreign national prisoners experience a variety of unfair practices ranging from allocation of 
prison tasks to failure to grant privileges and furloughs. However, the disproportionate 
representation of foreign national prisoners added more strain on prisoner staff relations: 
Prison Administrator 7:  While the rules are clear and have to be always in place, not 
all prisoners are aware of them. We have to take into consideration the serious 
communication barriers that we witness and the difficulties that ensue. We detain 
people from many corners of the world and as you can imagine, the people are 
carrying with them their own culture and customs. More often we feel a bit frustrated 
when we have to repeat what the rules are. 
7.3.2.1 Legitimacy and the problem of visibility  
Fitzgerald and Sims (1982) saw the problem of visibility functioning as a suppressive agent 
for securely establishing prison legitimisation. Garland (1990) argues that modern institutions 
of punishment are less accessible and much more secretive and socially invisible than the 
punishment of former times. The operation and function of the CJN demonstrates this by 
remaining an enigma to the general public. The public has limited knowledge of what really 
exists behind the high walls and barbed wire fences and are ill-informed of the prison rules 
and regulations, how prisoners live and how the system operates in general. The below 
excerpts recognize prison secrecy with many prison incidents going unnoticed. The following 
participants stated:  
Officer of the Commissioner for Administration Office: In confinement areas the lack 
of contact and minimal visibility for the general public gives ground for unpleasant 
situations to happen. To be more specific, it was the lack of visibility - and therefore 
real knowledge - that created the preconditions for the rapes, suicides and self-harm 
that occurred within our Central Jail. 
Senior Counsel of the Republic: Access to the Central Jail of Nicosia is restricted and 
therefore it is very difficult for the public to see and understand the proper levels of 
pain, despair and perhaps violence that prisoners have to put up with every day. 
While secrecy behind prison walls has been slowly breached in many jurisdictions, in others 
the internal operation is still shrouded in a veil of secrecy in which prisoners’ correspondence 
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is censored (see further Cheliotis, 2012). The exposure of prisons with severe and chronic 
challenges can decrease the legitimacy of the institution. Fitzerald and Sims (1982) argue that 
‘knowledge’ about the prison system threatens to weaken its power if it loses control of 
information about itself (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007). However in the case of the CJN, many 
‘incidents’ of prison disorder have been motivated by the desire to make prisoners’ pains and 
grievances visible. 
7.3.2.2 Corruption and Injustice 
Another central feature of the legitimacy thesis, as presented by participant narratives for this 
study, is that of corruption and injustice. Liebling’s work (2011) identified the idea that the 
moral quality of prison life depends heavily on the attitudes and conduct of prison officers. 
Prison work is about the use of power and authority deployed through human relationships 
with its subjects, namely prisoners and prison staff (Liebling, 2011). Relationships that are 
based on power and moral climates produce emotions that are observable and follow patterns. 
What is distinctive about the work of the prison officer is the enduring harmonisation of their 
work towards welfare, discipline, care and/or power (Liebling, 2011). Prison officers have to 
negotiate their authority on a daily basis with a dubious and complex crowd through 
interaction, where the application of rules ‘by the book’ is non-viable (Liebling, 2011). This 
is an inherently tricky and unstable issue.  
When discussing the current problems of the prison establishment, corruption and injustice 
were addressed as perennial problems. Historically, prison corruption has been a persistent 
and pervasive feature of corrections, periodically erupting in the form of scandals that are 
usually brought to our attention by the press. No prison is immune from this challenge and in 
the case of the CJN in recent years, major prison scandals involving prison staff have 
emerged. For many years prisoners and their families have repeatedly accused prison 
personnel of accepting bribes, organizing pardons, arranging transfers to open prison, and 
smuggling objects that significantly improve prisoners’ lives behind bars. In relation to 
corruption, participants narrated a wide range of instances ranging from romantic liaisons to 
the smuggling of illegal substances: 
 Prison staff 1: Yes, corruption exists in here [prison] but we are not all corrupt. We 
don’t have to generalise… After all those years working in the prison, I have 
developed a friendly relationship with few of the prisoners, who too often share with 
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me many of their secrets. They often tell me how much they paid my colleagues for 
having a mobile phone, a bottle of whisky, drugs, even to mediate for a transfer to the 
open prison. Prisoners always ask for all sorts of things… there is nothing wrong with 
asking, prisoners are usually often hopeless and desperate and they will try 
everything. 
Prison staff 4: Corruption amongst prison staff is a serious problem in here [prison]…. 
Well I know cases where prisoners were allowed to talk with their relatives and 
lawyers two or three times per day by paying of course, or other cases more extreme, 
where my colleagues were ‘caught’ in sexual relationships with prisoners. You cannot 
control your feelings, especially in this environment. 
Cavadino and Dignan (2007) highlight how the sense of injustice within prisons is inflamed 
by grievances concerning the prison regime, the behaviour of prison staff and the prison 
disciplinary system in general. Further to this, Sparks et al. (1996) claim that fair procedures 
and consistent outcomes are central elements of legitimate prison establishments, by arguing 
that there are: 
“...a number of facets of legitimacy relevant to the maintenance of order and the 
incidence of disorder in prisons. Amongst these, one would certainly have to include 
the centrality of fair procedures and... consistent outcomes. A third component 
concerns the quality of behaviour of officials - regarded in some quite strong sense 
as representing the system. Fourthly it is possible that the basic regime of the 
institution - its accommodation, services, and activities - may itself be regarded as 
illegitimate in failing to meet commonly expected standards [cf. Woolf 1991]. 
Therefore one can envisage circumstances under which institutions meet some of 
these criteria but not others. A procedurally ‘correct’ and bureaucratically efficient 
regime might simply fail on grounds of impersonality and lack of humaneness [Jacobs, 
1977], perhaps helping to explain why prison disorders can occur in brand new, 
uncrowded, well resourced facilities” (Sparks et al. 1996: 89, emphasis in original). 
In the case of the CJN, a great obstacle in achieving justice and legitimacy is the 
disproportionate negative outcomes of procedural injustice experienced by non-national 
prisoners (see further Jackson et al, 2010). The Council of Europe for example, on many 
occasions has emphasised how the Cypriot prison system suffers from a major racial 
imbalance (CPT, 2004; 2008; 2013). According to Cheliotis and Liebling (2006), a prison 
social system cannot be understood without reference to institutional controls and the racial 
dynamics of how prisoners are treated by staff. Today, foreign national prisoners make up 
seventy percent of the prison population, thus race inequality can be identified from the 
overrepresentation of non-nationals and in specific outcomes experienced by this group of 
prisoners (Jackson et al., 2010).  
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Prison Administrator 7: Foreign nationals are a group of prisoners that is prone to 
suffer unjust practices. Unlike Cypriots, foreign national prisoners are not aware of 
their rights and this often leads to controversies and fights. To a degree, Cypriot 
prisoners bother us less with complains and moaning around unfair treatment. 
It seems likely that unequal effects are experienced by prisoners from ethnic minority groups, 
which in turn have an impact on prison legitimacy. Jackson et al., (2010), emphasise the 
notion of injustice amongst prisoners from ethnic minority groups who suffer a systematic 
failure of procedure, namely a lack of fair treatment, not understanding the rules and how 
they are to be applied consistently and fairly and lack of neutrality in decision making and 
treatment. Disproportionate use of force, loss of privileges, and a greater use of segregation 
are important elements in explaining disrespect, a denial of voice and most importantly the 
failure to exercise control and authority in a fair and unbiased manner. The excerpt below 
perhaps elucidates further the unequal outcomes experienced by individuals from ethnic 
minority groups within the Cypriot prison system: 
Commissioner for Administration: Just like every core element of our criminal justice 
system, the Central Jail of Nicosia undergoes its own weaknesses and limitations. 
Prison staff attributes for example, are a vital element when dealing with a diverse 
racial and ethnic prison population, especially when the majority of the prison 
population consists of individuals of different cultures. Today, foreign national 
prisoners suffer from high levels of verbal and physical abuse, fear, mistrust, 
emotional deprivations and injustice”. 
This view clearly anticipates the importance of legitimacy in creating fair and unbiased 
procedures for all prisoners, and as Sparks and Bottoms (1995) put it: 
“…every instance of brutality in prisons, every casual racist joke and demeaning 
remark, every ignored petition, every unwarranted bureaucratic delay, every inedible 
meal, every arbitrary decision to segregate or transfer without giving clear and 
unfounded reasons, every petty miscarriage of justice, every futile and inactive period 
of time – is delegitimating” (Sparks and Bottoms, 1995, p: 60).  
7.5 Concluding remarks 
The present chapter has revealed the current challenges of the Cypriot prison system within a 
radical pluralistic framework. The prison is suffering from a serious material crisis of 
resources including space, equipment, food and levels of prison guards. However, material 
resources are only one facet of the crisis as deeper rooted problems exist, stressing the 
ideological dimension of the system. The lack of legitimacy for example, emphasises how 
authority breakdown, corruption, injustice and violence are not merely the direct outcomes of 
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a significant growth in the prison population, a reduced prison budget or of adequate prison 
buildings - although these factors contribute significantly - it is the result of what people 
believe; a moral reaction of people within and outside of the prison system. The crisis of 
legitimacy as indicated and analysed in this chapter is of paramount importance because of 
the need of the prison establishment to legitimate itself with different groups of people such 
as the prison staff and most importantly the penal subjects. Prisoners in Cyprus are indeed 
suffering from substantial injustice, corruption, coercion and deprivation and the crisis is 
unlikely to be resolved unless those symptoms are mitigated. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This study has provided a wealth of information of the causal factors for the rise in the prison 
population and the problems this brings in the prison system. The causes of the rise in prison 
population are extensive and significant factors have had an impact. These factors vary 
significantly across cultures and are relatively attached to party politics and a more punitive 
crime policy. This study showed how the financial downturn in Cyprus was turned by 
politicians into a criminogenic tool against immigrants and asylum seekers, which is reflected 
in recent developments of migration policy. The analysis carried out was primarily based on 
qualitative semi-structured interviews and has worked on many levels of analysis to connect 
the rise and challenges of the prison population with the structures, processes and ideologies 
that underpin them. As Loader (1998) argues: 
“Criminological inquiry cannot be pursued adequately without posing some 
fundamental questions about order, power, authority, legitimacy and social justice” 
(p: 201). 
The critical realist framework employed for this study assisted to uncover evidence which 
supports the suggestion that the dramatic rise in the use of imprisonment in Cyprus has 
significant social, political and economic components. In Cyprus, the rise in the prison 
population cannot be explained by differences in crime rates. Instead, the prison expansion is 
associated with punitive political structures and public sentiments and stresses the 
significance of the welfare state. This study finds evidence to suggests that the examination 
of the Cypriot prison establishment (including its physical structure, facilities, regime, 
untoward incidents and staff profiles) shines a spotlight on the nature of its society because 
this where the evidence of decisions about order and control, punishment and segregation, are 
felt the most.  
Regarding the problems that the Cypriot prison establishment is facing, a myriad of issues 
have been identified and analysed. This study has provided evidence suggesting that the CJN 
is seeing a series of challenges to its legitimacy, which are evident in recent episodes of 
prison unrest and the rise in self-harm and suicide. The most significant episode regarding 
legitimacy depicted for this study is the ‘January events’, a jumble of ‘crises’ including 
penological and material resources like buildings, staff, programmes, equipment and money. 
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Another important crisis is that of visibility and concerns the secrecy that shrouded the prison 
establishment for many years. The genesis of the ‘January events’ as shown in Chapter 7, was 
the result of a crisis in legitimacy due to deep grievances. The absolute level of deprivation 
and indignities visited on the oppressed led to a cathartic episode rebelling against prison 
conditions - particularly around issues like injustice and corruption. 
This chapter aims to summarise the main findings of the study and discuss their implications. 
While exploring the causal factors behind the rise in the prison population in Cyprus, it has 
been found that the increased fear of crime was driven by a rather populist criminal justice 
policy. The issue of crime is a decisive tool adopted by politicians in order to pass tough 
penal policies for political benefit. Today crime control policy is dominated by punitive 
mentalities, particularly towards immigrants and refugees.  
Additionally this study suggests that since hyper-penalisation has a negative impact on the 
prison population, it is important to implement a decriminalisation strategy especially 
towards immigration policies.  
8.2 Research Findings: a return to the study’s questions 
The following section will revisit the questions posed for the study: 
1. Why is the prison population rapidly growing in the Central Jail of Nicosia?  
2. In relation to the on-going growth of the prison population, what type of challenges 
is the Central Jail of Nicosia currently facing? 
8.2.1 Factors that impact the prison population 
This study finds evidence suggesting that penal populism in Cyprus has enabled politicians to 
pursue new political agendas on crime and punishment that appear to be driven by their crude 
and punitive appeal and not by evidence of their efficacy (see further Pratt, 2007). In Cyprus, 
political representatives and leaders have developed a style of politics that characterises penal 
policy-making by simplistic solutions to complex problems such as crime and imprisonment. 
The net result of this new style of politics in Cyprus has given the opportunity to populist 
politicians to develop strong ties with extra-establishment forces, all of whom claim to speak 
on behalf of the public. Populist politicians reach out to these groups for support and to 
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constitute a good indicator for policy development, leading policies into a divisive and 
schismatic penal apparatus (Pratt, 2007, 2008, 2011). 
Instead of leading penal changes, government bureaucracies appear to have less influence 
over them and hand over their former space to extra-establishment forces and the public 
mood, willing to pursue the public’s ideas rather than pursuing their own. Of course, 
politicians play a crucial role. It is not the public’s punitive stances and views towards crime 
and prisoners but politicians’ encouragement towards punitive laws and sentences (Pratt 
2008, 2011). The findings for this study suggest that punitive laws and sentences are 
improving politicians’ re-election chances, who arrogantly claim to know ‘what is best’ for 
‘our people’. These politicians have repeatedly failed to create effective and inclusive penal 
policies and constantly sensationalise the presence of foreigners and immigrants. 
Additionally, this study suggests that public opinion in Cyprus has become the main driver of 
recent penal policymaking decisions and initiatives. For example, populist punitiveness has 
been focused around three goals: to reduce crime by creating more penalties; to reaffirm 
moral consensus against certain offences and lastly to achieve electoral gains by responding 
to public discourse demanding harsher punishment/penalties. Political representatives in 
Cyprus appear to be very responsive to public opinion. Such responsiveness is an alienable 
right of representative democracy, as politicians do not want to stray too far from the wishes 
of their electorate. The recent examination of populism politics in Cyprus has revealed that 
political actors are promoting penal policies that are incredibly attractive to the public but are 
highly unfair and ineffective (Simon, 2007). An example of this is the amendment of the 
Immigration Law in 2015, which shows a conscious intention to use the politics of crime as a 
vehicle for re-election (see further Simon, 2007). 
When it comes to ask the question why penal populism emerges in Cyprus, the findings for 
this study are straightforward. The first point to make is that of growing anxiety among the 
Cypriot middle class in recent years about social order in the face of rapid social change. 
Over the last fifteen to twenty years, Cyprus’ modernisation has caught the attention of 
political parties which then used crimes rates as a political priority (see further Simon, 2007). 
However, in the case of Cyprus this has happened in periods where crime rates were 
declining, whilst the sense of insecurity about crime and ‘get tough’ approaches are still 
dominant and powerful (see further Garland, 2001; Roberts et al., 2003). This by default 
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creates the public’s responsiveness to political discourse which posits security threats in 
simplistic and direct way and then offers equally simple responses to these perceived threats. 
This has resulted in the unwillingness of the Cypriot public to marginalise in the setting of 
penal agenda (see further Inglehart, 1977). This study suggests that the Cypriot public 
appears to be outside the formal policy making process in an ugly and punitive disposition 
(Ryan 2003).  
In Cyprus, penal populist movements have been found in parties all across the political 
spectrum with political actors defending the rights of the public at large and concurrently the 
withdrawal of rights from those who pose a danger. The research shows that the majority of 
the society holds the moral absolutism of penal policies. Thus penal policies are in line with 
the (moral) aspirations of the majority, consequently the criminal justice balance is shifting 
away from the interests of criminals towards law-abiding citizens (Karstedt, 2001, 2015). 
This explains recent developments in the continuous and structural police relationship with 
the local community. 
The sense of anger and resentment over law and order problems gives the opportunity to 
populist politicians to link these issues with concerns about immigration. Views such as ‘they 
are not coming here with good intentions’ or ‘crime is their blood, we have to send them back 
to their countries immediately’ have been expressed extensively in Cyprus in recent times. 
Populist discourses on the connection between criminal activity and immigration have been 
found in mainstream political parties. While the political right has invested on the ‘tough on 
crime’ mantra, the political centre and left have abandoned their longstanding position of 
fighting crime and its causes by focusing on the reduction of social inequalities. 
Combating this populist drift is not easy. Promoting public knowledge of crime and 
punishment has been a core focus in international research (see further Indermaur and Hough, 
2002; Hough and Roberts, 2004); however, these research recommendations cannot be 
transferred to Cyprus without taking into consideration its penal culture. The availability and 
accessibility of criminological data in Cyprus is deeply problematic when reflecting on how 
to engage the public in penal agenda. The Cypriot public possesses little accurate information 
about crime or imprisonment rates - which are proxies to public opinion - with media and 
political discourse the only easily available sources of information about crime.  
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8.2.2 The significance of crimmigrants 
Public attitudes and opinions are likely to influence crime policy as governments take public 
sentiments and attitudes seriously when creating and implementing penal policies (Roberts et 
al., 2003). In this study immigration plays a fundamental role, considering that in Cyprus 
immigrants constitute 10% of the total population. In this study, the issue of ‘immigration and 
crime’ was examined, where immigrants were not only held responsible for the rise in 
criminality, but also being held responsible for other social problems such as unemployment. 
Today, in Cyprus immigrants are supposedly carrying a criminogenic effect ( see further 
Bosworth, 2008, Bosworth and Kaufman, 2008; Bosworth 2011; Bosworth and Guild, 2011; 
Aas 2005, 2007; Melossi, 2003, 2013a, 2013b). The ‘deviant’ migrant has a central role to 
play in political and media discourse, and is emphasised in the purifying filter aiming to 
protect the local and national identity from ‘threatening’ and ‘unwanted’ mobilities (Aas, 
2005; 2007; 2001; 2013). One of the significant discoveries for this study is the xenophobic 
and intolerant political discourse, which together with disproportionately high rates of 
imprisonment amongst ethnic minority groups in Cyprus, clearly indicates that the culture of 
crime and punishment is dangerously racialized. Regrettably, media portrayals of criminal 
activity of immigrants feed the public’s fears and anxieties and taking into consideration the 
mutual beneficial patronage between politicians and media executives in Cyprus, the causes 
of the ill-informed opinion of the Cypriot public becomes clear. According to Garland 
(2001), the recurrent image of offenders is racialized and requires regulation; today in 
Cyprus, current political discourse towards immigrants and refugees is often discriminatory 
and stresses the negative ‘consequences’ from the ‘excessive numbers’ 'waves’, ‘chords’, and 
‘floods’ of non-natives residing in Cyprus at present. Furthermore, racist, discriminatory and 
xenophobic political discourse towards immigrants and refugees have been exacerbated by 
two significant factors: the advent of the financial crisis in 2013 and the war in the Syria.  
Since the financial crisis broke, dominant political discourse in Cyprus has increasingly 
focused on common property and violent crimes, especially those crimes that are associated 
with foreigners and immigrants.  Whilst a small proportion of those interviewed expressed a 
sympathetic attitude towards refugees from Syria and other Middle Eastern states, the vast 
majority of the politicians used the small size of Cyprus and the unsolved ‘Cyprus problem’ 
to articulate their ‘concerns’ with the immigrants’ presence. In addition, the punitive shift of 
penal and extra-penal regulation of migration can be understood better by the process of 
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hyper-criminalisation of immigrants and recent illegalisation developments. As a matter of 
fact, over the last decade immigration policies saw significant changes; however, in 2013 the 
addition of ten penal sanctions restricting migration from particular countries such as Syria, 
Palestine, Egypt and Libya indicates a degree of selectivity. Additionally, findings for this 
study are in line with international studies that show a general climate of selective penal 
practices often framed in racialized language that postulates self-evident links between some 
nationalities and particular types of crimes (see further Di Georgi, 2010). 
The nexus of crime and illegal immigration was central to the political agenda of the national 
elections in March 2013, when certain political parties - mainly to the right and centre of the 
political spectrum - openly invited citizens to join with them against ‘those who pose a threat’ 
to the country’s sovereignty. This created the conditions of a ‘national emergency’ that made 
the atmosphere conductive to chauvinistic nationalism and racism (Bosworth 2008b, 
20011b). This study suggests that political parties have moved away from traditional 
populistic attitudes towards penal nationalism, promoting extreme penal stances and 
responses (Haney, 2016). Today the Cypriot culture of crime and punishment is based on 
penal nationalism sentiments with stronger penal discourse that is elaborated in critical 
moments. Penal nationalism is a vital instrument for small law and order parties, however as 
the findings of this study suggests, they can be found in mainstream political parties as well 
such as DHKO and DHSY. Penal nationalist discourse revolves around the ‘people’ and 
‘nation’ and crime control is seen as a matter of national protection, a vital characteristic for 
national survival. In the case of Cyprus national survival is of paramount significance if one 
considers that the country is still divided.  
8.2.3 Welfare 
Welfare ideals appeared to be a dynamic factor in the rise of the prison population within this 
study. Over the last twenty years, Wacquant (2009a) succeeded to set the foundations of 
penal policy and practice from a political economy perspective (Cheliotis and Xenakis, 
2010). Wacquant (2009a) elaborates that neoliberalism is based upon four institutional logics: 
economic deregulation, the withdrawal of welfare investment, individual responsibility and 
punitive penal responses. However, as this study suggests, neoliberalism is not a convenient 
descriptive typology but entails diversified and complex institutional features. For example, 
applying neoliberal penality in the case of Cyprus, it is evident that Wacquant does not pay 
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enough attention to significant national historical specificities. This omission hinders 
significant insights into the relationship between neoliberalism and penality. Indeed, Cyprus 
is tempted to import ‘superpower’ crime control policies incubated in the USA which then 
spread across Europe. Also, the findings of this study suggest that Cyprus is not exempt from 
the recent international trend in punitive upsurge. However, Cyprus’s turbulent history and 
ongoing ethnic strife saw intense periods of punitiveness. Furthermore, true to its peripheral 
status of the world economy, Cyprus followed a different route to the road of capitalism 
compared to other European countries. However, recent privatisation planning – including 
the Central Jail of Nicosia – does reflect the notion of neoliberalism and Wacquant’s 
arguments. With regard to the withdrawal of welfare investment withdraw, although the 
levels of social expenditure have seen an upward trend over the last fifteen years, the pattern 
of its internal contribution remains uneven (Andreotti et al., 2001). As this study suggests, the 
Cypriot welfare state has a recent history of colonial dominance where past and on-going 
ethnic and political strife have significantly weakened the democratic structure of the state. 
Furthermore, the political system of the welfare system appeared more prone to crisis than 
those in central Europe or in Scandinavia. Indeed, the findings of this study are in line with 
significant international observers (Cheliotis, 2013; Tappio-Saappala, 2007) highlighting that 
the welfare state in Cyprus is more vulnerable to partisan pressure. Additionally the weak 
state is now dealing with social issues such as poverty and immigration in a punitive and 
exclusionary penal response fuelled by insecurity which has been exacerbated by the ongoing 
financial crisis. Today, the Cypriot political culture is based on a welfare chauvinistic agenda 
where welfare protections and entitlements have become highly racialized.  
8.3 Prison challenges 
Regarding the second question, a number of serious challenges have been unearthed. While 
the prison population continues to grow, the money and resources to deal with this growth are 
limited, especially in financially stagnated periods where austerity measures prevail in every 
aspect of social life. The findings of this study suggest that the prison establishment in 
Cyprus is in a state of crisis; which consists of two main aspects, penological resources and 
legitimacy. The correction institution in Cyprus is facing a serious problem of limited 
resources such as space and the number of prison officers. The prison suffers from chronic 
overcrowding that contributes to the bad physical conditions within. In addition, this thesis 
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empirically deconstructs how poor conditions affect staff as well as prisoners, contributing to 
low staff morale. Apart from the poor conditions, the CJN has recorded minimal medical care 
for prisoners, with severe shortages of medical staff. Prisons have special requirements for 
provision of healthcare and in the case of Cyprus healthcare provisions are minimal in both 
assessment and intervention. While the prison population continues to grow, the number of 
medical and mental health staff is persistently low and prisoners with mental health issues 
and chronic addictions are observed periodically, a factor that is undermining prisoner 
welfare and well-being. Due to the fact that mental health screening is not obligatory, 
prisoner levels of self-harm and suicide saw a significant increase over the last three years.  
Findings of this study suggest that the crisis of penological resources affects not only the 
prison system but spreads to the entire penal system. This includes the courts and the 
probation service which is responsible for the implementation of non-custodial sentences. 
This generates an imperative to minimise the numbers of admissions (perhaps by 
decriminalising certain offences) and to deal with more offenders without using custodial 
sentences, serving them in the community instead. Another aspect of the crisis is that of the 
lack of resources that offer prisoners constructive and fulfilling ways of spending their time. 
For this study, the material aspect of the crisis was core to describing the current state of the 
penal system however this is only one aspect of a fuller picture (see further Cavadino and 
Dignan, 2007) 
For this study, the crisis of penological resources is based on material resources whereas the 
crisis of legitimacy is ideological in nature and comes down to the moral right to wield power. 
Legitimacy within prisons means authority used rightfully or power exercised within 
established rules standards and values (Liebling, 2011, p: 486). The multi-layered 
examination of the Cypriot penal system suggests that it faces a number of challenges to its 
legitimacy, evident in recent episodes of prison unrest and the rise in incidents of self-harm 
and suicide. Legitimacy is not a fixed occurrence, but it rather constitutes a perpetual 
discussion and dialogue between prison staff and those subjected to the exercise of power see 
further (Sparks et al., 1996; Sparks and Bottoms, 1996; Tyler, 2006, 2010; Jackson et al., 
2010). This concept of the dialogic dynamic of prison legitimacy places particular attention 
on the relationship between prison staff and prisoners and as the findings of this study 
suggest, acceptability of power can be achieved by the appropriate attitude and conduct of 
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power holders (Liebling, 2011). Authority and power within the CJN are not ‘things’ but 
insinuate an interpretative process that is continually required, interrupted, disrupted and 
required again. The main discoveries of this study are in line with British work on the 
importance of legitimacy, in identifying circumstances in which prisoners consent to 
authority - the proxy of the legitimacy thesis - and prison regimes (Sparks, 1994; Sparks and 
Bottoms, 1995; Sparks et al., 1996).  A central finding of this study is the breakdown in the 
administrative control and operation of the Cypriot prison establishment with poor 
communication between prison staff and prisoners, scandals, incoherent rules, injustice and 
corruption. In effect, it is the disorganisation of the prison rather the organisation of prisoners 
that caused the ‘January events’. 
Undoubtedly, the ‘January events’ - a term first coined by this study - constitute the biggest 
legitimacy episode of penal history in Cyprus. An explanation of these events has exposed 
structural circumstances of imprisonment (material conditions, power relationships, 
grievances, coercion and state organisation) that require immediate action and restoration. 
The analysis of the structural circumstances of imprisonment has revealed a deep set of 
grievances such as inhumane and degrading prison conditions, meagre material conditions, 
poor health provisions, coercion, resentment, and an arbitrary use of power. Therefore, the 
derivation of the ‘January events’ could be better understood by taking into consideration the 
institution’s cultural, environmental and material context. A significant element of the 
relationship between the ‘January events’ and the deep set of grievances is that of visibility. 
The Central Jail of Nicosia is shrouded in a veil of secrecy, with the public having limited 
information on its physical structure, facilities, regime, untoward incidents, staff profiles and 
numbers and prisoner profiles and numbers, all factors that exacerbate the legitimacy thesis. 
The problem with secrecy is that many incidents of prison disorder are motivated by the 
desire to make prisoners grievances and allegations more visible to the wider public. 
Furthermore in the Central Jail of Nicosia, particular changes in achieving justice and 
legitimacy are the consistent and disproportionate outcomes experienced by ethnic minority 
groups (see further Jackson et al., 2010; Tyler, 2003). These disproportionate outcomes occur 
in a prison system that suffers from a fundamental race imbalance with prisoners from ethnic 
minority groups accounting for seventy percent of the total prison population (see further 
Council of Europe, 2014). Prisoners from ethnic minority groups are most commonly the 
victims of procedural injustice. This study’s discoveries are in line with international research 
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evidence which suggests that within the Cypriot prison system, prisoners from ethnic 
minority groups are disproportionately experiencing a greater use of segregation and lower 
levels of privileges, which in turn communicates disrespect, a denial of voice, and a failure to 
wield authority in a fair and unbiased manner (see further Jackson et al., 2010, Tyler 2003, 
2010). 
Indisputably, the crisis of legitimacy is related to an underlying political crisis which 
surpasses the prison walls (Fitzerald and Sim, 1982). The inequitable constitution of the 
prison population and the role of imprisonment, for example addresses the political crisis of 
penal legitimacy. The Central Jail of Nicosia disproportionately holds drug and property 
offenders, those with addictions, the mentally ill and finally those from ethnic minority 
communities. In Cyprus, the law enforcement agencies are exclusively focused on the 
criminality and punishment of the sub-proletariat which simply underscores the political 
illegitimacy of current penal affairs and uses of imprisonment (see further O’Donell, 2016, 
Handbook on Prisons). This political illegitimacy calls us to stop reformatting and 
regurgitating the aims of punishment and urges us to start engaging in critical thinking of 
alternative ways of punishing criminals and also appeals for greater promotion of human 
rights, social justice and democratic ideals ( O’Donell, 2016). 
8.4 Originality and contribution to the current state of knowledge 
This PhD thesis aims to explore the causes in the rise of the prison population and to identify 
the challenges that the Cypriot prison establishment may face. The current state of knowledge 
in the field of comparative research consists of studies stemming from the micro (who) and 
macro (why) and seeks to understand what changes have caused the surge in the prison 
population. Recent findings of comparative studies exploring variations in the use in 
imprisonment included explanatory factors such as the crime levels (Tonry, 2001; Garland, 
2001), social indicators such as investment in welfare programmes (Beckett and Western, 
2001; Downes and Hansen, 2006), public punitivity and fear of crime (Hought and Roberts, 
2005) and variations in political structures and forms of democracy (Lacey, 2010) (see further 
Tapio Sappala, 2011; Karsdedt, 2010). Although innovative approaches and implications 
have been discussed throughout this research, it is important to devote a sub-section to 
originality in this concluding chapter. The uniqueness of this thesis takes two forms including 
the theoretical orientation, and method and methodology.   
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8.4.1 Theoretical contribution to knowledge 
This PhD study offers an innovative analytical and methodological approach in comparative 
analysis of punishment in penal politics. It combines rigorous examination of the explanatory 
factors behind the rise in rates of incarceration and the challenges this may bring to the 
penitentiary.  The motivation for carrying out such a research is well summarised by Karstedt 
(2001): 
“The concept of culture has moved from the periphery to the very centre of scientific 
investigation, and culture figures as a primary rather than dependent variable in global 
change. Criminology has made no exception to this development after lingering for 
decades between the Scylla of culture-blindness and the Charybdis of extreme cultural 
relativism. In a recent interview, Nils Christie argued that criminal justice policy is 
“cultural policy,” and as such much less determined by crime rates than by the 
cultural identity that a nation wants to achieve” (p: 286). 
Indeed, the concept of culture has recently emerged at the core of criminology. Many 
criminologists argue that crime and social control are social and cultural phenomena 
(Karstedt, 2001, Garland, 2001, Nelken, 2005).  The ‘crime-incarceration’ mantra does not 
sufficiently address the rise in the prison population between the member states. Through 
comparative analysis, this PhD thesis discusses how the politicisation of crime has resulted in 
increased penal punitiveness. Recent ‘symbolic’ politics characterised by a clear cut division 
of discourse between victims and offenders and ‘us’ and ‘them’, usually utilised by Cypriot 
populist political actors and political parties in general. In a period of tougher penal policy, 
the passing of legislation for certain offences is of paramount significance because penal 
policy carries a moral logic that is culturally and historically defined. The analytical 
challenge that we must thus address is that of ‘country-specific exceptionalism’, with 
reference to its specific social, political and economic development (Lappi-Seppälä, 2011).  
Various studies in the USA and the UK have shown that adverse economic conditions such as 
unemployment, and income inequality are linked to the rise of criminal activity, particularly 
of violent and property offences. However, in Cyprus politics has not only shaped the 
financial crisis itself but has infused projections of the connectivity between crime and 
financial crisis, for example, the deployment of emotive discourses by dominant politicians 
has increasingly focused on property and violent offences conflating it with immigration. 
This thesis is part of the larger discussion of increasing importance of political and public 
discourse around the ‘criminogenic’ effect of immigrants. Stumph (2006) has argued that the 
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merger of criminal law and immigration law is taking place in many jurisdictions throughout 
the world with the concepts of membership and the borders as central features. 
The recent works on punishment and migration of Bosworth (2008); Aas (2011) and Melossi 
(2013) emphasise the expansion of the mechanisms of borders, which depends heavily on the 
criminalisation of non-citizens.  Brown (2010) argues that sovereignty is a peculiar border 
concept and its meaning denotes supremacy and autonomy; whilst Aas (2011; 2013) argues 
that today the role of border controls is to ensure clear boundaries between insiders and 
outsiders. In the same vein, Aas (2013) and Aliverti (2012) argue that sovereign states imply 
an element of selectivity and that there are several categories of states, those who are 
desirable e.g., students and tourists, and those who are black listed. Dauvergne (2008) affirms 
that illegality does not denote a breach of immigration law but it also entails a pervasive and 
insidious relationship between immigration, crime and insecurity. Despite heavy criticism, 
recently the concept of ‘illegality’ saw a great deal of popularity on political and legal 
discourse that relates to migrants. Melossi (2013) sends symbolic political signals with his 
work ‘Criminalisation of Immigrants’ and the progressive securitisation and criminalisation 
of migration today. Huysman (2006) further indicates a legitimate but complex process of 
exclusionary practices. 
The selection of the Cypriot prison establishment was purposive. Cyprus has the third highest 
number of non-citizens imprisoned. This thesis contributes to existing knowledge largely as it 
fills a gap in knowledge around the Cypriot criminal justice system and penal system. Whilst 
neo-liberalisation has a direct impact on the use of imprisonment in many jurisdictions across 
the world, this bears little relevance to the case of Cyprus due to national historical 
complexities. This thesis suggests that in order to analyse the core events of Wacquant’s neo 
liberal penality e.g. inflated prison rates, lower levels of crime activity, and the over 
presentation of foreigners, drug offenders and the poor in the Cypriot prison establishment, it 
is essential to examine the history of welfare and economic regulation in the country, two 
important requisites of the neoliberal thesis. Due to its peripheral status, Cyprus has a long 
tradition of insufficient investment and spending on welfare expenditure - despite a steady 
increase in recent years - as well as having an under-regulated national economy. 
Undoubtedly, Cyprus has shown a trend in rising punitiveness over recent times. However, 
the turbulent past of the country has also seen intense periods of punitiveness.   
210 
 
This thesis contributes to the field of politics of imprisonment by examining how penal 
politics in the Republic of Cyprus have been built on tough law and order rhetoric that marks, 
excludes and expels those considered transgressive, particularly non-nationals. Thus 
developing a unique Cypriot penal nationalism that equates punitiveness with national 
sovereignty, protection and survival (see further Haney, 2016). Whilst this concept has been 
discussed extensively by Haney (2016) in relation to post-socialist Eastern European nations, 
this thesis shows that in the case of Cyprus, the unsolved ‘Cyprus problem’ along with the 
fact that Cyprus is still an ethnically divided nation, creates a community that requires 
security from the ‘chords’ and ‘waves’ of ‘them’. 
8.4.2 Methodological contribution to knowledge 
The originality of this thesis can be also found in its methodology. This thesis has utilised 
applied empirical research using critical realism as a philosophical and methodological 
framework (see further Fletcher, 2017). Whilst critical realism has been a useful 
philosophical framework within the social sciences, there is scarce empirical evidence of the 
precise methods - including methods of data collection, coding and analysis - best suited to 
the application of critical realism research. The purpose of this study has been to provide a 
critical realist analysis ensuring the typical trajectory of qualitative research project.  
The discoveries of the thesis suggest that the reasons behind the surge in the prison 
population have significant social, economic and political factors. Through an innovative 
methodological and theoretical approach, this research has successfully demonstrated the 
complexity and interconnection of these factors. Today in Cyprus, crime is highly politicized, 
which has resulted in high levels of punitiveness. The new punitive era saw an increase of 
victim-centric penal developments and also a rising concern with national sovereignty and 
survival which then led to the criminalisation of certain forms of movement.  
This critical realist research provides explanation and critique of penal conditions. Therefore, 
it is possible to produce recommendations for action on penal problems. Although 
recommendations are fallible; this thesis bases its recommendations on the identified 
tendencies and causal mechanisms. 
For this critical realist study, interviews provide an important basis for gaining access to 
‘richly textured accounts of events, experiences and underlying conditions or processes, 
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which represent different facets of a complex and multi layered social reality’ (Smith and 
Elger, 2012: p:14). The interviews did focus on participants’ subjective experiences however 
this was without suspending critical analytical ability in the process, since causes and 
underlying conditions are not transparent products of a verbal exchange between interviewer 
and interviewee (see further Smith and Elger, 2012). One important element of this 
qualitative study was also the selection of its participants. Since the qualitative nature for this 
study has been set to examine changes and factors that contributed to the rise in the prison 
population and the challenges that the rise has caused in the prison establishment, the 
‘informants’ were called to make connections brought from their situational knowledge and 
the social mechanisms that operate in their settings. This study, which is the first of its kind, 
has employed ‘key informants’ - those embodied with power or a position (given or won) to 
effect change, have an impact and implement penal policies. 
Whilst thematic analysis is perhaps the most common form of analysis in qualitative research, 
the utilisation of thematic analysis for this study was proven to be an important instrument in 
identifying and analysing patterns (usually referred to as themes) within data (see further 
Braun and Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis is a flexible method of analysis that enables 
‘themes’ to emerge and theoretically sits between the two poles of essentialism and 
constructionism - a key characteristic of the theory of critical realism. For this study, thematic 
analysis acknowledges the ways participants make meaning of their experiences and the 
social contexts impinging those meanings, while remaining focussed on the material and 
limits of ‘reality’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
8.5 Where next? 
Over the past three years Cyprus has been the focus of international attention not only in 
relation to the financial crisis, but also in connection with significant law and order issues. In 
June 2015 (following the risk of a Grexit), the government announced its plans to hand the 
management of the CJN to the private sector due to biting austerity measures, although this 
suggestion continues to face strong opposition. In August 2016, the Minister of Justice and 
Public Order has stated that: 
“The public-private partnership method is the most cost-effective… Constructing new 
prisons is among the issues of top priority to the justice ministry. We feel that 
constructing new prisons through a public-private partnership project appears to be a 
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cost-effective solution, considering the additional operating cost of the current prison, 
as well as the constant needs to repair the premises.” 
During the interview process when asked about the possibility of a prison privatisation the 
Ombudsman stated: 
“I know that the current financial crisis will be used by the government to hand the 
management of the prison to the private sector. Besides, the Ministry of Justice and 
Public Order believes that this is a fair and feasible solution at this time… but it 
[prison privatisation] seems to me quite the opposite. The state has the duty and the 
responsibility to continue the work that has been undertaken hitherto. I understand 
that it is extremely difficult to overcome the existing prison problems, but I do not 
think that privatisation will have a positive effect or rehabilitate our prison… I insist 
that the enforcement of penal processes and decisions is the responsibility of the 
state”. 
Politician 17 (political left) also argued: 
“I will not be surprised, if in five years’ time, the prison will be privatised. These days 
they [government] privatise everything… Prisons are of public trust and if the 
government wishes to hand the administration of the prison to the private sector then I 
am afraid that we will have a problem related to legitimacy”. 
The potential marketisation of the CJN to the private sector has created a new predicament 
for the Cypriot government (see further Garland, 1996; 2001), where the state appears to have 
weak authority and inadequate criminal justice control agencies. The argument around the 
privatisation of the CJN is an adaptive strategy that helps us to understand the volatile 
character of recent penal policies in Cyprus. The proposition of prison privatisation is in line 
with the transnational political project of neoliberalism (Wacquant, 2009a).  
Handing the ownership of the prison to the private sector has been vigorously opposed on a 
number of grounds, for example Sparks, 1994; Harding, 1997 and Moyle, 2001 argue that the 
legitimacy of the distinction between the allocation of punishment and its administration is 
blurred particularly in disciplinary decisions and penalties, transfers, sentence planning and 
parole (Genders, 2002). Over the last four years in Cyprus, the governments’ privatisation 
folder has been bulging at the seams. The government, driven by ideology, is using the 
financial crisis to convert public funds into private profits despite a long trail of failures. 
Current ‘victims’ of the privatisation spirit are the National Telecommunications Service, and 
the Electricity Authority of Cyprus. 
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While the untoward incidents of the ‘January events’ were forgotten - except for trivial 
references in relation to prison conditions - in February 2014, the management of the prison 
attracted the attention of the media, the correctional institution had marked a significant 
development by appointing the first female Acting Prison Governor; however, this positive 
development was soon dashed by her subsequent resignation following a grand scandal 
involving drunk prisoners. Following her resignation, the Ministry of Justice and Public 
Order appointed another woman to the post who has seen innovative prison administration 
practices. The new Acting Prison Governor has enacted significant changes with prisoners 
today being allowed unrestricted telephone calls, an increased number of visits and visitors, 
and Skype communication for foreign national prisoners. Furthermore, prisoners have the 
opportunity to participate in social events inside and outside the prison walls. In July 2016, 
the Ombudsman recognised the efforts of the new governance to establish a fair and stable 
environment and called upon the prison governance to promote and safeguard all forms of 
equality. Similarly, the Council of Europe (CPT, 2015) acknowledged the efforts and 
emphasis given on diversity. For example, in July 2015 the Acting Prison Director was 
criticised heavily by the influential Orthodox Church for accompanying LGBT prisoners to 
the second gay pride parade in Nicosia. This action was seen positively by the Ombudsman 
who claimed that this development ‘is part of a broader effort for radical changes in the 
operation of the prison system in Cyprus’. This prison development is clearly marking a 
different spirit that governs the current administration of the CJN and how the prison 
administration addresses specific taboo issues inside the prison. The current picture of the 
prison does not resemble anything of the image that was created by previous governments 
which saw five convicts lost to suicide. Today, the cells for convicted prisoners are installed 
with air conditioning and recently the prison management updated the female wing with an 
inflatable pool used by female prisoners in order to minimise monotony. 
8.6 The Central Jail of Nicosia and the need for future research 
The data for this study was collected in 2014 at the peak of a financial crisis and at a time 
when the Central Jail of Nicosia faced a number of challenges to its legitimacy, two events 
that have a decisive role in determining the causes of the rise in the prison population and the 
challenges of the prison due to the rising prison population. During the last three years, the 
political situation saw significant changes, countless protests have taking place against social, 
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political and economic conditions and yet the financial state of the country has not improved. 
Whilst a more stable economic environment, the political culture in Cyprus seems unable to 
bring radical changes to perceptions of crime and crime control in general. 
This study is the first empirical attempt to understand why imprisonment rates saw a 
significant growth in the Republic of Cyprus, and critically examines the current challenges 
of the Central Jail of Nicosia. The findings of this study provide substantial and ground-
breaking evidence for future research in relation to the theme of the study. Having found such 
a negative perceptions towards crime and punishment it will be interesting to gain a more up 
to date understanding of the structural forces behind the rise in the prison population by 
carefully examining the state of the penal politics, the inclusiveness of the Welfare state and 
the relationship between crime, punishment and migration. Once the financial situation as 
well as the refugee crisis are improved, the need of re-examining the causes of the rise in the 
prison population will assist to establish a more balanced approach of the factors. 
Research on the Central Jail of Nicosia is scarce but necessary to both the exploration of the 
system and whether and it ‘works’ effectively and meets its claims, and to challenge the 
treatment of prisoners. The exploration of the Cypriot prison establishment was the first 
empirical attempt of this kind and the results as presented in Chapter 7 are ground-breaking. 
This study investigated the challenges of the prison and assisted in the identification of 
‘January events’, the biggest legitimacy episode in Cyprus’ penal history. The study 
presented evidence suggesting that the Cypriot prison establishment suffers from a serious 
material crisis of resources including space, equipment and staff, however, material resources 
are one only facet of the crisis as hidden and deeper problems exist , stressing the ideological 
aspect of the establishment and a fundamental political crisis which move in the prison wall. 
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Appendix 1: Interview Guide 
1. Take me back through the history in your career that brought you to the Cypriot 
criminal justice system. Why did you choose a career in …..? 
 Why did you choose to work for the ….? 
 When did you start your career? 
 Could you describe the sentencing/prison environment when you first started? 
How different is today?  
 
2. Personal experiences 
 How easy is you position in our days? 
 It was easier in the past? Why? 
 Which factors are more likely to affect your role today? 
 Are those factors the same to those ten or fifteen years ago? 
 In your opinion, what types of challenges does the Cypriot criminal justice 
system is currently undergoing? 
 
3.  Criminal justice policy 
 What were the aims of penal policies today? 
 How different are those aims to those ten years ago? 
 Can you provide me with an example of a time when you had to conform to a 
policy with which you did not agree? 
 How punitive are penal policies today? Why? 
 Are current penal policies more concerned with the victim or the offender and 
why? 
 How do you justify the recent increase of the prison population? 
 
4. Offenders 
 How offences have changed over the last ten years? 
 Are offences getting more serious now? 
 Can you describe the characteristics of offenders in courts today? 
 How different were the characteristics of the offenders fifteen years ago? 
5. Immigrants 
 Do you think immigrants pose as a threat in the society? 
 In your opinion, do immigrants contribute to the growth of the prison 
population in Cyprus? 
 In your opinion, do immigrants and foreigners commit more crimes than 
Cypriots? 
 
6. Crime rates 
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 Is crime activity growing in Cyprus nowadays? 
 In your opinion, how crucial is criminality when exploring the rise of the 
prison population? 
 So, to what extent do you agree that the rise in the prison population is caused 
by an increase in the levels of crime? 
 How different was the situation ten years ago? 
 Can you see any changes in relation to the offences? What type of offences 
predominate the Cypriot society today? 
 Do foreign nationals commit more crime than Cypriots? 
 Can you see any other way of dealing with crime apart from imprisonment? 
 
6. Welfare 
 Can meagre welfare provisions cause an increase in criminality? 
 How inclusive is the Cypriot welfare system? 
 How important is welfare spending and investment in your agenda? 
 How effective is your opinion the social protection system in Cyprus? 
 In your opinion does welfare provision distributed and accessed fairly and 
equally? 
 
7. Central Jail of Nicosia 
 
• How could you describe the prison environment today? 
• How different the environment was ten years ago? 
 • In your opinion, what type of challenges does the prison is currently 
undergoing? (Overcrowding conditions, corruption, weak security, rapes, 
self-harm, corruption, racism) 
 
8. “January events” 
 What were the main problems in the prison before the President’s 
intervention? 
 What were the main reasons for the President's intervention to send police 
forces into prison? 
 How improved are the prison conditions today? 
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Appendix 2: Participants’ Background Information 
Participant No Age Gender Occupation 
1 39 Male Prison staff 
2 37 Female Prison staff 
3 45 Male Prison staff 
4 41 Female Prison staff 
5 39 Female Prison staff 
6 58 Male  Prison administrator 
7 59 Male  Prison administrator 
8 63 Male Judge 
9 60 Male Judge 
10 55 Male  Judge  
11 53 Male Judge 
12 57 Male Judge 
13 62 Male Public prosecutor 
14 58 Male Public prosecutor 
15 54 Male Politician (DHSY) 
16 50 Male Politician (DHSY) 
17 60 Male Politician (AKEL) 
18 57 Female Politician  (AKEL) 
19 49 Male Politician (DHSY) 
20 57 Male  Politician (DIKO) 
21 58 Male Politician (DIKO) 
22 57 Male Senior Counsel of the 
Republic 
23 55 Male Counsel of the Republic 
24 62 Female Commissioner for 
Administration 
(Ombudsman) 
25 56 Male Head of the Anti-
Discriminatory Body 
(Ombudsman Office) 
26 34 Female Officer of the 
Commissioner for 
Administration Office 
27 45 Male Officer of the 
Commissioner for 
Administration Office 
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Appendix 3: Research Information Sheet 
School of Arts and Social Sciences – Research Ethics Framework 
Research Information – for participants 
 
To be completed by the researcher and supplied to participants. 
The researcher must ensure the participant has ample time to read all of the information before 
asking them to sign the Participant Consent form (ASS-RE4) 
 
Name of project 
Cypriot Exceptionalism? The future of the penal system in modern Cyprus 
 
Research Organisation 
Northumbria University 
 
Researcher’s name 
Katerina  spyrou 
 
What is the purpose of the research? 
To explore the functioning and operation of the Central Jail of Nicosia. Furthermore, this study sets 
to uncover the true causes of the rise in the Cypriot prison population and to examine the challenges 
of the prison establishment due to the unprecedented levels of the prison population.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The raw material from interviews like interviews transcripts and researcher notes are going to 
remain strictly confidential and will be kept in a safe cabinet until this research comes to an end. 
Also, appropriate and relevant quotes will be used in my thesis and any subsequent publications 
from this (e.g. conference papers). Participants have the right to refuse to grant consent for any 
interview material to be used in future researches or publications. 
 
 
 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
Because your knowledge and expertise is relevant and appropriate to the purpose of this research. 
Additionally your experience, role or position within the Greek- Cypriot Criminal Justice System is 
crucial and appropriate to the main principles posed by this PhD.  
 
 
 
 
 
What will I have to do if I agree to take part? 
Simply answer some questions and talk about your experiences. With your consent the meeting will 
be recorded. The researcher will transcribe the recording and send the transcript to you for factual 
accuracy before using it in any publications. 
 
Will my taking part in this research be kept confidential? 
Anonymity will be given to interviewees who request it, in which case a pseudonym will be agreed or 
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the researcher will refer to an ‘anonymous source’ in any publications.  
 
 
 
Who can I contact for further information 
about this research contact? 
 
  
Professor Mike Rowe 
Dept of Social Sciences 
Northumbria University 
Lipman Building 
Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE1 8ST 
Tel: +44 (0)191 243 7647 
michael.rowe@northumbria.ac.uk  
 
   
Who should I contact if I wish to make a 
complaint or report an incident concerning this 
research? 
 
 Dr Wendy Dyer 
Dept of Social Sciences 
Northumbria University 
Lipman Building 
Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE1 8ST 
Tel: +44 (0)191 227 7468 
wendy.dyer@northumbria.ac.uk  
 
You will be given a copy of this Information Sheet and a copy of the Participant Consent Form 
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 Appendix 4: Research Information Sheet in Greek 
Προς: 
 
                                                                                                            ΣΥΣΤΗΜΕΝΗ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑ ΤΗΛΕΟΜΟΙΟΤΥΠΟΥ 
 
Newcastle upon Tyne   
Αξιότιμη,  
Θέμα:  Συμμετοχή σε συνέντευξη  για ακαδημαϊκή εργασία.  
Ονομάζομαι Κατερίνα Σπύρου και  εργάζομαι   ακαδημαϊκός  συνεργάτης  στο Τμήμα των 
κοινωνικών επιστημών  στο Πανεπιστήμιο Northumbria που εδρεύει στην  πόλη Newcastle Upon 
Tyne στο Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο. Στα πλαίσια της ακαδημαϊκής   μου έρευνας   ετοιμάζω τη  
διδακτορική  διατριβή  μου με τίτλο «Cypriot Exceptionalism? The future of the penal system in 
modern Cyprus», η οποία υποστηρίζεται από το πιο πάνω αναφερόμενο ακαδημαϊκό   ίδρυμα.   
Η  έρευνα μου εστιάζεται  στα  προβλήματα που δημιουργούνται  στη  λειτουργία και 
αποδοτικότητα του κυπριακού σωφρονιστικού συστήματος  ένεκα της αύξησης του πληθυσμού των 
φυλακών και το συγχρωτισμό των υποδίκων και  των καταδικασθέντων για διαφορετικά αδικήματα 
που αφορούν το κοινό ποινικό δίκαιο και τους  επιμέρους ποινικούς νόμους.  Ταυτόχρονα,  
αναδεικνύονται οι μέθοδοι αντιμετώπισης των προβλημάτων που σχετίζονται με το σωφρονιστικό 
σύστημα σε συνάρτηση με το γεγονός  ότι η Κύπρος συνιστά  κέντρο υποδοχής μεταναστών.    Η  
ερευνητική προσέγγιση του πιο πάνω ζητήματος επεκτείνεται στο πεδίο των επιστημών της 
κοινωνιολογίας και της εγκληματολογίας.  
Στόχος  μου είναι η διεκπεραίωση μίας  ολοκληρωμένης  επιστημονικής  διατριβής   μέσω της 
βιβλιογραφικής μεθόδου και της  λήψης  συνεντεύξεων   από αντιπροσώπους  όλων  των  ομάδων  
που σχετίζονται με το σωφρονιστικό σύστημα.  Μέχρι σήμερα έχω λάβει συνεντεύξεις από 
σωφρονιστικούς λειτουργούς, δικαστικούς  λειτουργού και δημόσιους κατήγορους .   
Θεωρώ όμως  ότι η έρευνα μου δε θα ήταν ολοκληρωμένη  χωρίς τη συμμετοχή του τμήματος σας, 
καθώς η συνεισφορά του Επιτρόπου Διοικήσεως στη βελτίωση του  κυπριακού σωφρονιστικού 
συστήματος είναι σημαντική.  Για αυτό το λόγο, θα σας παρακαλούσα να  μου παρέχετε  μία 
σύντομη συνέντευξη σε σχέση με τα πιο πάνω ζητήματα.  
Στο σημείο αυτό θα ήθελα να αναφέρω ότι θα  ήταν μεγάλη μου τιμή να συμμετέχετε στην  έρευνα 
μου και η συμβολή σας  στην επιστημονική προσέγγιση του ζητήματος  είναι  πολύτιμη.  
Ένεκα του γεγονότος ότι δε διαμένω στην Κύπρο,  θα σας παρακαλούσα  αν φυσικά το επιτρέπει και 
το πρόγραμμα σας,  να  οργανώσουμε τη συνάντηση μας στο διάστημα από τις  3/03/2014 μέχρι 
και  τις 15/03/2014.   
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Τέλος σας  ενημερώνω ότι επισυνάπτω  το έντυπο πληροφοριών   που εκδίδεται από το 
Πανεπιστήμιο Northumbria για τους συμμετέχοντες στις συνεντεύξεις  για τη διδακτορική   μου 
διατριβή  
 
Σας ευχαριστώ εκ των προτέρων. 
 
Με τιμή,   
 
Κατερίνα Σπύρου 
(Στοιχεία επικοινωνίας)  
Katerina.spyrou@northumbria.ac.uk 
11, foundry Court 
St Peters Baisin 
Newcastele Upon Tyne 
NE6 1UG 
England 
Tel: + 00447584022325 
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Appendix 5: Prison Access Letter 
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Appendix 6: First stage of Block and File Approach  
Me: What determines the political culture in Cyprus today? 
Participant 15: Today the political environment in Cyprus is determined by public opinion. 
We listen to what the public has to say, listen to their concerns and then try to find 
substantive and operational solutions. 
Me: So we could argue that  penal policies are driven by victims and their victimhood? 
Participant 15: Yes, that is true. I am going to give you one example. Internationally, theft 
and burglary are considered to be brutal and reprehensible offences. Just try to imagine a 
stranger who invaded your space and removed from your property objects that with toil and 
blood you acquired.  This is not very nice is it? When we enact penal policies or modify 
existing legislations we keep in mind victims and how they are impacted by crime. 
Me: Generally speaking do you believe that Cypriots are more likely to be the victims or the 
offenders? 
Participant 15: Well, I am not a judge but recently I think Cypriots are more likely to become 
the victims of immigrants mainly. Property crime has been dangerously rising and the 
financial crisis has worsened the numbers of offences such as burglaries and thefts.  
Me: So, immigrants commit more offences?  
Participant 15: Without any shadow of a doubt. 
Me :In your opinion, how crucial is criminality when exploring the rise of the prison 
population? 
Participant 15: Hmm, there is no doubt that the past seven to ten years has seen a significant 
growth in the levels of crime…..crime activity and ataksia in Cyprus is alarmingly high and I 
am really concerned with its dimensions…. Since 2000, the rising level of criminality has 
been a priority in our political agenda. 
Me: In your opinion, do immigrants contribute to the growth of the prison population in 
Cyprus? 
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Participant 15: Unfortunately today their presence is dominant and suffocating… You go to 
the coffee shop the waiters are from Romania, you go to the supermarket the cashiers are 
from Georgia, you call a plumber and a Syrian appears… you feel a foreigner in your own 
country. We do not need any more dirty immigrants, we have more than enough. As long as I 
remember we have been controlled by other nations (the participant is referring to the Turkish 
invasion and the period during British colonialism)… but today we are swamped by 
immigrants… 
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Appendix 7: Second Phase of Block and File Technique 
Welfarism Crime Illegal 
Immigrants 
Racism/Xenophobia Punitiveness 
Judge 12: Of 
course we cannot 
bypass the 
correlation 
between penal 
expansion and 
welfare 
contraction. 
Welfare spending 
and welfare 
programmes are 
there to help 
those people in 
need, but when 
those 
programmes are 
limited and have 
significantly 
reduced from 
earlier years then 
yes this  has a 
direct impact on 
the prison 
population.  
 
(Judge 8): state 
provisions and 
assistance is of 
paramount 
significant when 
we are seeking to 
understand the 
reasons behind 
the escalation in 
the prison 
population. The 
purpose of social 
protection is to 
ensure that 
specific social 
groups have 
sufficient support 
regardless of the 
government in 
power at any 
Politician 20: 
well, in my 
opinion 
criminality plays 
a crucial role …. 
The prison 
population is 
rising simply 
because the 
criminal activity 
within the 
Cypriot society is 
alarmingly 
excessive …Today 
crime rates in 
Cyprus are very 
high and the 
latest crime 
figures suggest 
that we have to 
take immediate 
and drastic 
actions…… what I 
mean is time for 
us, the people 
who lead this 
country, to 
become tougher 
with criminals 
and generally 
those who pose 
as a threat to 
social order. 
 
Politician 15: 
hmm, there is no 
doubt that the 
past seven to ten 
years saw a 
significant 
growth in the 
levels of 
crime…..crime 
activity and 
ataksia in Cyprus 
Politician 15:  
Unfortunately 
today their 
presence is 
dominant and 
suffocating… 
You go to the 
coffee shop the 
waiters are from 
Romania, you go 
to the 
supermarket the 
cashiers are 
from Georgia, 
you call a 
plumber and a 
Syrian appears… 
you feel a 
foreigner in your 
own country. 
 
Politician 16: 
certainly they 
contribute……I 
challenge you to 
watch the news 
tonight …you 
will witness that 
today crimes are 
committed by 
Romanians, 
Bulgarians, 
Syrians, 
Egyptians, 
Pontiacs etc. I 
understand that 
the political 
conditions in 
these countries 
are appalling, 
but this is not 
our problem……. 
Today, in Cyprus 
we have to sort 
out our own 
Politician 15: we do 
not need any more 
dirty immigrants, 
we have more than 
enough. Since I 
remember my self 
we have been 
controlled by other 
nations (the 
participant is 
referring to the 
Turkish invasion and 
the period during 
British 
colonialism)… but 
today we are 
swamped by 
immigrants… 
 
Politician 16: they 
are threating our 
society. Those 
people are carrying 
their silly customs 
and religion with 
them, they only 
think that they 
know to do is to ask 
for work permits 
and housing 
benefits. Well, 
Cyprus today is in 
huge debts and we 
don’t necessarily 
have to support 
Muslims and 
Buddhists [ the 
participant is 
laughing 
sarcastically]…Today 
our aim should be 
the solution of the 
national problem 
and not how to get 
rid of them, in this 
Judge 7:  and off 
course an 
unnecessary 
punitiveness has 
contributed 
significantly to 
the mass 
number of 
prisoners in the 
prison today. 
The sentences 
that we have to 
impose are 
clearly more 
punitive and in 
my opinion is 
unnecessary. 
Immigrants for, 
example, that 
overstay their 
visas, I don’t 
understand why 
we have to 
impose a prison 
sentence when 
we can deport 
those people 
and put them on 
stop list in case 
they want to 
come back…. 
Party leaders 
usually are 
making populist 
statements 
aiming in my 
opinion at cheap 
sensationalism. 
 
Officer of 
Commissioner 
for 
Administration 
Office: Ethnic 
minority groups 
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time. But in 
Cyprus it has been 
proven that some 
governments 
were more 
generous in terms 
of the money 
invested in social 
protection. 
 
is alarmingly high 
and I am really 
concerned with 
its dimensions…. 
Since 2000, the 
rising level of 
criminality is a 
priority in our 
political agenda. 
 
Politician 21: no, 
crime activity in 
Cyprus has taken 
threatening 
dimensions and 
any other way of 
dealing with 
crime is not 
going to be 
effective. Crime 
rates are 
dangerously 
rising and to a 
certain extent is 
threating is every 
day….  we have 
to provide 
effective 
responses and in 
my opinion 
imprisonment is 
the best way of 
dealing with 
crime that 
increases day by 
day.  
     
Politician 19: 
during the last 
ten to fifteen 
years, criminality 
in Cyprus is 
rapidly growing. 
We are not only 
a small country 
but a divided 
nation as well, 
and the 
unfortunate rise 
problems, the 
financial crisis, 
for example, has 
caused 
extremely 
unpleasant 
financial and 
social problems 
to our people 
and I do not 
believe that we 
have to show 
any empathy to 
what is going 
around the 
Middle East or 
Eastern Europe. 
 
Politician 21: Of 
course they 
commit more 
crime than 
Cypriots. Also 
the nature of 
their crimes is 
cruel and brutal. 
For many years, 
we welcomed 
foreign people 
living and 
working 
peacefully, who 
at the same 
time showed 
respect to our 
laws and 
regulations. 
Those who 
disrespect our 
laws and 
regulations are, 
in my opinion, 
rightly placed in 
the prison. 
sense they are  not 
only threating our 
society but our 
sovereignty too. 
for, example, are 
more often the 
victims of 
punitiveness, 
from the whole 
criminal justice 
system, I mean 
police, 
courtroom, 
policies and 
prison… penal 
policy is taking 
into account the 
experiences of 
victims and 
ignores 
ostentatiously 
the 
circumstances of 
offenders. 
 
Senior counsel 
of the Republic: 
The type of 
people we see 
today in the 
prison is the 
same all over the 
world. We see 
unemployed 
people, people 
with serious 
addictions, and 
individuals with 
minimal savoir 
faire, basically 
people of lower 
class. 
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of criminality is 
complicating our 
role. Or crucial is 
to eliminate this 
kind of 
phenomena. 
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